Volume 3, March 2003
www.psljournal.com/archives/papers/drugs.cfm
Defending Against Biochemical Warfare: Ethical Issues Involving
the Coercive Use of Investigational Drugs and Biologics in the Military
William J. FitzPatrick, Ph.D.* and Lee L.
Zwanziger, Ph.D.**
* Assistant Professor in the Department
of Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; Member of
the Virginia Advisory Committee on Ethical, Legal and Social Issues in Genetic
Research
**Director of Research on the
staff of the President’s Council on Bioethics[1]
Introduction
The threat of biological or chemical warfare raises urgent
questions about how best to protect both civilian populations and military
personnel from biochemical attacks. We shall focus here on some issues that
arise specifically in the military context, with regard to prophylactic or
therapeutic administration of investigational
drugs and biologics to servicepersons--that is, drugs and biologics lacking FDA
approval for the use in question (though they may or may not be approved for
other uses). These issues came into sharp focus during U.S. missions in the
Gulf and in Bosnia, and the ethical questions arise again in the context of the
current “War on Terrorism” and (as of this writing) likely renewed military action
against Iraq. Of particular relevance are ethical concerns over the waiving of
ordinary consent requirements for the administration of investigational drugs
or biologics to protect soldiers in emergency situations.
Under current law, the President may waive the consent
requirement for “the administration of an investigational new drug or a drug
unapproved for its applied use to a member of the armed forces in connection
with the member’s participation in a particular military operation,” when it is
determined that “obtaining consent (A) is not feasible; (B) is contrary to the
best interests of the member; or (C) is not in the interests of national
security.”[2]
The nonconsensual use of investigational prophylactic or therapeutic compounds
raises important questions about the nature of the justification for such
measures, the conflict between individual autonomy and military objectives and
interests, and the relation between such innovative protective measures and
research involving human subjects.
We shall argue that despite legitimate concerns over
respecting autonomy, which do need to be addressed, certain features specific
to the military context can in principle justify the mandatory administration
of certain protective medical compounds that presently count as
“investigational” because
they lackng specific approval
for the use in question. This has largely been obscured by the grouping, for
specific for legal reasons bound up with regulatory
history, of widely disparate practices under the single heading of
“investigational” uses of drugs or biologics, which has in turn misled some
into viewing even plainly therapeutic but innovative uses of drugs as a form of
“research,” which would raise all the ethical issues associated with research
on human subjects. At a recent conference on “Bioethics and Bioterrorism,” for
example, an epidemiologist for the state of New Jersey described how “the CDC’s
prophylaxis response” to the recent anthrax contamination incidents made “many
individuals in New Jersey [feel] they were being experimented upon, rather than
prophylactically treated,” because it made “medication and vaccination
available as an ‘investigational new drug trial’.”[3]
This misperception that the use of “investigational” compounds automatically
amounts to research is perhaps understandable on the part of the general
public, and it poses certain obvious practical problems. More problematic from
a theoretical point of view, however, is that such a misperception exists also
on the part of some ethicists, including those debating the use of
investigational compounds in the military.[4]
In this way, conceptual artifacts of regulatory evolution have, we believe,
tended to distort thinking about the ethical issues, which should not rely as
heavily as it often does on contingent legal categories such as
“investigational” uses. If we are clear about the ethically relevant
distinctions between research and treatment, as discussed below, then it will
be clear that waiving the consent requirement for certain “investigational”
treatments in combat situations need not
amount to coerced participation in research.
Some of the perceived difficulty here may be avoided simply
through certain regulatory modifications. For example, the FDA has recently
amended its rules to allow for the approval of some potentially life-saving
drugs and biologics without requiring the usual human efficacy studies, in cases where it would be clearly unethical to
carry out such studies; animal efficacy studies may now suffice in certain
circumstances (in conjunction with human safety
studies).[5]
This "animal efficacy rule" allows for the possibility of moving some
hitherto "investigational" compounds into the category of approved drugs or biologics, which would
also obviate the need in such cases for a special Presidential waiver of the
consent requirement for the administration of such compounds: their use could
be ordered by commanding officers just as use of the Influenza vaccine may be,
for example. This change in status has in fact just occurred in the case of
pyridostigmine bromide (discussed below in connection with the Gulf War), which
was approved for combat use on 5 February 2003; it need not therefore be administered any longer as part of an
investigational new drug trial, with all of the labeling and documentation
requirements that involves--requirements that
may be impractical in combat situations. Alternatively, some have argued
instead for a new FDA product category, such as "Licensed for
Contingency," to permit military contingency use of what have so far been
investigational products.[6]
Again, such an approach would avoid giving any misimpression of coerced
participation in research, by avoiding the pairing of the “investigational”
label with a waiver of consent: if the compound is licensed for contingency
use, then such use by the military will not be "investigational.”
With suitable oversight, such steps may well be the best
practical course for both securing effective protection for troops and
mitigating negative public perception: they would eliminate the burden of
operating under clinical trial requirements for "investigational"
products in battle conditions, eliminate (what we shall argue are)
misperceptions about coerced participation in research, and also eliminate the
tipping off of adversaries that would likely result from use of the specific
Presidential waiver of consent for "investigational" products in time
to make them effective. At bottom, however, the very same fundamental ethical issues need to be addressed,
whether we are talking about waiving the consent requirement for the use of
“investigational” products or about measures to reclassify these products so as
to allow for their nonconsensual administration as standard treatment. And in
any case, despite recent changes in FDA rules, there may
be other compounds of potential military
importance that remain "investigational," so that the issue of
waiving consent for investigational compounds remains a live issue. We shall
therefore stick to this question, and argue in part that such waiving of
consent in the administration of certain "investigational" products
in military contexts may sometimes be justified at least in principle.
It is, however, important to be clear about the nature of
this justification, which is compatible with respect for persons only because
it is not ultimately paternalistic in
the way it is sometimes portrayed as being. Moreover, we will argue that there
are further conditions that must be met if such nonconsensual administration of
investigational drugs or biologics is to be properly justified. In particular,
a reasonable and ethically significant surrogate must be found for the autonomy
that is being forfeited, such that proper respect for persons is maintained.
(Again, this is equally true on the alternative approach, where autonomy is
simply forfeited in a different way, i.e. through reclassifying a use as non-investigational so that it can be
mandated in the way other approved
treatments already are.) Typical justifications do not go far enough in this
respect, and they also tend to miss an important point about proportionality
that likewise needs to be stressed. We will suggest ways to remedy those
shortcomings, so that the military’s goal of both effectively protecting all
its personnel and promoting its objectives can be achieved in a way that is
consistent with the
ideal of respect for individuals.
Competing Levels of
Interest
The major problems specific to the military context arise
from the tension between the person who has volunteered as an autonomous
individual to undertake the role responsibilities of military service, and the
military institution, which must in large part treat service members
collectively in order to accomplish its objectives. On one hand, the moral
sensibilities and laws of the civilian society from which the volunteers come
tend to regard the individual as the primary unit of concern in medical
decisions involving participation in research or treatment.[7]
This is not to deny that utilitarian considerations play an important role in
some medical decisions, as with the mandatory vaccination of public school
children; nor is it to deny that individuals may bear some social
responsibility for the state of their own health, given the extent to which
lifestyle decisions affect health, which in turn affects health care costs that
are in part borne collectively.[8]
The focus, however, is generally on individual autonomy concerning medical
interventions directly affecting one’s own body, as having general priority
over any collective interest in the health of the individual.
In the military context, on the other hand, while it is true
that “servicemen and women do not subordinate themselves entirely to the
‘mission’ or to the welfare of their fellows,”[9]
they have volunteered to take on both the special risks and the special duties
of military service. So although they enjoy similar rights and protections with
regard to participation in research in military laboratories, they are subject
to mandatory standard vaccinations, physical examination and reasonable
treatment “to protect the health and overall effectiveness of the command as well
as the health of the soldier.”[10]
The special element of collective interest that is a structural part of the
military makes it importantly different from the civilian context, though it is
worth noting that such a compelling level of collective interest is not
altogether without parallel in civilian society. For while normally adult
civilians are not compelled to submit to medical interventions as
servicepersons are, they have been so compelled under special circumstances, as
during an epidemic of a dangerous disease. In Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the
Supreme Court famously upheld the constitutionality of legally mandated
vaccination for smallpox where this was deemed necessary for public health,
noting that the Court had already “distinctly recognized the authority of a
State to enact quarantine laws and ‘health laws of every description’."[11]
The general reasoning in the opinion delivered by Justice Harlan is relevant to
our present discussion:
There are manifold restraints to which every person is
necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis organized society
could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each
one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy.
Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which
recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in
respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be
done to others.
. . .[Thus,] in every
well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its
members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times,
under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be
enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may
demand.
This reasoning is meant to be very general, and when applied
to civilian society in ordinary circumstances it still leaves the vast majority
of health care decisions to individuals. But when applied to the military, the
element of collective interest in the health of individual members becomes far
more pervasive. Servicepersons take on their duties as part of a hierarchical
organization of mutually dependent individuals prepared to risk life and limb
together for the sake of collective military objectives. Since the organization
exists to achieve certain collective outcomes, and individuals volunteer to
join the organization knowing that they will be taking on responsibility for facilitating
those objectives with fellow service members who depend on them for success and
safety, each service member is responsible for maintaining his or her
combat-readiness—both for the sake of the military objectives and for the
safety of fellow service members.[12]
Because of the collective nature of military action, the
management of risk to personnel and the promotion of military ends must be
coordinated by commanding officers, and would often be hindered by a policy
allowing for individual exceptions based on personal preference. Therefore,
where there is an imminent threat of biochemical warfare, for example, there is
an obvious corporate-level interest in ensuring that all members are protected
as well as possible—given available information and medical technology—from the
relevant biological or chemical agents. Indeed, “if servicepersons who refused
to grant consent were permitted to enter combat without these protections, not
only would they face increased and unnecessary risks themselves, they would
also imperil other servicepersons insofar as the risk becomes actual, disabling
harm, and also thereby diminish the likelihood of the military’s succeeding [in
its mission].”[13] (We will
return to consider this argument in more depth later.)
What makes the case of “investigational” compounds more
complicated and difficult than ordinary cases of protection, however, is that
it goes beyond the use of drugs or vaccinations that have been approved for the
specific contexts and purposes in question. In the Gulf War, for example, U.S.
troops were ordered to take Nerve Agent Protection Packs of pyridostigmine
bromide (PB) in anticipation of possible exposure to soman from Iraqi chemical
weapons. While this drug already had an established use for the clinical treatment
of myasthenia gravis (at dosages much higher
than that prescribed for troops for protective purposes), PB had not been
approved for military uses on the basis of substantial evidence of efficacy in
human trials. Thus, it fell into the regulatory category of “investigational”
use (though as noted earlier, this has just recently changed). The same was
true of the use of the botulinum toxoid (BT) vaccine, which had established
uses in certain occupational settings, but was not human tested for efficacy or
approved for the military use in question. Again, such use of investigational
compounds raised special concerns for many, echoed by the ongoing concerns of
some service members over the implementation of the Anthrax Vaccine
Immunization Program (AVIP), intended to vaccinate all service personnel in
response to a threat of weaponized Bacillus
anthracis.[14]
In the case of PB, questions about the safety and efficacy
of such investigational use arose in light of uncertainty about how it might
interact with nerve agents other than soman which might equally have been
encountered by troops engaged in operations against Iraq.[15]
This led to general questions about whether the military’s right to coercive
administration of what it believes to be reasonable protective measures should
extend to such cases of investigational medical intervention. The U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) argued that it should, and negotiated with the FDA
to develop grounds for a policy allowing the Military to mandate wide
administration of PB and BT. The DoD’s arguments for the necessity of
protecting the troops collectively, and the impossibility of seeking informed
consent individually (let alone honoring refusals), were important in the
development of an interim rule issued by the FDA to permit the investigational
use of the compounds in the military context—and to waive the consent
requirement where it was judged not feasible to obtain consent.[16]
Again, the possibility of such a waiver of the consent requirement is now
provided for by law, but it raises important questions. Does this amount to
treating service personnel as human research
subjects without their consent? Is it a dehumanizing failure to respect their
autonomy? It is to these issues that we now turn, with the aim of showing that mandatory
administration of investigational compounds need not amount to anything like
coerced participation in research, and that if
certain conditions are met, it can be done in a way that does not fail to show
proper respect for human autonomy.
Treatment, Innovation
and Research
When the FDA approves drugs or biologics for marketing, it
approves them relative to a given indication, which is limited by the
population and conditions in which safety and effectiveness were experimentally
assessed. After an approval, licensed physicians may use the product according
to their professional judgment in individual cases, not limited to the labeled
indication—a practice referred to as “off-label” use. Any deviation from the
population, condition or dosage set out in the approved product labeling
constitutes off-label use. If the manufacturer wishes to market the product for
a new use (for example, for children in addition to adults, or for treating a
different type of condition), then the company must undertake clinical research
and submit supplementary studies supporting the safety and effectiveness of the
product in the new conditions. But physicians may prescribe whatever legal
products they deem appropriate for the particular patient.
Off-label use is a normal and ethical part of good medical
practice. What is distinctive about the sort of off-label use we are
considering in the military is that (i) it is applied to a collective body
rather than to an individual patient, and (ii) the decision to administer is
driven not solely by the aim of treatment for each individual patient as such,
but also by (a) the interests of fellow service members who depend on the
fitness of that individual, and (b) the military’s interest in maintaining the
collective combat-readiness of the troops for the sake of the military
objective. This is significant for at least two reasons. First, the adoption of
an off-label use as a matter of policy to apply to a collective body is
importantly different from the case-by-case exercise of professional judgment
by an individual physician with regard to an individual patient—which is why
the U.S. military services are not ordinarily allowed to employ off-label use
in the practice of medicine on a large scale. Second, in those special circumstances
where a product is used in a manner that departs from its labeled indication,
the appeal to the above collective concerns, over and above the individual’s
own welfare as such, might be construed as implying a lack of respect for the
dignity of individual servicepersons. This impression is likely to be
compounded where the consent requirement is waived, so that the individual may
be left feeling “that he has become a ‘guinea pig’ in a grotesque experiment,”
coerced into serving as a human subject for utilitarian medical research.[17]
The dignity of the individual—the fact that “though a mere ‘number’ to the High
Command, he is not a token and not a thing”—might seem to be lost in such a
scenario.[18]
It is a mistake, however, to infer from the fact that a medical
intervention is innovative—i.e. involves use of a compound that is classified
for legal purposes as
“investigational”—that it must therefore constitute research in an ethically
relevant sense, and that waiving consent thus amounts to coercive use of troops
as human research subjects. And it is a mistake to infer, from the fact that
the purpose of the intervention is not solely
the benefit of the individual patient as such, that the patient’s dignity is
not being respected. While a host of jokes from every war testifies that these
points may often not be apparent to recruits,
they are crucial for the project of ethical justification, and for clearly
setting such cases as the mandatory administration of PB in the Gulf apart from
the sort of abuse condemned in Nuremberg.
To begin with, treatment with an investigational product
differs from research proper in the principle
aim of the activity and in the
different structures imposed by that aim.[19]
The relevance of intent is well recognized in the Belmont Report—the influential statement of ethical principles and
guidelines produced by the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.[20]
The report specifies that while the “purpose of medical or behavioral practice
is to provide diagnosis, preventive treatment or therapy to particular
individuals [or groups of individuals],” research aims instead “to test an
hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or
contribute to generalizable knowledge.”[21]
Thus, “the fact that a procedure is ‘experimental,’ in the sense of new,
untested or different, does not automatically place it in the category of
research.” As Hans Jonas noted in the context of a single physician-patient
relationship:
As long as a doctor can say, even if only in his own
thought: “There is no known cure for your condition (or: you have responded to
none); but there is promise in a new treatment still under investigation, not
quite tested yet as to effectiveness and safety; you will be taking a chance,
but all things considered, I judge it in your best interest to let me try it on
you”—as long as he can speak thus, he speaks as the patient’s physician and may
err, but does not transform the patient in to a subject of experimentation.[22]
In the context of large-scale off-label use of drugs or
biologics, as in the use of PB or BT to protect troops during the Gulf War, the
matter is slightly complicated by the fact that an aim of knowledge does enter
the picture: for presumably if it is at all feasible to gather data on adverse
effects of such treatment, then efforts should be made to do so for the sake of
improving safety for possible future uses. This aim of knowledge acquisition,
however, need not change the essential nature of the activity, and it will not
do so as long as it remains secondary
in the relevant sense. The principle here is this:
If the aim of prevention or therapy
constitutes a sufficient reason for a
certain intervention—as in the above example, where the concern to protect
troops was sufficiently compelling quite apart from any furtherance of
research, and would have been done even if the data gathering had been
impossible or ineffective—then the intervention falls under the category of
treatment rather than research.
The existence of a secondary
aim of gaining knowledge, as of adverse effects, no more transforms such an
activity into research, in any ethically significant sense, than a secondary
aim of learning about the deleterious side-effects of chemotherapy (in order to
improve treatments in the future) transforms that activity from therapy into
research.
An innovative, off-label intervention may thus count as
“investigational” for legal purposes, and even have a contingent secondary aim
of data-gathering, while still plainly being done with the primary and
sufficient aim of treatment or protection; and in such a case, while we may
wish to qualify its description by calling it “innovative treatment,” it is
just misleading to group recipients of such treatment with human subjects of
research. One obvious reason is that the design of a research study, unlike
clinical medical practice, includes the use of controls. This reflects honestgenuine ignorance
of the outcome, acknowledging the possibility of spurious associations,
previously unrecognized common causes, etc., in a principal effort to advance knowledge rather than to protect or to
treat all participants. By contrast,
the protective use of PB and BT in the Gulf War was not part of some general
research study involving controls, but was aimed specifically at treating all troops at risk of attack involving
biochemical weapons. And this makes its nature—as treatment rather than research—clear.
It is instructive to contrast this sort of case with a clear
example of something that does clearly count as military research on defense mechanisms relation to biochemical threats.
Operation Whitecoat was a series of experiments on human subjects carried out
in the U.S. between 1954 and 1973. The subjects were Seventh Day Adventists who
were conscientious objectors and served in non-combat positions of various
sorts, including service as test subjects. They were told about each
experiment, and after a period of some days to consider the details and to ask
questions, they were then asked to provide informed consent if they still
wished to participate. (Recruits could be conscientious objectors without
joining Operation Whitecoat, and even then could decline particular protocols,
so that there was no obvious coercion to participate.[23])
The subjects were also told they would be cared for if taken ill, and while
some did become ill, no subjects died during the operation or later of causes
attributed to it. The work involved testing, by direct exposure, the efficacy
of vaccines and therapies for a variety of infectious diseases thought to be
likely risks from biological weapons attacks, and the trials were run under
controlled conditions. In other words, the trials were explicitly carried out
as research, not in any sense as preventive or therapeutic treatment for the
participants, setting this sort of case—with its sole aim of advancing
knowledge—clearly apart from cases involving the protection of troops in combat
situations.
The absolute requirement for free and informed consent in
any such research project aimed at producing generalizable knowledge and not
treatment may be taken as given. But when the issue
is not such research, but instead the coordinated effort to protect troops in
combat from biochemical attacks, then the use
of innovative treatments where there is no satisfactory alternative need not in
itself compromise the ethical principles at issue—even where consent is not
obtained because this might be unfeasible. Indeed, it is the very same concern for persons that
largely justifies, at least in principle, the call for potentially innovative
uses of drugs and biologics in combat exigencies. As noted before, this is not
the whole story, because the concern is not solely with the individual’s health
for its own sake, but also with his or her fitness the sake of others who depend on it; and even the
collective well-being is viewed by the military as important not only
intrinsically but also for the sake of the military objectives in question. But
the existence of these further instrumental interests in the individual’s
well-being does not undermine the fact that the administration of the compound is being done to protect the individual,
rather than to use him or her as an unwitting “research subject”: it is simply
that in a military context this aim is pursued for multiple reasons, rather than only
for the sake of the individual as such. If those further reasons are legitimate
ones, as must in general be possible unless we
reject the institution of the military itself as inherently illegitimate, then
they need not contribute to any disrespect for the individual who is being
protected (though they may, if the
various considerations are not properly balanced according to reasonable
standards of proportionality, as discussed further below). It is thus plainly
an exaggeration to suggest, for example, that mandatory innovative treatment
measures necessarily “treat servicepersons as nonpersons, obliterating their
individuality and rendering them fungible.”[24]
Such measures instead treat them precisely as servicepersons—persons who have voluntarily (in the U.S. at
present) given up a measure of autonomy with respect to certain decisions in
order to facilitate the cooperative achievement of certain objectives.
It is important, then, to distinguish between oplausible off-label
uses of approved compounds in
the practice of medicine, characterized by the primary and
sufficient aim of preventive or therapeutic treatment, on one hand, and various
forms of research, characterized by
such primary and sufficient aims as the testing of hypotheses and the
advancement of general knowledge, as through the use of controlled studies.
Both of these may fall under the general legal
or regulatory category of
“investigational” uses, but the deep differences in intent, justification and
structure warrant their careful separation for purposes of ethical assessment. Whether a product counts as investigational or
not can turn on something as specific as whether it has been shipped across
state lines for a purpose other than the labeled indication—something that is
legally significant, perhaps, but not of any obvious ethical significance to the recipient.
Similarly, a drug’s investigational status may just be largely a result of the
fact that few manufacturers identify the military as a potential market
justifying the expense and risk of product development—so that “prevention of
effects from biochemical weapons in military service” is not, in any event,
likely to appear as an indication on the labels of many approved products.[25]
But again, it is a mistake to allow such factors and related regulatory
categories to determine our thinking about the relevant ethical concerns,
questions and distinctions.
A good example of this tendency to conflate regulatory and
ethical categories and concerns may be found in Annas and Grodin’s argument
that the military’s use of PB, for example, could not relevantly count as treatment. They note that the DoD
“recognized [such] products as investigational when it requested an exemption
to use them without its troops’ consent,” and they find it contradictory “that
the DoD needs a special exemption from its own research regulations to provide treatment
for its troops”; for “if treatment were really at stake, no exemption and no
consent would be required: the U.S. military can treat its troops at will
because they have an obligation to remain fit.”[26]
But this is simply to beg the question against their opponents, assuming
without argument that “treatment” in the
ethically relevant sense must be understood simply in relation to actual
regulatory stipulations, so that nothing that might require a special exemption
for particular reasons can possibly count as treatment. But one can surely
grant that a product has the legal
status of being “investigational,” so that its use requires a special exemption
as a matter of regulatory fact, without denying that for purposes of ethical assessment it is a case of
treatment—any ethical concerns arising only insofar as the specific reasons for
its investigational status are ethically significant.
There is thus no obvious reason, if we are careful to keep
regulatory and ethical categories distinct, to conclude as Annas and Grodin do
that “it is the experimental or investigational nature of the intervention, not
the intent of the physician or researcher, that determines whether or not an
intervention is research or therapy,” and hence determines what ethical
standards are appropriate for evaluating it. Indeed, our point has been that the the “investigational”
nature of an intervention by itself determines very little, and that the aim of the intervention along with other
features of the context—such as the imminent threat of combat, the real need
for protection and the absence of comparably effective alternatives—are crucial
for determining how we should think ethically about the intervention in
question. As one study concludes, the term “investigational” is “a term without
precise meaning. It does not demarcate the boundary between research and
treatment with a bright orange line. Rather, it constitutes a gray zone in
which most of the activity is research, much of the activity involves both
research and treatment, and some activity is solely treatment.”[27]
Or we might say that it is a term that has a precise legal meaning but a vague
operational meaning, as products in this category can be in significantly
different stages of development, reflecting how well they are understood and
the different purposes for which they are administered, all of which makes for
varying degrees of ethical significance. The point, then, is that the
investigational uses we are discussing—in connection with protecting troops
against threats of biochemical weapons—are clearly not research studies, but
amount to what might be called “innovative
preventive or therapeutic treatment” under special circumstances that are already recognized to justify other
forms of nonconsensual preventive or health-promoting treatment.[28]
This is not to deny, however, that there remain special
concerns here, particularly with regard to preventive
treatment, due to the greater uncertainty surrounding such innovative uses and
the increased limitation of personal autonomy that is entailed by waiving the
consent requirement. We shall consider these issues in the next two sections,
and also return to examine more fully the justification for nonconsensual
administration of investigational compounds in certain circumstances.
Innovative Preventive
Medicine
Preventive medicine in general raises its own set of ethical
concerns, due to the fact that preventive interventions are carried out on
presently healthy patients or populations. To foreseeably cause suffering in
the course of treatment for a condition from which a patient is already suffering is regrettable, but
it is distinctly problematic foreseeably to put healthy persons at risk of
suffering, as from side-effects or complications of preventive medicine. It has
also been suggested by critics of “medicalization” that the treatment of
healthy persons may foster unnecessary anxiety, and perhaps even the feeling of
obligation to submit to such medical intervention in light of thoughts
mentioned earlier about responsibility to others for one’s own health.[29]
The last concern is less problematic for military personnel
than for civilians, because service members are already obligated to submit to
medical intervention. But questions about the risk of the intervention itself
in a healthy patient or population certainly remain. Obviously this needs to be
balanced against the risk to be avoided by means of the intervention, taking
into account both its severity and the likelihood of its occurrence. For most
civilians in the continental U.S., for example, a typhoid immunization, which
may result in soreness and systemic illness, is not warranted, though that will
change with plans to travel to areas of greater typhoid risk. Our topic here,
however, is the protection of troops who face significant risk of attack
involving biochemical weapons—in connection, for example, with operations against
an enemy that has used such weapons in the past—where the severity of harm
would likely be very high. This makes the case for preventive measures
correspondingly strong, at least insofar as the risks of the treatment are
outweighed by the risks in the absence of it.[30]
One special difficulty, however, about the use of such
preventive interventions in this context—even where individual consent is
respected—is that service members will tend to lack both the expertise and the
access to information that would be necessary for full participation in threat
assessment. This naturally imposes a heavier responsibility on officers and
members of relevant institutional review boards (IRBs), who are cleared for the
information and do participate in that assessment. And this is obviously all
the more true where consent is waived and the decision is made for service members by others.
A serious ethical worry here is that there may be a bias
among commanding officers toward using any available preventive medicine to
maximize the short term fitness of troops for the sake of present military
objectives, without sufficient regard for the long term welfare of individual
servicepersonstroops. Suppose, for example, that in
order to keep troops fit for the sake of a certain mission, a drug were administered
to protect them from certain temporarily disabling but not otherwise serious
effects of some disease or agent they might encounter. Such a use may well be
unethical if the mission were of comparably
little importance and there were substantial
uncertainty about the long term adverse affects of the drug. Proportionality matters here as
elsewhere, and if individuals are not given the right to make informed
decisions about such matters, this places a very heavy ethical burden indeed on
those to whom the decision-making falls—particularly the IRBs responsible for
informing and reviewing such decisions.
The ethical legitimacy of such nonconsensual and innovative
medical interventions will thus turn not only on the existence of a suitable
risk/benefit analysis, but on the proper functioning of a suitably constituted
IRB that takes the full range of considerations—including the intrinsic value
of service members’ long term welfare—into account and balances them
appropriately in determining whether or not such measures are appropriate on
given occasions.[31] We imagine a range of
possible scenarios, including (a) cases where the IRB might recommend a particular
compound appropriate for mandated administration without further restriction, (b) cases where the
compound might be deemed fit for mandated administration but only to service
members to be
deployed to a particular high risk mission, (c) cases where the
compound is
of such uncertain efficacy in the particular situation that might be offered only
with (perhaps
verbal) consent, and finally, (d) cases where so
little is known about the compound that its only proper use would
be in controlled
research
situations. And part of the proper functioning of such an IRB is its
being sufficiently respected by the military to be allowed to do its job
effectively. If,
for instance, the IRB were to advise that the compound were in one of the
latter two categories and the military were to override this recommendation and
mandate administration anyway, one might expect disciplinary problems among some service
members and
a wider erosion of trust in senior military decision-makers. WWithout effective
and balanced ethical oversight in place it is doubtful that such limitations on
individual autonomy can be ethically justified, as there is simply too much
room for decisions to be made with too little weight given to individual
welfare as such, and too much given to short term fitness for the sake of other
objectives.
The Argument for
Waiving Consent
Let us return to the argument for waiving the consent
requirement, in certain circumstances, for the use of an investigational drug
or biologic in order to protect troops at risk of encountering biochemical
weapons. Military medicine is obviously paternalistic in the sense that doctors
possess the right to make medical decisions for service members where
established preventive or therapeutic treatments are involved. But it is
important to see that the justification for paternalism in this sense is not merely the thought that this is in the individual’s best interest, which
latter is a more specific notion of paternalism. Indeed, the latter sort of
paternalism—making decisions for an individual simply because it is in his or
her best interest as an individual—has
no more place in a military context than it does elsewhere, and would be
equally insulting to the individual.
What justifies the compromised autonomy in the military
context, as we observed earlier, is the fact that the individual is part of a
cooperative group of individuals who depend heavily on each other both for the
achievement of their corporate-level military goals and for their very safety.
An individual’s heath is not merely his or her own concern, but the concern of
those whose lives may depend on it, and of those who are responsible both for
protecting the unit and for carrying out the relevant objectives.[32]
This is not a paternalistic justification in relation to the individual, as
with the justification of a parent’s healthcare decision-making on behalf of a
child, but an other-regarding justification in relation to fellow service
members and to the mission the individual has pledged to serve.
The appeal to “the best interests of the member” in U.S. law
governing the waiving of the consent requirement is therefore somewhat
misleading: it is doubtful that one can justify coercive medical intervention
in the case of a person of sound mind, by appeal to his or her own welfare
itself.[33]
The commanding officers’ duty to protect servicepersons does not plausibly
imply a paternalistic duty to protect individuals from themselves, as it were,
e.g. where someone might prefer to forego a vaccination that the military
believes is in his or her best interest. It rather involves the protection of
servicepersons as members of a body of mutually dependent individuals, so that
if an individual is ordered vaccinated against his or her will, the reason is
not simply that this is judged best for that person, but that it is judged of
sufficient importance to the safety of fellow service members and to the
carrying out of the mission. And the structure of this justification is the
same whether we are discussing the nonconsensual administration of a standard
vaccine or a special nonconsensual administration of an investigational vaccine
through a waiver of the usual consent requirement for such compounds.
By clarifying the non-paternalistic nature of the
justification for nonconsensual medical intervention, we can better see that
such intervention need not involve any failure to respect the dignity of the
individual. A paternalistic justification—where a military doctor orders a
serviceperson to submit to an intervention for his or her own good simply as an individual—would arguably fail to
show respect for the individual’s autonomy to make his or her own decisions on
matters that simply affect him or her
individually. But a justification that appeals to the individual’s duties to
fellow service members and to commanding officers does not similarly denigrate
his or her autonomy: for though it implies limitations in the scope of the
individual’s exercise of autonomy,
those limits are justified by the weight of the competing considerations in the
special context of the military organization, and not by any denial of his or
her decision-making capacities.
Having said that, however, it is important not to understate
the significance of such limitations in the scope of the exercise of autonomy.
Howe and Martin argue that the principle of respect
for persons that is normally satisfied through protecting autonomous
decision-making may instead be satisfied in the present context simply by
“maintaining the military’s explicit and implicit promise to servicepersons to
protect them from unnecessary harm,” along with providing servicepersons with
information about the investigational compounds they are being ordered to take.[34]
This position would in principle be supported by their claim that “the
serviceperson freely agrees when joining the military to relinquish individual
autonomy” to various degrees under various circumstances. For that free
agreement is itself an exercise of
autonomy, tying later limitations in the exercise of autonomy to a legitimate
autonomous act of the individual. The problem, however, is that as things in
fact stand, the free agreement to which they appeal here is far too broad to
support their position satisfactorily.
Recruits certainly understand that they are forfeiting some
autonomy when they enlist, and that they may be ordered into dangerous and even
life-threatening situations. But even an agreement to accept orders to put
one’s very life on the line in certain circumstances does not entail an
agreement to forfeit one’s autonomy generally. No one thinks that because a
recruit is willing to be ordered into battle he or she has therefore indicated
a willingness also to be ordered to participate in dangerous research studies,
or to donate an organ to a fellow soldier—even if the risks of such activities
are lower than those of the
battlefield. Now we have argued that under certain circumstances there is ultimately justification for
nonconsensual medical interventions involving compounds not approved for the
use in question. But we cannot simply assume that a recruit understands this to be implied as part
of the sacrifice of autonomy. Such a possibility will never even occur to many
recruits at the time of enlistment, when they may have only a vague
understanding of what forms of autonomy they are or are not forfeiting. Yet if
the autonomous decision to enlist is to make up for specific later limitations
in the exercise of autonomy, then clearly that decision must be made with an
awareness of those limitations—at
least where especially significant forms of autonomy are involved, such as a
say in what is done to one’s own body in the name of medicine. At present,
there is nothing we are aware of in the enlistment documents for the armed
forces of the United States that calls a recruit’s attention to the issue of
possible nonconsensual use of investigational medical interventions.
We suggest that appropriate respect for persons as
autonomous agents can be shown only if good faith efforts are made to inform
recruits of at least the central forms of autonomy they are freely
subordinating when they enlist, so that the latter act allows for a meaningful
tracing of later possible limitations in the exercise of autonomy to the
agent’s own informed, autonomous decision. This idea has been discussed under
the heading of “anticipatory consent,”
which could in fact take place at various stages, such as recruitment, basic
training, or just before a deployment where nonconsensual use of
investigational compounds is likely to become an issue.[35]
Obviously such anticipatory consent at the time of recruitment would be very
limited in detail, but
this is the stage where the explanation of the new relationship within
which the medical intervention might be ordered is appropriate. Limitations on
the expression of autonomy can be less of an affront to the dignity of the
individual as an autonomous agent if he or she has earlier made an informed
autonomous decision to take the risk of being placed in such a position of
diminished exercise of autonomy.
This would not not—indeed could not—require
a detailed knowledge, at the time of recruitment, of what biochemical agents
are likely to be encountered where, what investigational drugs or biologics are
likely to be used, with what risks, and so on. But there is no reason that
recruits in the U.S., for example, could not be made explicitly aware of the
provisions of section 1107f of Title 10 of the United States Code (described
earlier), just as they are made aware of the relevant regulations concerning
illegal drug use, and similarly required to indicate their understanding and
acceptance of it; this would constitute an explicit agreement to receive
investigational interventions as ordered, should that circumstance arise. It is
doubtful that such a practice in connection with enlistment would place an
undue burden on the military or significantly hurt recruitment, given (i) that
recruits are already willing to put themselves in potentially lethal danger,
(ii) that the prospect of such nonconsensual interventions with investigational
compounds is restricted to particular military operations where they would be
in danger in any case, and (iii) that those compounds are, in the best available
medical judgment,plausibly their best protection.
What might hurt recruiting is the perception that the
military would be likely to make such decisions in a way that failed to give
proper weight to servicepersons’ long term welfare, as discussed earlier. But
if the military is worried about this perception, that is simply further reason
to guarantee that there is sufficient and effective oversight by an appropriately
constituted IRB, and to make this known to the public and to recruits. If
servicepersons are already willing to trust their commanding officers with
their lives, there is no reason they will not equally be willing explicitly to
consent to this subordination of autonomy in relation to medical interventions,
as long as the above conditions are met. The real concern about this proposal
is a different one: namely, that the anticipatory consent could easily become just another
form to sign, of little apparent importance at the time and hence of little real
significance.
We could avoid this however, by treating it as an essential part of the explanation
of the individual’s relationship with the military, and the
reasons behind the sacrifices he or she is being asked to make.
Conclusion
We have argued that in circumstances where troops are faced
with a threat of attack involving biochemical weapons, and the best protection
for them appears to be a uniform intervention using an investigational
compound, then the military’s duty to protect its troops may justify
nonconsensual use of such a compound. Such justification requires a careful
distinction between treatment (including innovative preventive treatment) and
research, and between paternalistic and non-paternalistic rationales for
nonconsensual treatment. When the relevant points are kept clearly in mind,
such nonconsensual interventions may be seen to be compatible with respect for
persons as autonomous individuals (even where the scope of their exercise of
autonomy is necessarily restricted), and to bear no problematic resemblance to
the use of servicepersons as involuntary human subjects of research.
In order fully to satisfy the requirement of respect for
persons, however, the possible limitations in autonomy must be traceable back
to an informed, autonomous decision on the part of each individual to forfeit
such forms of autonomy in such circumstances. This is a condition that does not
presently appear to be built into recruitment practice in the U.S., and yet
seems important to the proper justification of waiving the consent requirement
for the use of investigational compounds. Moreover, the latter can be justified
in practice only insofar as certain ethical hazards are carefully guarded
against by a suitably constituted and effective IRB, whose functioning is not
hindered by military command. Finally, despite the existence of a sound
justification for waiving the consent requirement for the use of
investigational drugs or biologics under certain circumstances, it may well be
that a better approach is to modify regulatory practices, as by adding a
special category (or range of categories) of licensing for such particular uses
as the protection of troops from biochemical weapons, so that the special waiving
of consent for investigational compounds needn’t arise. Our primary concern
here, however, has been to illuminate the ethical issues surrounding the
nonconsensual administration of such compounds for the sake of protecting
military personnel, however exactly those compounds are categorized for
regulatory purposes.[36]
[1] The opinions expressed herein are the author's and
may not reflect those of current or former employers.
[2] United States Code, Title 10 (Armed Forces), Subtitle
A (General Military Law), Section 1107f (henceforth 10 U.S.C. 1107, etc.).
[3] From the report by B. Garland, on the “Bioethics and
Bioterrorism” conference at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., 28
February 2002, in The Journal of
Philosophy, Science and Law, Vol. 2, March 2002.
[4] See G.J. Annas and M.A. Grodin, "Commentary. The Hastings Center Report (March-April
1991): 24-27, which will be critically discussed below.
[5] Federal Register, May 31, 2002; 67(105): 37988-98.
[6] This case has been pressed by Arthur O. Anderson, M.D., , Chief, Department of
Pathology and Office of Human Use and Ethics, and Chairman of USAMRIID
Human Use Committee, Fort Detrick, first in a memorandum to U.S.
Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (6 December 1994) and a letter to
Mary K. Pendergast, J.D., Deputy Commissioner and Senior Advisor to the
Commissioner, FDA (26 October 1995), and more recently in a memo (11 October
2002) described in a Bureau of National Affairs report entitled “Human Subject
Protection Army Researchers’ Plan Seeks Exemption From FDA Experimental Product
Safety Rules,” Medical Research Law and Policy
Report, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 56 (15 January 2003). It appears, however, that
the FDA is instead moving more in the direction of a "Streamlined
IND" process that would speed up the approval process for products
relevant to protection against biochemical or nuclear warfare. This has already
been used in the re-licensing of the smallpox vaccine, for example.
[7] In the wake of increasing concern over terrorism,
however, there may be some pressure toward at least incremental shifts away
from such emphasis on the individual. See J.D. Moreno, "Bioethics after
the Terror," American Journal of
Bioethics, 2:1 (2002): 60-64.
[8] See R. Bayer, "Voluntary Health Risks and Public
Policy," The Hastings Center Report
(October 1981): 26.
[9] Annas and Grodin, "Commentary,” 25.
[10] Army Command Policy, AR600-20, 5-4: “Command Aspects
of Medical Care,” b2.
[11] Jacobson v. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S. Ct. 358 (Mass. 1905).
[12] On the concept of role responsibilities, which may
extend well beyond any list of enumerated duties, see G. Dworkin, "Taking
Risks, Assessing Responsibility," The
Hastings Center Report (October 1981): 26-31.
[13] E.G. Howe and E.D. Martin, "Treating the
Troops," The Hastings Center Report
(March-April 1991): 21-24, at 23.
[14] Anthrax was until recently an occupational disease of
agricultural and textile workers. The anthrax vaccine marketed in the U.S. was
first approved in 1970 and the indication on the labeling was “…individuals who
may come in contact with animal products such as hides, hair or bones which
come from anthrax endemic areas…individuals engaged in diagnostic or
investigational activities which may bring them into contact…[and] high risk
person such as veterinarians….” Further, vaccines must usually be approved for
release on a lot by lot basis, even when the manufacturer is in full
compliance, and the manufacturer of the U.S. licensed anthrax vaccine
experienced a series of setbacks in achieving compliance with good
manufacturing practices (see L.M. Joellenbeck, et al., Institute of Medicine
report: The Anthrax Vaccine: Is it Safe?
Does it Work? Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2002). So concerns
were raised both about the use of the vaccine in combat conditions and about
the lots of vaccine available. Finally, although we deal here only with defense
against biochemical threats, some similar issues arise with the military use of
certain vaccines for naturally occurring conditions in a particular locale. For
example, immunization of troops stationed in Bosnia against tick-borne
encephalitis (TBE) again raised concerns because the product, manufactured
by an Austrian company and approved in EuropeAustria,
had never been approved in the U.S., where TBE does not occur. See:
http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/usammda/info335.pdf
and http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/library/randrep/mr1018.9.chap2.html
*REF,
letter, see also recent IOM REPORT)
[16] There have been many descriptions and analyses of the
DoD’s reasoning, but see especially Howe and Martin, "Treating the
Troops"; and R.A. Rettig, Military
Use of Drugs Not Yet Approved by the FDA for CW/BW Defense (MR-1018/9-OSD.
RAND/NDRI, 1999), ch. 3, at www.gulflink.osd.mil/library/randrep/cover.html
[17] A.O. Anderson, Memorandum
For the Record (21 September 1990). Subject: “USAMRIID Human Use Committee
Position on Waiver of Informed Consent in Wartime.”
[18] H. Jonas, “Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting
with Human Subjects,” chapter 5 in his
Philosophical Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980): 108. YEAR. p. 108.
[19] See R. Levine, "Commentary," The Hastings Center Report (March-April
1991): 27-29.
[20] The National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report: Ethical
Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research
(April 18, 1979). http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/mpa/belmont.php3
[21] Ibid., Part A: “Boundaries Between Practice and
Research.”
[22] Jonas, “Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting
with Human Subjects,” 127.
[24] Annas and Grodin, "Commentary," 25.
[25] Levine makes a related point about the botulinum
toxoid vaccine even in a civilian context. While it has long been made
available by the CDC for use in certain occupational settings, it has remained
“investigational” simply because due to the rarity of botulism, “there is
virtually no financial incentive to pursue a marketing permit.”
("Commentary," p. 29)
[27] Rettig, Military
Use of Drugs Not Yet Approved by the FDA for CW/BW Defense, ch. 6.
[28] In a letter from Michael A. Friedman, M.D. Lead
Deputy Commissioner, FDA, to Edward D. Martin, M.D., Acting Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Health Affairs, dated July 22, 1997, the FDA details
deficiencies of the DoD in administration and oversight of PB and BT as
investigational products. The agreements to allow administration of the
products as investigational included detailed requirements for data collection,
which the DoD in many cases failed to fulfill. We see no indication that the
data required and not produced had any impact either on the health of
recipients or on the health of potential future recipients—this latter because
the products were not without previous evidence of safety and efficacy in other
settings. Certainly the FDA cannot be faulted for requiring what was plainly
demanded by current law and regulations; rather, we take this as evidence that
the treatment IND is not the ideal regulatory vehicle for innovative use of
preventive interventions in the military during a deployment, either from the
perspective of the FDA or from that of the DoD.
[29] See M. Verweij, "Medicalization as a Moral
Problem for Preventive Medicine," Bioethics
13:2 (1999): 89-113.
[30] Particular attention must be paid to vaccines, since
unlike a drug or a protective device, the effects of immunization cannot be
removed from or washed out of the body when the threat that justified the
intervention ceases to exist (as noted by Annas and Grodin). To date, no long
term adverse events have been shown to result from the relevant vaccines. In
the case of the anthrax vaccine, the product has been heavily monitored, though
very long term data do not exist. The most relevant data may come from studying
hyperimmunized personnel at Fort Detrick, Maryland, in which few if any adverse
events connected with the immune status of the subjects were observed. See C.E.
Fulco, et al. eds., Institute of Medicine report: Gulf War and Health (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press,
2000), and L.M. Joellenbeck, et al. eds. Institute of Medicine report: The Anthrax Vaccine: Is it Safe? Does it
Work? (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press; 2002).
[31] Part of what is meant by ‘suitable constitution’ is
the presence on the IRB of at least some members who are not otherwise
affiliated with the government (while still possessing security clearance so
that they have access to necessary information), to help assure that all
relevant interests will be given proper weight. This is explicitly provided for
in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 21 (Food and Drugs), Vol.1, Part 50
(Protection of Human Subjects), Section 23, d2 (i.e. 21CFR50.23d2).
[32] Cf. Howe and Martin, "Treating the Troops."
[33] 10 U.S.C. 1107f: “The President may grant such a
waiver [of the consent requirement with regard to the administration of
“investigational” compounds] only if the President determines, in writing, that
obtaining consent (A) is not feasible, (B) is
contrary to the best interests of the member, or (C) is not in the
interests of national security” (our emphasis).
[34] Howe and Martin, "Treating the Troops," 22.
[35] See Rettig, Military
Use of Drugs Not Yet Approved by the FDA for CW/BW Defense, ch. 4. There is
at present no regulatory mechanism for this form of consent in connection with
the possibility of a future need for some sort of “investigational”
intervention.
[36] The authors wish to thank Melissa Balmain, an
anonymous referee for this journal, and especially Arthur O. Anderson, M.D.,
for helpful input and suggestions.