The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Euro-Med Partnership

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The impact of EU Enlargement on the Euro-Med Partnership

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The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Euro-Med Partnership

Introduction

The EC/EU’s concern with stability on its southern borders and its relationship to enlargement stretches back to the 1970’s. But its most important policy initiative burst on the scene in 1995 when the Spanish presidency of the EU organized a conference in Barcelona, with the 15 members of the EU and 12 countries of the South Mediterranean. The outcome was the Barcelona Declaration or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) Initiative. In launching this initiative, EU foreign ministers recognized a need to respond to “new” security issues emanating from the region, such as drug trafficking, human rights violations, and environmental degradation (Joffe 1998). In addition, many EU officials saw the EMP as a strategy to compete with other trade blocks, without having to invite non-European Mediterranean countries to join the EU. Finally, EU ministers believed that the initiative would “add another layer in a comprehensive European effort to help settle the Arab-Israeli conflict” (Solingen 2002).

Backed by the largest EU financial commitment ever made outside the Union, the Barcelona Declaration launched a set of economic, political, cultural, and social initiatives whose stated purpose was to extend southward the European area of stability. The EMP became the EU’s main Middle East policy instrument; indeed, it became the only regional organization in which both the Palestinian Authority and Israel are included. It also was designed as the EU’s preferred tool for engaging Islam in a “dialogue of civilizations,” and its central foreign economic policy in the region as a whole.¹

Most importantly, however, the EU Commission represented the EMP as an ambitious attempt to invent a region that does not yet exist and to create a regional identity that would rest, neither on blood, nor religion, but on civil society, economic interdependence, voluntary networks and civic beliefs. The stated aim of this experiment was to construct in the Mediterranean region a pluralistic security community whose practices are synonyms of peace and stability (Adler and Crawford 2004).

This essay assesses the impact of the 2004 EU enlargement on the aims of the Euro-Med Partnership and the prospects for its success. Does the Mediterranean policy of an enlarged Europe herald a new era of foreign policy behavior—as stated in the Barcelona Declaration—or does it represent the continued politics of power and

¹ EMP is a wide multilateral framework of political, economic, and social relations that, before EU enlargement, involved 700 million people in 27 countries or territories around the Mediterranean. In addition to the 15 EU states, the EMP included Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority. EU enlargement has turned Cyprus and Malta, which, until May 2004 were partner countries, into full members of the Union. It also has added eight more countries to the EMP: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
domination? Either way, will the net impact be a stabilizing one, enhancing regional security and economic prosperity, or will it be destabilizing, widening the gap between Europe and its southern neighbors?

These questions are of crucial importance, not only because of the vital significance of the Mediterranean and the urgent need to resolve conflicts born there, but also because the search for their answers allows us to explore the content of the EU’s foreign policy. Much of the recent literature on this topic has described Europe as a “civilian power,” whose foreign policy aim is the projection of norms and values—democracy, the rule of law, peacekeeping and human rights—, rather than the maintenance and expansion of material interests. Indeed, the EU is the world’s largest bilateral aid donor, providing twice as much development aid to the world as the United States. The EU is also the largest importer of agricultural goods from the developing world. Some analysts believe that this deployment of “soft power,” renders the use of “hard power” less necessary (Khanna 2004).

As Nicolaidis (2003) and Wendt (1999) have argued, the EU has chosen to be weak in military capabilities, because it has adopted a “Kantian” culture. Many have argued that the EU’s power rests on the ability to attract states to become members or partners of a political community, the access to which depends on the adoption of a set of norms, practices, and institutions. In the words of Graham Fuller (2003) Europeans have “forged their homelands into a new cooperative whole,” and taken their power to be “the power of a gradually expanding international community of consent.” Most analysts, noting the dearth of EU military power, argue that Europe’s strength lies “in the ethical reach of its foreign policy” (Bicchi 2004). As noted above, the EU’s stated aim in the Mediterranean is to construct a region in which European values can take root in order to meet new security challenges with a non-security based policy (Williams 1998, Manners 2002, Spencer 2002, Moravcsik 2003, Whitman 2002).

Another interpretation of the EU’s aims, however, has emerged from “realist” interpretations of international politics. Attina (2004) notes that by taking on the role of “region builder and partnership maker” the EU aims to exert direct influence over Mediterranean politics. This role, he argues, can be interpreted as that of an external power attempting to change the domestic politics of its neighboring countries for its own benefit. Clearly the EMP was devised to protect EU member states from the adverse consequences of large-scale migration flows and from an uncontrolled flood of competing agricultural products that might enter the European market under WTO agreements—an effort on the part of the EU to control the region for its own benefit by exploiting its asymmetric relationship with North African and Middle Eastern States. In

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2 The idea of Europe as a “civilian power” is best captured by Duchêne (1973): “The European Community’s interest as a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force is as far as possible to domesticate relations between states, including those of its own members and those with states outside its frontiers. This means trying to bring international problems the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics, which have been in the past associated exclusively with ‘home’ and not foreign, that is alien, affairs.”
fact, the origins of the EMP can be located in a pronouncement made by EU foreign ministers at an EU Summit. Institutionally, it is defined, administered and funded from Brussels. There are no headquarters or civil servants dedicated to this project outside EU structures and thus no symbolic venue with which it can be identified. The very fact that the timeline for appraisal of the process is successive EU presidencies is telling. From the South, the enterprise is interpreted more often through the core-periphery paradigm than as an instance of positive sum liberalism: a (friendly) takeover rather than a joint venture. Indeed, for centuries, the Mediterranean Sea stood for the “mare nostrum” belonging to the Greeks and then the Romans. The relationship between European countries and the Mediterranean states has deep colonial roots, saturated with a history of domination and exploitation. Realists believe that the Euro-Med process is a strategy to consolidate regional dominance rather than “build” a region (Crawford 2004).

Realists also believe that the same quest for supremacy lies behind the project of EU enlargement. Many analysts (i.e. Kupchan 2003, Rifkin 2004, Reid 2004, Kegan 2004) have used the occasion of the 2004 EU enlargement to reflect on Europe as an ascendant world power. Some have gone so far as to note that as the EU enlarges eastward, it will come to dominate the geopolitics of Eurasia, gradually replacing America as the arbiter of the globe's strategic heartland.

In this context, the “Euro-Med Partnership” may be nothing more than an attempt to control the geopolitics of North Africa and the Middle East. Should the EMP in the context of EU enlargement and the “new neighborhood” policy be interpreted as the aim of a “civilian power” in the service of peace and prosperity for all? Or is the EMP a guise in which the power politics of an enlarged EU are played out?

It is still too soon to amass definitive evidence that would provide credible answers to these questions. Nonetheless, some trends are coming to light. In providing what I hope to be informed speculation on the impact of enlargement on the EMP, this essay begins by briefly tracing the history of the Barcelona Process. It does so by first briefly examining the impact of previous EC enlargements on the Mediterranean, beginning with the accession of the UK in the 1970s as the impetus for the creation of a Mediterranean region. It then provides a snapshot of the Southern enlargement, which led to the de facto partition of the Mediterranean. In this historical context it looks to the creation of the EMP in 1995 and assesses its achievements, failures, and the obstacles to success. Finally it turns to an assessment of the 2004 enlargement, with its corollary, the notion of a Wider Europe--New neighborhood and its goal of extending European norms beyond its borders.

The role of EC enlargements in creating and undermining the Mediterranean “region”

The first step in the stabilization of Europe’s southern borders through the projection of “Western” values was to invent a Mediterranean “space” within which Western values could be projected. In the early life of the EC, before the region was invented, the Commission and the member states had related to the EC’s southern neighbors through
widely divergent bilateral policies and agreements (Haas 1990). In fact, it was the first EC enlargement that initially spurred the idea of a single region.

The run-up to the UK’s accession raised the issue of the EC’s relationship with third countries. Before its admission into the EC, the UK had very low import duties, benefiting not only its former colonies but also countries around the Mediterranean. When the UK joined the EEC, it had to adopt the common external tariff, which was much higher. Thus, non-member Mediterranean countries who had been traditional exporters to the UK saw the writing on the wall: they would lose the UK market to member states whose exports to the UK would be duty free and subsidized by the common agricultural policy. As this issue rose to the top of the EC agenda, the Commission and member countries began to debate the appropriate adjustment of existing agreements with Mediterranean countries. Should there be a common tariff for them? Or should bilateral relations continue to prevail?

Other problems raised the visibility of the issue: concerns over terrorism and oil defined the European Community’s key interest in the stability of the Mediterranean region. Terrorism had been on the rise in Europe, spilling over from the Arab-Israeli conflict, and all member states began to tighten immigration controls in order to prevent terrorist networks from taking root on European soil. The gathering oil crisis jarred Europeans into a reconsideration of their dependence on Arab oil, the need for secure supplies, and the maintenance of good relations with Arab countries.

Driven by all of these concerns, the EC launched the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) (Bicchi 2002, pp. 4-5). The goal was to create a free trade area covering all of the countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea, excluding Albania, Yugoslavia, and Libya, and including Spain, Portugal, and Greece. The GMP offered trade concessions for the non-member Mediterranean countries (NMNCs) in their economic relations with the EC, aid, and social provisions for migrants from the Maghreb in Europe. It also offered agricultural concessions and eliminated its own tariffs on industrial imports originating from the NMNCs while allowing them to retain their own tariff barriers.

Because this policy applied to all targeted states equally and was an EC policy rather than that of a member state, the concept of a “Mediterranean Region” was codified. Bicchi (2004) reports that EEC documents addressing trade policy toward the Mediterranean basin clearly show the evolution of the idea of a single “region.” For example, a 1971 report originating in the European Parliament argued against the approach of ‘agreements à la carte’ that had prevailed until this time, because they did not create among Mediterranean peoples “this certainty of belonging to one and the same region of the world, having its own personality, its brand image.”

This view, however, was undercut with the accession of Spain, Greece, and Portugal. The inclusion of these three states took them out of the GMP and thus divided the “region” that the Commission was trying to cultivate. Tovias (2004) goes so far as to argue that the inclusion of the three new members was obtained at the expense of the
economic stability of the western and eastern Mediterranean non-members. Although there were similarities among the economies around the Mediterranean in the agricultural sector as well as many industrial sectors, non-members lost trade revenue when trade was diverted to the new members. For example, Morocco’s citrus and tomato exports to the EC were replaced by exports from Spain and Portugal. This lost trade expanded the economic cleavage between EC members and Mediterranean non-members. The gap grew even wider as EC development policies targeting the new members began to take effect, leaving the Mediterranean non-members in the dust. In short, as Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis (2005) argue, the southern enlargement undermined the ‘regional promotion policy’ and the idea of ‘Mediterranean’ as it was conceptualized in the GMP. Even then, it appeared that the EC was attempting to create a region of predominantly “Muslim” or “Arab” states separate from “Europe.” This, then, represented a de facto partition of the Mediterranean.

Reviving the Mediterranean “region?”

Throughout the 1980s, with global politics still dominated by East-West confrontation, the creation of a Mediterranean region of cooperation and stability was a low priority for the world’s powerful states. The end of the Cold War, however, presented new challenges and promised to eliminate the obstacles to a renewed regional initiative. Xenophobia triggered fears of massive immigration from North Africa, and the cold war’s end gave rise to the new security threats emerging from militant Islamic fundamentalism, its link with terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. As early as 1992, the European Council of Lisbon had expressed its unease at the "advance of extremist forces... in various North African countries." Two years later, the European Council of Essen elevated the Mediterranean to a "priority zone of strategic importance to Europe."

To combat these perceived threats, and because France feared that Europe would drift eastward with a reunited Germany and the prospect of EU membership for the countries of East Central Europe, the European Community began an initiative called “Renovated Mediterranean Policy,” which dealt mainly with financial aid to NMMC’s, aiming to boost regional economic development through cooperation, and to increase regional trust and transparency. And at the behest of France, Italy and Spain, NATO formulated a Mediterranean policy in 1994, promising to work with non-members to strengthen regional stability, and began to lobby the EU to concoct a new policy towards “Islam.”

Encouraged by progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process, the idea of re-creating a “Mediterranean Region” crept higher on the policy agenda, and the EU became formally involved in the project of creating regional stability. The first major steps were taken at the European Council Summit of 1992, which were followed by the Barcelona Declaration creating the EMP in 1995. The basic premise of that initiative was that the Euro-Mediterranean area constituted a “common space,” or at least that it possessed enough of the precursor elements of a region (geographic contiguity, common values, traditions, or interests) to make regional building a possibility. Stephen Calleya (2002)
writes that “from this premise flowed two other assumptions: that the member-states or
regimes were equally committed to the goal of regional cooperation as a tool to promote
peace, stability and prosperity; and that they were also receptive to the kinds of political,
ecconomic and social liberalization that makes transnational (as opposed to inter-
governmental) cooperation possible.”

The Barcelona Declaration established 3 baskets, (a) security on the basis of
mutual confidence and partnership, (b) a zone of shared prosperity through economic
integration, and (c) the rapprochement between peoples through social and cultural links
leading to the creation of a Mediterranean civil society. Economic proposals in the
Barcelona Declaration included the establishment of a Free Trade Area between the
Union and Southern Mediterranean countries by 2010 and the removal of their tariff and
non-tariff barriers. The creation of a free trade zone was intended to shift the adjustment
costs of trade to the NMMCs, after 20 years of EC/EU trade concessions enshrined in the
GMP. Through the agreement to create a Free Trade Zone, the Keynesian ideas of
development contained in the GMP gave way to the neo-liberal ideas of the Washington
Consensus (Tovias 2004).

Economic aid and loans from the European Investment Bank were to benefit the
NMMCs’ private sector and to encourage structural reform and privatization. The
central financial instrument for EMP is the MEDA (Mesures d’Accompagnement)
program, offering technical and financial support as incentives for social and political
reform. MEDA II (1999) created the "structural adjustment facility" financed under
MEDA I to target more specifically the reforms necessary for free trade with the EU on
the one hand and to streamline EU decision making on the other. The Barcelona process
also aimed at encouraging “good governance,” namely democracy and human rights, and
advanced the development of confidence-building measures to enhance regional security.
The political element of the Barcelona declaration includes a list of principles concerning
respect for democracy and the rule of law, human rights, the right of self-determination,
non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and peaceful resolution of disputes.

Some progress has been made on each of these three fronts. In April 2002, the
Euro-Med partners adopted the Valencia Action Plan, making sustainable development
the guiding principle of the Euro-Med Process. The action plan included reinforced
credit facilities for Mediterranean partner countries through the European Investment
Bank (EIB) and the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation to promote cultural
exchange. EMP is acting as a catalyst for the improvement of bilateral cooperation;

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3 For early assessments of the economic basket of the EMP see Marks (1996) and Galal and Hoekman (1997).

4 The MEDA Regulation was adopted in 1996, and the beneficiaries were Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, Malta, Morocco, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

5 The plan aims for 2 billion euros (1.8 billion dollars) per year in EIB loans by 2006. The
economic and financial provisions of the EMP seek to achieve a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) by 2010 and to promote regional development by attracting foreign direct investment
(FDI).
bilateral economic agreements have been signed, and EU-Med trade has increased every year. Furthermore, in 2003, a Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) was created. The FEMIP supplements MEDA in supporting private sector development of the Mediterranean partners in order to attract investments to the region. In 2004 the EU devoted €1 billion to development of the Mediterranean region, a large increase over previous years. As a result, there have been substantial improvements in infrastructure throughout the region (transport, telecommunications and energy, as well as the interconnection of the Mediterranean partners' infrastructures with the Trans-European networks).

Other areas have achieved positive results as well. There has been an increase in regional cooperation in the field of Justice, and agreements to combat terrorism and drug trafficking have been signed. EMP enthusiasts have patiently built a host of civil society networks to promote common cultural and security understandings, including EuroMeSCo, a security think-tank, which has become an important example and leading promoter of public diplomacy in the region. Finally, the EMP has begun its own process of “enlargement,” with plans to integrate Libya and enlarge the free trade zone to six Gulf countries, as well as the conclusion of an agreement with Syria.

Despite these achievements, however, to date, the disappointments have overshadowed the successes. The objectives of the EMP were slated to be confirmed by twenty-seven Mediterranean states in Malta in 1997. But the stalled Middle East peace process and ensuing tensions in the Middle East overshadowed the meeting and cast grave doubts on the partnership’s success. Subsequent meetings, including at Stuttgart, Marseille, and Valencia did very little to push the EMP forward. Negotiations began on a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Stability and Peace, but because Mediterranean governments had divergent perceptions of threats and challenges to political stability, they were short-lived (Attina 2004). On the economic front, private sector investment has only trickled into the NMMC’s, and a huge economic gap between EU and the NMMCs remains and continues to grow. Indeed, the sum of the GDP of the 10 partner countries is as high as the Spanish GDP alone. In contrast to the EMP Mediterranean partner countries, the new member states of the EU have grown much faster: the combined income of the 10 NMMCs is only one tenth of combined income of the new EU members. Likewise, progress toward democracy in the southern Mediterranean states has been slow compared to the pace of democratization in Latin America, Eastern Europe, East Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.

**Obstacles to success in EMP**

Why these disappointments? As noted above, the Israeli-Arab conflict, in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular, together with the events that were unleashed

6 The original plan was to launch the document at the Marseille Conference in November 2000, but progress on the Charter stopped at this very meeting.
by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, provide two of the most visible obstacles to the realization of the goals of the Barcelona Declaration. Since the EMP’s inception in 1995, the Middle East peace process has been halting and uncertain, and the higher the tensions, the more the EMP has been disrupted and weakened. Thus when the “El-Aksa Intifāda” erupted in 2000, and the bloodshed began, the EMP entered a phase of permanent crisis. The Palestinian crisis cut a deep cleft between Israel and moderate Arab countries and between Israel and Europe. The triangular partnership between Europe, the Arab world, and Israel was thrown into turmoil.

But the failed Israeli-Palestinian peace process has not been the only roadblock to EMP progress. A number of other obstacles have emerged to block or distort the realization of EMP goals. Within Europe we have seen a move to the right and the rise of nationalism, with frightening implications for the EU’s relations with the Arab world and specifically for the Euro-Mediterranean process and its multilateral agenda. In recent years, anti-immigrant parties have enjoyed alarming success in elections throughout Europe. Their decidedly anti-liberal stance, nationalism, xenophobia, and commitment to territoriality, sovereignty and self-reliance spell a rejection of “multilateralism,” openness, and construction of a regional identity—principles which lie at the heart of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

Despite the fact that Europe will need to revitalize its labor force with immigrants in the coming years7 and youth unemployment in the Mediterranean partner countries is a growing scourge, anti-immigration sentiment continues to grow. Fears that right wing majorities would demand a “Fortress Europe” were deepened in 2002 when EU members of the European Council appeared determined to strengthen border controls to stem immigration from the Mediterranean region. British Prime Minister Tony Blair had even suggested that the British Royal Navy might be willing to use gun boats in the Mediterranean in order to halt immigrants from entering the EU (Shaaban 2003).

A third obstacle is the persistence and strengthening of authoritarian regimes in North Africa and in the Middle East. These regimes reject the liberal orientation of the Barcelona process and resist any kind of “conditionality” imposed upon them. As Calleya (2002) writes: “many of the requirements of free trade and greater foreign investment (abolition of monopolies and licensing arrangements, reduction of customs and excise fees, legal security and transparency, autonomous civil society organizations and institutions) threaten the revenue-base and even the power base of neo-patrimonial authoritarian regimes.” Many of these states are also torn by internal schisms and by blurred territorial definitions. Their very existence is tenuous, and their own national identities are uncertain. It is questionable whether, without a secure national identity,

7 By 2023, the ratio of working to retired people in the EU will fall from 4:1 to 2:1. During the 1990s employment increased three times more in Europe than in the Southern Mediterranean partner countries (9.8 percent per year as opposed to 3.4 percent.) Unemployment in the NMMCs is about 2.5 times higher than in Europe. Population growth and high unemployment in the NMMCs combined with labor market pulls from Europe have increased the pressure on migration (Handoussa and Reiffers 2003).
these states will be able to assume the regional identity believed to be necessary for the success of the EMP (Del Sarto 2003).

A fourth obstacle lies in the divergence of expectations and goals that the various partners bring to the table. While European countries seek stability through the “careful Westernization” of the Arab world (Tovias 2004), or the “convergence of civilizations” toward the European model, the Arab world seeks preferential access to European markets and development aid, resisting Europe’s vision of convergence.

Two historical legacies—colonialism and economic “backwardness” provide a fifth obstacle. Colonial domination and exploitation have bred deep-seeded resentment and created cultures of victimization in North Africa and the Middle East. The economic “backwardness” of the Arab states around the Mediterranean has been perpetuated and deepened by colonialism and European domination. The trade dependence of the NMMCs on the EU has increased in recent years, while Europe’s trade dependence on the NMMCs is negligible and consists primarily of dependence on energy supplies. Even that dependence is likely to weaken as the EU enlarges and begins to look eastward to the former Soviet Union to fill its energy requirements. The economic inequality between Europe and the rest of the Mediterranean has created a structure of asymmetrical interdependence, giving the EU the upper hand in all negotiations in the Euro-Mediterranean process.

The imbalance is reinforced in the Euro-med negotiating process: despite efforts to overcome bilateralism, European countries negotiate as a bloc through the EU, while the Southern Mediterranean countries sign agreements and negotiate bilaterally with the EU (as well as individual member states) on all issues. Thus, the Barcelona Process, despite its multilateral dimension, did not amend a negotiating process that reinforced the power imbalance between the EU and its Euro-Med partners.

Clearly, the management of the EMP by the Commission perpetuates and recreates an asymmetry between EU member states and the rest in a manner that continues to generate the critique of neo-colonialism; there is no equivalent management structure among the non-member partners of the EMP. The Euromesco Joint Report of 1997-98 suggested that while the Commission should retain a management role, stopping short of the creation of a Secretariat, a ‘ProMed’ group of civil servants from the NMMCs should be constituted to act in a management capacity as a partner of the Commission. However this form of institutionalization has yet to be implemented or discussed (Vasconcellos 2002, p. 2). With regard to the economic basket, all decisions are in the hands of the EU, where decisions on trade and aid are reached through compromises among the 25 members.8

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8 There is no voting mechanism for EMP decisions. Although the European Parliament proposed the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly at the Velencia meeting (Gillespie 2002, p. 12), no concrete decisions have been taken to create one. Decisions in the EMP on political and cultural issues are made by consensus. There is no formal voting. Veto power by any of the 27 EMP members is the rule (Lannon et al. 2001, pp. 117-8). Before any EMP ministerial summit, each EMP member country prepares its national position on the different items on the agenda. Positions are shaped by a combination of business lobbies and member state conceptions of the national interest. While each state
Aid is disbursed directly from the EU budget on a bi-lateral EU—individaul NMMC basis. Tovias (2002) notes that the term “bilateral” is perhaps a misnomer because all aid is given on a unilateral basis from the EU to the NMMCs. There have been no negotiations between the EU and NMMC within an EMP forum over how that aid is disbursed or how much aid will be offered to each MNMC. Before the Valencia meeting in April 2002, Spain advocated the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Bank that would place EU members and non-members on an equal footing, a suggestion that found favor in several countries of the Maghreb. But because of opposition from the northern European countries, the idea was diluted into increased credit provision via the European Investment Bank, where decisions on aid would continue to be made unilaterally by the EU (Gillispie 2002, p. 12).

Enter the 2004 “Enlargement” and the “New Neighborhood” policy

Will the 2004 Enlargement and the “New Neighborhood” policy contribute to progress in strengthening the Euro-Med partnership, or will it present yet another obstacle to cooperation? Will it inject new life into the Barcelona process and its projection of “civilian” power? Or will it feed into a relationship of dominance and dependence between the EU and the southern states of the Mediterranean? Whether positive or negative, there will certainly be an impact. The 2004 enlargement of the EU created the largest internal market and the largest regional bloc in the world, a region that rivals the United States in population, gross domestic product, and scientific and technological capabilities. Now the EU accounts for almost half of the world’s foreign direct investment. With this enhanced power base and extended global reach, it will have an even greater influence than before on its neighbors and on the world as a whole.

Recognition of that influence is embodied in the “Wider Europe-New Neighborhood” policy (ENP). In 2003, the European Commission published a concept paper, entitled title "Wider Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors.” Directed explicitly to countries “that do not currently have the perspective of membership of the EU” (COM(2003) 104 final, 11.3.2003, p. 4), its intent was to set forth an initiative that would “avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe” (Commission 2003, p. 4) but at the same time would stipulate relations with neighboring states who would have no concrete prospect of accession (Haukkala and Moshes 2004). These states were “Russia, the countries of the Western Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union and the Southern Mediterranean”, which “should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital” (COM (2003) 104 final, 11.3.2003, p. 4).

fashions its own position, the position of the EU member states is coordinated by the Commission; member states are represented by their own ministers at the EMP bi-annual intergovernmental Summit. There is almost no leeway for a state to negotiate its position once in the Summit (Tovias 2002).

9 Of course enlargement creates new dividing lines. New visas would be required in order to enter the new member states and the inclusion of new members in the Common Market created new trade barriers along the new eastern and southern borders of the EU.
Despite the stated effort to avoid divisions, the ENP divided the EU’s “neighborhood” into three areas. In the first are the four official accession countries – Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Turkey – as well as the applicant country Macedonia. Because they are potential accession countries, they are excluded from the “policy,” although they are presently in the “neighborhood.” In the second, to the East, are Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Russia. Finally, to the south, 10 Southern Mediterranean countries in the EMP are grouped as potential partners “to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighborhood.” The explicit goal in regard to these countries is “to anchor the EU’s offer of concrete benefits and preferential relations within a differentiated framework which responds to progress made by the partner countries in political and economic reform” (COM(2003) 104 final, 11.3.2003, p. 9).

After the enlargement, in May 2004, the Commission published a further strategy paper on the EU’s “neighborhood policy.” This paper added the Southern Caucuses as “neighbors” for purposes of the policy and included Action Plans calling for “political dialogue and reform; trade measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU's Internal Market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information society, environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts” (Commission 2004). Echoing the earlier paper, the EU would offer incentives to the neighboring countries in return for successful implementation of political and economic reform and adoption of EU rules. In the Fall of 2004, the Commission added financial incentives, providing something like the EU structural funds in return for compliance with the Action Plans. These incentives would, in turn, influence internal developments in the EU’s neighboring states. Finally, the strategy paper strongly encouraged sub-regional cooperation in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean (Commission 2004). It names several issue areas where sub-regional cooperation is considered useful, for example in the realm of economic cooperation, environment, nuclear safety and natural resources, migration, civil society etc.

Many analysts and the EU Commission itself have proclaimed that the most recent enlargement and the attending “New Neighborhood” initiative will only strengthen the goals of the Barcelona process. For example, as a more powerful actor on the world stage, the EU may be able to exert more muscle in bringing the Israeli-Palestinian

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10 These are: Extension of the Internal Market and regulatory structures, preferential trading relations and market opening; perspectives for lawful migration and movement of persons; intensified cooperation to prevent and combat common security threats; greater political involvement of the EU in conflict prevention and crisis migration; greater efforts to promote human rights, further cultural cooperation and enhanced mutual understanding, integration into transport, energy and telecommunications networks and the European research area; new instruments for investment promotion and protection; support for integration into the global trading system; enhanced assistance, better tailored needs; new sources of finance.

11 The 2004 EU enlargement brought two Mediterranean Partners (Cyprus and Malta) into the EU, while adding a total of 10 to the number of member states. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership thus now comprises 35 members, 25 EU member states and 10 Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey). Libya has observer status since 1999.
conflict to a peaceful solution. And the membership of Malta and Cyprus—and later Turkey—might be important in keeping Mediterranean issues high on the EU agenda. (Shaaban 2003). Gillespie (2004) suggests that the new member states may support the Euro-Med process if they conclude that “democracy promotion in particular is an area of EU activity in which they have a rare opportunity to underline their own national achievements.” He goes on to report that “according to optimistic scenarios traced by European officials, the new initiative may encourage the introduction of instrumental reforms by ‘reluctant democratizers’. . . and could even strengthen the local appeal of pro-democracy political elements within North African countries. Finally, it has been suggested that the NMMCs need not fear that migration from the new member states will further block the “free movement of people” from the Southern Mediterranean: although the new members add new workers to the EU population, the demographic characteristics of the new member states are very similar to the EU 15\(^\text{12}\), and migration will be restricted, at least in the short run. Thus the new members will not add significant weight to current migration flows and will not affect the flows of migration coming from the Southern Mediterranean (Handoussa and Reiffers 2003).

### Economic Benefits or Costs?

In fact, however, the most obvious impact of enlargement will be economic. Enlargement not only opens new markets to the Southern Mediterranean countries, it has changed tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, abolishing non-tariff barriers for new members, and keeping them in place for the EMP countries linked to the EU through a Free Trade agreement. This means that the NMMC’s will have to enhance their competitiveness and pay even more attention to economic reform. Private investment decisions will be affected by changes in market prospects. And labor market considerations will change, influencing migration patterns. Public financial flows will also be affected. In preparation for the 2004 accession, the EU devoted the bulk of its technical and financial aid to the prospective new members. To date, the volume of EU aid for the Euro-Med region is miniscule when compared to what was disbursed in the accession countries before May 2004. By 2003, EU funds allocated to the accession countries averaged € 545 per capita per year compared to €14 per capita per year for the Euromed partners (Handoussa and Reiffers 2003) The hope among some southern Mediterranean analysts is that now the EU can devote more resources to the EMP, in particular, its economic basket (Shaaban 2003).

As noted above, the “New neighborhood” policy includes a proposal for deeper integration of the neighboring countries, including the Mediterranean partners, in the EU Single Market, not only for goods (an aspect that is largely covered by the Association Agreements) but also for services, capital movements and (as a long-term objective) movement of persons. Harmonization of the regulatory environment and liberalization of trade in services may potentially have even stronger positive economic effects than liberalization of trade in goods.

\(^{12}\) Handoussa and Reiffers (2003) report that the average growth rates of the population of the Central East European countries were -0.15% between 1975 and 2000.
But some analysts are skeptical. Tovias (2002) argues that as the EU looks eastward for products that currently come from MNMCs, EU non-tariff trade barriers will “bite” more than before. This will deepen Arab suspicions of European neo-colonial intentions in the Euro-Med process. Agricultural competitors from the new member states are already slowing Egyptian agricultural exports to the EU to a trickle. Despite claims to the contrary (Wallström 2005, Ferrero-Waldner 2005) enlargement is likely to have an adverse impact on Mediterranean countries' export access and market share in the EU.

Some trends in this direction have already emerged. Handoussa and Reiffers (2003) report that NMMC exports to the EU increased by 7.2% per year on average since 1990 (8.4% for non-oil exports) versus 4.2% toward the rest of the world (6.9% non-oil). This increase drove up the share of total exports from the Mediterranean Partners to the EU from 45% in 1990 to 51% in 2001. On the other hand, the exports of the accession countries to the EU increased by 10.5% per year on average since 1995, versus 8.7% with the rest of the world, thus increasing the share of the accession countries’ exports to the EU to 67% in 2001. This differentiated progress led to a significant growth of the accession countries’ market share in the EU (10.9% of EU non-European imports in 2002 versus 7% in 1995) larger than the growth in the share of the NMMCs (6.6% in 2002 versus 5.6% in 1995).

Furthermore, with EU enlargement, most Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the EU 15 is now flowing to the new member countries in Eastern Europe. Without an infusion of capital, non-member countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) will most likely remain low-wage raw materials suppliers and export platforms for the EU’s industrial machine. To the extent that FDI flows into the region, it will be attracted by low-cost labor and will concentrate in labor-intensive production methods across the industrial spectrum. In modern sectors, plants in these countries might be simply “screwdriver factories”—assembling final products, importing key components, and using few local suppliers. Other foreign investments might be in “services”—sales, marketing, and distribution outlets for imports produced in the EU. Or investments will flow to low-technology extractive sectors, like oil and gas. All innovative activity would continue to be concentrated in the EU as the “core.” This means that prospects for rapid economic development of the NMMCs are bleak.

Will the new member states support the EMP? Gillespie (2004) suggests that, having undergone the stress of transforming their own political and economic systems in order to qualify for EU membership, they may be reluctant to support economic programs that bolster North African and Middle Eastern states that do not reform their regimes and address the root causes of political instability. At best, because they must continue to focus on their own economic growth and political reforms, and they may show little interest in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. After all, they are potential competitors in trade, and only 2 per cent of total EMP exports are now bound for the new member countries of the EU.

Although certainly not all of the evidence is in, and the impact of enlargement will vary for the countries of the Southern Mediterranean, I believe that EU enlargement
is unlikely to help close the economic gap between North and South in the Mediterranean region. As noted above, in the run-up to enlargement, as the economies of the accession countries grew, most of the EU’s Mediterranean partners moved ahead very slowly. Indeed, the economic gap between the EU and the NMMCs is widening at an alarming rate. And as Stephen Callelya (2002) has noted, in the run-up to enlargement, “the prosperity gap with Europe, especially Central European countries . . . would have widened even further without the recent rise of oil prices and a significant slowdown of demographic growth, the only positive developments in the [Mediterranean] region.”

“New Neighborhood”: Integration or Exclusion?

Contrary to the EU’s claims above, the “New Neighborhood” policy accompanying enlargement seems to signal exclusion rather than closer integration into the European “space,” and—like the enlargements of the 1980s—to again prevent the creation of a Mediterranean “region.” Indeed, efforts to design and build a “New Neighborhood policy” may subvert the region-building project of the EMP. Four indicators of subversion are likely to appear: 1) new divisions in the Mediterranean region resulting from enlargement, 2) the weakening of sub-regional cooperation, 3) perceptions of exclusion on the part of the NMMCs, and 4) contradictions in the conditionality requirements that may push the NMMCs further from Europe. Each of these indicators deserves brief discussion.

First, this most recent enlargement, like earlier enlargements before it, have gathered some Mediterranean countries into its fold while explicitly espousing a policy of exclusion for others, since there is nothing in the ENP that offers the prospect of accession. This means that the NMMCs must bear the burden of adjustment to the EU’s rules and norms without the prospect of membership. And a new class of economic winners and losers may be created by the ENP, dividing the region further.

Secondly, the ENP may inhibit cooperation among the countries of the Southern Mediterranean. In April 2000, Chris Patten, in an effort to build reliable regional negotiating partners, advocated the creation of sub-regional free trade areas, offering EU support for any efforts to establish multilateralism as a principle of South-South Cooperation. In 2001, the Arab League established an Arab Free Trade Area to be completed by 2007. In addition, the Agadir Declaration of May 2001 announced the establishment of a free trade area between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. The EU offered technical assistance to the “Agadir Process,” and the Valencia Action Plan supported efforts on the part of North African countries to revive the Arab Maghreb Union.

But the ENP is very likely to undermine these efforts. As Fischer (2005) has pointed out, “although the ENP strategy paper strengthens the idea of sub-regional cooperation, ENP remains by and large a bilateral approach to the region.” And as Gillespie (2004) writes: “In the absence of a strong Maghrebi or North African regional bloc, some countries may obtain material benefits from a substantial increase in
integration with Europe (so long as the policy is adequately funded) . . . . Others may fail to qualify for—or decide not to seek—a comparable place on the revised ‘pyramid of privilege’ (the metaphor traditionally used when classifying EU relations with third countries); in response, they may become more inward-looking and reliant on traditional sources of cohesion and identity, or may look for alternative international alignments.”

Third, Shaaban (2003) reports that one of the most pressing concerns generated by EU enlargement in the Southern Mediterranean is the inevitable feeling of exclusion from the EU. And this exclusion is based only on geography - the “simple fact of being located on the "wrong" side of the Mediterranean.” Feelings of exclusion can produce hostility, fuel social discontent, and strengthen perceptions of discrimination upon which radical political elites like to feast. This slippery slope of exclusion, hostility, and backlash can generate friction around the Mediterranean Sea that will further cause a fragile “regional identity” to disintegrate.

Finally, the liberal agenda of the Barcelona Process and of the ENP carries with it its own problems and contradictions that exacerbate the consequences of perceptions of exclusion. In the short run, economic inequities are exacerbated by the conditionality policies of economic liberalization. In this way, economic liberalization can undermine the process of political liberalization envisioned at Barcelona and in the ENP by exacerbating economic inequality and thus endangering liberal democracy. George Joffe’s (2002) discussion of the effects of the imposition of the “Washington Consensus” in Algeria provides an apt example. There, economic liberalization facilitated the growth of an unaccountable elite, feeding on patronage and outside of the control of the democratic state.

Furthermore, liberalism is considered by many Muslim critics to be an unattractive blueprint for social and economic life. Its relentless insistence on individual freedom and competition weakens community. Community provides protection, cooperation, and mutual obligation, but strong community also interferes with the operation of the market and its principles of individual self-interest and competition. Markets, in turn, breed insecurity and inequality, feeding the longing for human community. Many Muslim critics regard the market as deficient and flawed for these reasons.

And many Muslim leaders eschew democracy, arguing that many democracies pay only lip service to the rule of law, minority and citizen rights, and independent judicial review. With its “tyranny of the majority,” repression of minorities, and absence of a binding system of values, democratic systems, they argue, can actually exacerbate social and cultural conflict. In periods of economic uncertainty and political transition, when states that once provided entitlements pull back or are dismantled according to neoliberal demands, when democracies are so constructed that they fail to protect rights, and when the introduction of markets leads to deep insecurities, the strong values and rich symbolic resources of community and religion offer hope in their promise of collective power to those populations who feel powerless (Zakaria 1997, Crawford 1998).
In short, Europe's liberal identity and its liberal discourse and practices are out of step with the reality that Europe's interaction with Arab world has helped create. Thus, the Barcelona Process and the ENP may be caught between the language of post-colonialism and the behavior of neo-colonialism. What this means is that Europe’s insistence on liberal practices embodied in the Copenhagen criteria, which were so successful elsewhere, for example in eastern Europe, are out of step, not only with Muslim states and Europe's negative legacy in the Muslim world, but, also with Europe's own political objectives and its turn to the right.

Conclusions

Perhaps the most important aspect of the Euro-Med partnership for the creation of stability and prosperity on Europe’s southern border is the idea of “region building” contained in the Barcelona Declaration. Theorists of regionalism point to regional integration in the post-cold war context as a key indicator of international change because regional integration changes the character of state sovereignty and national identity. Regions are conceptualized, not in terms of geographical contiguity, but rather in terms of purposeful social, political, cultural, and economic interaction among states that often (but not always) inhabit the same geographical space (Calleya 1997). Theorists of the new regionalism hypothesize that the purposeful guidance of these interactions can lead to the creation of a regional political culture and a regional “identity” that will have important implications for peace and stability (Jong Choi and Caporaso 2002). Applied to the Mediterranean region, the hope is that the EuroMed process could serve as a laboratory for new forms of “mutual recognition in deep conflict prone settings . . . a laboratory for the honing of overlapping identities binding together groups and individuals. . . [inspiring] a different, truly universal, kind of international politics” (Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis 2005).

But the arguments made here suggest that a number of factors, including the protracted Israel-Palestine conflict, the rise of right-wing extremism in Europe, the persistence of authoritarian regimes in the Southern Mediterranean and the tensions between economic and political liberalization militate against success in building a stable and prosperous Mediterranean region. The enlargement of the EU and the accompanying “new neighborhood” policy may exacerbate these problems by limiting NMMC exports to Europe, by diverting resources from the EU 15 away from the Mediterranean region, by a lack of interest on the part of the new East European members in Mediterranean stability, by dividing the region again between members and non-members, and by inhibiting the growth of sub-regional cooperation.

If this pessimistic scenario is correct, it is unlikely that the EU’s Mediterranean policy in the context of enlargement and the ENP signals a new era of “civilian power” with region-building as the longest pole in the tent. The perpetuation of core-periphery relations, bilateralism, exclusion, conditionality, and perceptions of exploitation militate against region-building, possibly leading to the Mediterranean “tent’s” collapse.
The factors that have weakened the Barcelona Process all suggest that the “realist” view of Europe’s relationship with its neighbors may be the more correct one. It is not Europe’s “magnetic allure,” as Robert Cooper calls it, that draws Europe’s neighbors to accept its human rights standards, its liberal democracy, or economic openness, but rather conditionality requirements for aid that place its neighbors at the bottom of a “pyramid of privilege,” that is likely to inhibit the kind of region-building that those who prefer the exercise of “civilian power” would like to see. From the vantage point of the Southern Mediterranean, Europe’s behavior is that of a neo-colonialist.

Of course, there are good reasons to attempt region-building within the realist paradigm of international relations. As Brooks and Wohlforth (2002) have remarked, “states often build regional partnerships in order to balance against the overwhelming power of another state.” The Euro-Med process was part of the EU’s effort to balance the influence of the United States. If the EU could not yet aspire to be world hegemom, it could be a regional one, a power that would assert its preeminence over the US in North Africa and the Middle East. This preeminence would not be induced by direct political action, mediations, and missions, but rather by a systematic use of economic tools to create a region for political ends.

But the project of EU enlargement has overshadowed the process of region-building in the Mediterranean—whether that process is motivated by “realist” goals or by the desire to pursue the system-changing goals of a civilian power. EU enlargement has provided Europe with resources and markets that were always elusive in the Euro-Med process. It has given the new members the badge of a European regional identity. The Euro-Med process will continue within the context of the ENP but the Europe’s only viable region will be built by the project of enlargement.

Nonetheless, despite this suggestion that there is an unhappy connection between the EMP and EU enlargement, it is not clear that the Southern Mediterranean would be better off without the Euro-Med partnership. After all, MEDA has poured billions of euros into the Southern Mediterranean but very little into countries of the eastern “neighborhood,” such as Ukraine. One could argue, of course, that countries to the east of the EU are potential members of the European “club.” As such they may have privileged access to EU resources that will never be available to the NMMCs. Nonetheless, to date, the Southern Mediterranean receives more aid than ever envisioned for Europe’s eastern neighbors in the ENP.

Furthermore, as suggested above, it is not entirely the fault of the EU that sub-regional cooperation has faltered in the Southern Mediterranean. Because of their exclusive focus on Europe for aid and trade, Southern Mediterranean countries have not been eager to cooperate among themselves. The EU is quite happy to work with other regional groupings, such as ASEAN and Mercosur; and, as noted above, has offered to help stimulate sub-regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. Indeed, if the NMMCs would resolve to create a cooperative sub-region, they would be a more powerful negotiating partner for the EU. EU enlargement and the ENP may, in the end, not be helpful to the Barcelona Process, but the process itself is clearly in need of reform and its
disappointments have many causes. As for the ENP itself, we can expect it to be a weak policy instrument—whether used as an instrument of power or as long as the prospect of EU membership is not offered to Europe’s “neighbors.”
References


