Eastern Enlargement and the European Security Agenda

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These monographic papers address issues relevant to the ongoing European Convention which concluded in the Summer of 2003. The purpose of this Convention was to submit proposals for a new framework and process of restructuring the European Union. While the European Union has been successful in many areas of integration for over fifty years, the European Union must take more modern challenges and concerns into consideration in an effort to continue to meet its objectives at home and abroad. The main issues of this Convention were Europe’s role in the international community, the concerns of the European citizens, and the impending enlargement process. In order for efficiency and progress to prevail, the institutions and decision-making processes must be revamped without jeopardizing the founding principles of this organization. As the member states negotiate the details of the draft constitutional treaty, the Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Papers will attempt to provide not only concrete information on current Convention issues but also analyze various aspects of and actors involved in this unprecedented event.

The following is a list of tentative topics for this series:

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5. The member states against Europe: the pressures on and warnings to the Convention by the European capitals.
6. Is it possible that the Convention will be a failure? The effects on European integration.
7. Similarities and differences between the European Convention and the Philadelphia Convention of 1787.
8. The role of a politically and economically integrated Europe in the governance of the world.
9. How important is European integration to the United States today?
10. The failure of a necessary partnership? Do the United States and the European Union necessarily have to understand each other? Under what conditions?
11. Is it possible to conceive a strategic partnership between the United States, the European Union and Russia?
12. Russia: a member of the European Union? Who would be interested in this association?
Eastern Enlargement and the European Union’s Security Agenda

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EASTERN ENLARGEMENT AND THE EUROTPEAN UNION’S SECURITY AGENDA

At the end of the Cold War the security threats facing Europe underwent a dramatic change. With the virtual implausibility of interstate military conflicts came an increased risk of enthonationalist violence, as exemplified by the wars in the former Yugoslavia, organized crime, terrorism, and immigration, among others. The attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States further transformed the global security context, effectively making the obliteration of international terrorism the primary US foreign and domestic policy goal. The intensification of the efforts to combat terrorism further underscored the indivisibility of the European Union’s internal and external security and gave rise to a renewed debate on the Union’s global voice.

At the same time, the European Union is embarking upon one of the most challenging and momentous enterprises of its history - enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta. The accession of ten new member states will inevitably change the size and shape of the EU and influence its decision-making processes as well as increase the range of issues brought to the table, including common foreign and security policies.

This paper will look at some issues that play an important part in the security agenda of the European Union and its member states and will outline some of the potential challenges the eastern enlargement poses in these areas. It will argue that the securitization of immigration from Central and Eastern Europe has occurred mainly along the dimensions of labor migration and organized crime as a danger for the socioeconomic welfare of West European societies in general. The focus on combating terrorism, while vitally important, necessitates continuing cooperation with the accession countries in the efforts to strengthen their porous borders, without creating new lines of division on the continent. While the new members are likely to contribute to the formulation of more Atlanticist foreign and security policies, a convergence between the interests of the current and new member states is likely to occur, thereby strengthening the European Union’s voice in global affairs.

The paper is divided into two broad sections, the first one of which deals with the “softer” security issue of immigration and the threats it presents to the public order in the European Union in terms of competition for scarce jobs, organized crime, and terrorism as a key security threat. The second section addresses the state of common European foreign and security policies in the aftermath of the war with Iraq and the impact of enlargement on their scope and effectiveness, as well as on the transatlantic relationship.
Societal Security in the EU and Enlargement

Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the security field was transformed to include issues ranging from large-scale violence and civil wars to small-scale guerrilla conflicts, ethnic violence, international terrorism, organized crime, drug- and human trafficking, and illegal immigration, among others. The broader definition of security included perceptions of threats to the state as well as the society and the individual. Threats to state and society in particular have taken on a new importance since the attacks in Washington and New York on Sept. 11. These events led to the establishment of homeland security as the primary domestic and foreign policy goal of the United States, resulting in the “war on terror,” which now headlines the international security agenda. In the European Union, the tenuous line between internal and external security had become ever more blurry in the 1990s. Internal security came to encompass a number of issues, including terrorism, drug-trafficking, organized crime and illegal immigration, which now dominate international security. With regards to the eastern enlargement, many of these issues come together as they are sometimes represented as being introduced in the European Union through the migration flows from the East.

The removal of internal borders within the EU put a renewed emphasis on the policing of the external borders of the Union and placed migration firmly into the national security frameworks of the member states. Portrayed as a root cause of perceived threats to economic well-being, social and political order, and cultural and religious identities, migration is securitized as an existential threat to society, thereby justifying the need to take extraordinary measures to protect it. Some of the earliest examples of securitization of migration can be found throughout the text of the Schengen Agreement. For example, Title 1, Art. 7, provides for the approximation of the signatories’ visa policies as soon as possible “in order to avoid the adverse consequences in the field of immigration and security that may result from easing checks at the common borders,” and the application of visa and admission procedures “taking into account the need to ensure the protection of the entire territory of the five States against illegal immigration and activities that could jeopardize security.”¹ The 1990 Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement also connects migration and asylum with terrorism, transnational crime, and border control, and locates it in a framework regulating the security of the internal market.² Most recently, Javier Solana, High Representative of the EU for CFSP, recently stated in a speech to the European Parliament that, ”massive flow of drugs and migrants are coming to Europe and affect its security. These threats are significant by themselves, but it is their combination that constitutes a radical challenge to our security.”³ The statements clearly imply the necessity of measures directed at cross-border movements of migrants and drugs, with the goal of protecting Europe.

Even prior to September 11, 2001, the ability of the EU to regulate its borders with the Central and Eastern European countries was deemed to be central to its internal security. Following the securitization rhetoric of EU officials, and especially member states’ leaders, the opening up of the Eastern bloc was seen as threatening to the security of the internal market primarily through labor immigration and crime. One of the main reasons for the relatively low level of public approval of enlargement in the EU is the fear of “flood” of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe, who as cheap labor would displace local workers, thereby causing economic and social dislocations. The rationale behind the fears from an influx of immigrants is not without merit: despite the economic growth of the past decade, the average wage differentials between the CEECs and current EU members still remain significant. The number of migrants from the CEEC candidates, however, constitutes a relatively small portion of the overall third-country migration to the EU. During the 1990s, the total number of legal immigrants from the candidate countries to the European Union was approximately 830,000, or 15% from all legal immigrants from third-countries, and 0.2% of total EU residents. With the exception of the refugees from the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the Central and Eastern European countries have not been a major source of immigration to the EU, and in fact, have fallen short of the expectations. The prevailing pattern of migration from the East appears to be short- or medium-term, with the goal of short-term or seasonal work, and concentrated in Central Europe, primarily Austria and Germany.

The European Commission has stipulated a transition period of maximum of seven years for the free movement of labor after the accession of the CEEC, the same restriction that the Iberian countries were subjected to. A number of the current member states have decided to use this authority to restrict the intake of workers from the new member states, including Great Britain, Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Greece. Many leaders, however, are recognizing that the policy of “zero immigration” is no longer sustainable in the European

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5 For example, in 1997, an average of 57% of EU citizens thought that there were too many foreigners living in their country, with the highest rate in Greece with 84% and the lowest in Ireland – 17%. Average of 66% thought that people coming from Central and Eastern Europe who wish to work in the EU should be accepted with restrictions, compared to 17% who thought that they should be accepted without restrictions, and 14% percent who thought that they should not be accepted at all. European Commission. Results of “Continuous Tracking” Surveys of European Union (September 1996 to January 1997). http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/co/co10/co10gra.pdf.

6 In 1999, the number of candidate country nationals who were legally employed in the EU was approximately 290,000 out of total 5,280,000, or 6% of all foreign workers and 0.2% of the labor force. The majority of these workers – almost 70% - are in Germany and Austria, where they account for approximately 10% of all foreign workers, and 0.4 and 1.2% respectively of the total labor force. The number of undocumented workers and migrants was estimated at approximately 600,000, most of whom engage in short-term work while abroad (“working tourists”) or cross-border trading (“trading tourists”). The latter group are generally low-cost and flexible alternatives to local labor, in other words, the feared cheap labor competing with the local workers for scarce jobs, but some of them are engaged in areas already abandoned by the local labor, such as household tasks, care, and other personal services. European Commission. Information Note: The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement. Annex 1. Brussels. (6 March 2001): 26-28.

7 Ibid. 29-30.

context and the calls for the relaxation of immigration policies are growing. The estimates of potential migration into the EU from the candidate countries varies widely, ranging from 120,000 in the first year and declining to 50,000 over the first 10 years, to 380,000 in the first year and declining to 200,000 over ten years. Not only the anticipated flood of immigrants has not materialized, but the CEECs are no longer expected to be a major source of immigration capable of meeting the demographic needs of European markets. Hence, the issue of labor migration has been securitized despite being a largely non-existent threat.

Despite the empirical reality, however, immigration remains a contested issue, allowing for the resurgence of right-wing parties and groups in some EU countries. Anti-immigrant groups ranging from labor organizations to right-wing political parties and organizations, advocate more restrictive immigration policies, and are particularly opposed to the free movement of persons from some Central European countries after their accession. Since migration began to be linked to organized crime, terrorism, and later Islamic fundamentalism in the 1990s, the redefinition of migration as a security threat to the receiving countries has been politicized in the member states of the EU and become a mainstream political issue. This is the result not only of the changes or costs of actual migration, but also of the growing tendencies to define socioeconomic and cultural problems as caused by migration. While internal security, organized crime, welfare and unemployment, and preservation of identities were not necessarily the result of increased flow of immigrants, the issue has been successfully politicized by political parties, legitimating more restrictive external border policies.

As a result of the collapsed economies, corruption, shaky judicial and law enforcement institutions in the Central and Eastern European countries, organized crime flourished and the potential for spillover into the EU was recognized early in the 1990s. Although instances of crime by themselves present threats to individuals and not to society at large, rising crime rates are perceived as destabilizing to the domestic public order, and therefore, to societies as a whole. For instance, separate crime incidents committed by illegal immigrants in Italy provided opportunities for right-wing groups to argue for stricter immigration laws, giving them wide public exposure, and a rise in electoral fortunes. Drug-trafficking and mafia-type organizations

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9 For instance, last fall the state premier of the länder of Saxony called the transition period “unrealistic and unsustainable,” and that “Western Europeans’ fear that cheap laborers from eastern Europe will flood their countries and take away their jobs are mainly due to ignorance.” “Premier Say Transition Periods Are Unrealistic,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 4 Oct. 2001. http://www.faz.com.


11Stratfor (Strategic Forecasting). “The Return of ‘Fortress Europe?’” http://www.stratfor.com/home/0110312230.htm. Jörg Haider, for example, has long opposed eastern enlargement arguing that “from the moment we open our borders, 200,000 people will come here, settle, and look for jobs,” and the equally telling statement that “enlargement is a declaration of war on all industrious and other hardworking people in Austria. We demand that the question of enlargement be removed from the EU’s agenda,” made as late as 1998. Jörg Haider, qtd. in Lykke Friis, “Eastern Enlargement, Schengen, JHA and All That…”.


were the most typical and expected potential risks of enlargement.\textsuperscript{14} Organized crime and corruption, still problematic to accession countries and endemic to those countries left outside, are also cause for concern because of their possible spillover effects. While the accession process helped stabilize the region, and therefore, lessen the threat to the current members of the EU, the fear persists that the porous borders may in fact bring those very same threats within the EU itself.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, admitting new members who are economically lagging behind their Western counterparts, however, and whose institutions – despite the progress made during the 1990s – are still relatively unstable, is at times presented as a way of simply “importing” the problem into the EU.\textsuperscript{16} The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, altered the security priorities by replacing illegal immigration and organized crime with international terrorism as the key security issue worldwide.

\textbf{Migration, Terrorism, and Enlargement}

Terrorism has become the main politically-related violent threat to the societies of the European Union. International terrorism, along with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed states and organized crime are considered to be the main threats by the new European Security Strategy.\textsuperscript{17} In response to the attacks in the United States, the EU accelerated the implementation of existing measures and introduced new ones for combating terrorism, including the adoption of common definition of terrorism, and an EU-wide arrest warrant, among others. While Europeans were not unaccustomed to battling terrorism, prior to September 11 the efforts were focused primarily on terrorist groups who were active on a national level, and whose demands were concrete and negotiable. In contrast, the emphasis has now shifted to international terrorism, with its global financial networks, communications and operations.\textsuperscript{18}

David Carlton defines terrorism as “significant levels of violence perpetrated by politically-motivated sub-state actors who may or may not be to some degree sponsored by, but who will not normally be directly controlled by, sovereign states.”\textsuperscript{19} It is also a threat that is rooted within western societies, thereby making possible the connection between open borders and immigration with facilitating terrorism.\textsuperscript{20} Framing the issue of security in this way often implies that it is immigrants who are at the root of these problems, and tighter policing seems to

\textsuperscript{14} The majority of the European public (51\%) believes that with enlargement and the opening of borders, the fight against crime and drug trafficking will become more difficult. European Commission. Flash Eurobarometer 140: Enlargement of the European Union. Brussels, March 2003, 64.

\textsuperscript{15} 53\% percent of the public in the current member states believe that enlargement will make it more difficult to control illegal immigration. In fact, this opinion is prevalent in twelve of the fifteen member states compared to ten in the previous survey. European Commission. Flash Eurobarometer 140 “Enlargement of the European Union,” Brussels, March 2003, 57.

\textsuperscript{16} Friis, “Eastern Enlargement, Schengen, JHA, and All That,” 5.

\textsuperscript{17} Summary of the Address by Mr. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy to the European Parliament. Brussels, 18 June 2003.


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. 25
be the proposed solution. At least in part, this fear is again rooted in the ethnonational fear of foreigners and justifies support for repressive internal security practices.\textsuperscript{21}

Even though, following Sept. 11, many European countries stepped up efforts to police their borders, throughout much of Central and Eastern Europe border authorities remain overwhelmed by a flood of immigrants from Middle East and Central Asia. The eastern borders of the European Union and the Mediterranean are the main routes through which illegal immigrants seek entry into the EU. The eastern rim of the candidate states in particular, which includes Slovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania – are points of entry for many refugees or illegal immigrants from countries long considered to be hotbeds of militant extremism, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{22} The eastern route appears to be an easy option for anyone with terrorist intentions to enter Western Europe. According to intelligence officials’ accounts published in the press, there is evidence that entering the EU through CEECs has been tested by Al Qaeda and other groups.\textsuperscript{23} Not surprisingly, the threat raises concerns among authorities, and is reflected among the public’s fears as well, influencing its overall opinion on the upcoming enlargement. Some Eastern European leaders have urged the CEECs to focus on combating illegal immigration, drug-trafficking, money laundering, and corruption, as part of their anti-terrorism efforts. Recognizing that the CEECs are a region of transit, Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, for example, has argued that “our cooperation can be especially effective in shutting down the channels that feed terrorist networks.”\textsuperscript{24}

The reasons for suspected terrorists to choose one of the CEECs as a transit route to Western Europe are not new: insufficient number of border guards, dilapidated infrastructure, and corruption. For those intent on doing so, there is little to stop them from crossing the borders illegally; those who are caught usually demand asylum, giving them the right to remain for six months in unguarded camps, which become their launching pads for the journey westward.\textsuperscript{25} In countries other than the candidates, such as Albania and Kosovo, where the institutions of the state have yet to be fully consolidated, crime networks appear to be hard to break up and in some cases may work together with Islamic extremists.\textsuperscript{26}

The Schengen Acquis and its Implementation by the Candidate Countries

The fear of the expected mass influx of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe has been one of the main reasons for incorporating the Schengen acquis in the Amsterdam Treaty. The

\textsuperscript{21} Ole Waever and Bary Buzan, unpublished manuscript. December 2000, 426-7.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} “Lithuanian President Calls For Reinforced Measures To Combat Terrorism,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, 6 Nov 2001 www.bbc.com
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} “They Are On Both Sides of the Pond; Europe’s Hunt for Al Qaeda.” The Economist, 2002. www.economist.com
Europeanization of policies in this area, and particularly the partial communitarization of the Justice and Home Affairs pillar, enabled the member states to reinforce their restrictive policies and law-enforcement approach to immigration and to impose their security agenda on the candidates for enlargement as well. The Union’s position has been that by “the date of accession, acceding countries will need to have achieved a high level of border control, even though certain special arrangements such as shared infrastructure and equipment or joint patrols could be envisaged.” Thus, it is hardly surprising that the negotiations on this part of the acquis received much attention and were considered critical in the accession process as a whole. Given the relative lack of technology, expertise, and experience the CEECs have in the area of border control, however, the emphasis has shifted to the actual capacity of the candidates to implement the acquis. While their shortcomings have been recognized, nonetheless, the ability of the accession countries to implement the acquis and provide effective border control for the new external borders of the Union has become a preset condition for their entry into the Union.

It has been well-documented that the state of the border control institutions of the CEECs has much to be desired. The pressure from the EU has prompted the candidates to pass the necessary legislative framework for implementing the provisions and standards required by the acquis, which range from the reorganization of border patrols and police forces to establishing visa requirements and implementing changes to the criminal code, among others. The existing problems are mainly due to the lack of coherent policies among the authorities responsible for border control, lack of autonomy of the border guards, and inadequate equipment, infrastructure, and compensation for the border guards. Furthermore, the provisions and standards of the acquis continued to change as more legislation was being adopted at the European Union level, thereby making it ever harder for the candidates to keep up with the fast-moving legislative target. While the volume of legislation increases, there is not one single model of border controls across the EU, or even clear definitions of crimes that the candidates are expected to fight, such as human trafficking. In addition, the European Union’s emphasis has been on effective border controls, the implications of the new external borders for the candidate’s relations with their neighboring countries have been left largely unresolved. The emphasis on law enforcement also suggests that human rights are taking back seat to the importance of repressive measures. In Central and Eastern Europe, where human rights norms are still being forged, this may result in negative outcomes with regards to another aspect of border controls, such as data gathering and handling asylum applications.

In tandem with the EU member states, all thirteen candidates for membership agreed to full solidarity with the United States in its war on terrorism. That meant measures, such as cooperation in intelligence gathering and sharing experience in training anti-terror forces and

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30 Mitsilegas 675.
31 Mitsilegas 677.
providing emergency medical services. The United States has also trained court, customs and immigration officials in the CEECs.\textsuperscript{32} There is a clear necessity for continued close cooperation with the accession countries most of which do not have experience to combat terrorism or the adequate means to monitor and police organized crime. The fight against terrorism takes place through the police and judicial cooperation, but it has become a central component of the strategic concepts of military alliances, such as NATO, and the EU’s security and defense structures. The enlargement of both of these institutions to include a number of Central and Eastern European is intended to extend the zone of stability as the best guarantee against security threats, including terrorist attacks.

**European Security after September 11th**

Traditionally associated with the defense of the territorial state from external threats, military security remains a core security concept. While mutual military threats are virtually non-existent in the European Union as well as North America, parts of the Old Continent’s periphery remain prone to instability. The wars in the former Yugoslavia and the resultant influx of refugees into the West brought to the fore the realization that Europe’s security was indivisible. The concept has also expanded to include non-military threats to the ability of governments to maintain themselves, such as migration or rival ideologies.\textsuperscript{33} This section will take a brief look at the impact of enlargement on the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. It will argue that the convergence between old and new members’ foreign and security policy behavior is likely to increase as the socialization effect of EU governance on the accession countries grows. Also, the accession of the Central and Eastern Europeans may contribute to the making of a more Atlanticist EU foreign policy as well as enhance the “eastern dimension” of its external action, but it will also strengthen Europe’s voice as a global actor.

**Common Foreign and Security Policy After Iraq**

In the aftermath of September 11 and the subsequent “war on terror” waged by the United States, the area of military security once again came to the spotlight. The invasion of Iraq brought about the most significant rift in transatlantic relations since World War II, simultaneously undermining the credibility of the United Nations, NATO, and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. The disarray, which surrounded the latter, indicated a lack of consensus on fundamental issues of foreign and security policy among the member states, perhaps the most important of which was on the *reason d’etre* for Europe’s global role. In this context, it can be argued that military security was less about the defense of sovereign, territorial states, than about Europe’s (meaning the EU’s) ability to be a substantive foreign policy and security actor in the world, especially *vis-à-vis* the United States. In other words, multilateralism as embodied in fora such as the UN Security Council and NATO, and ultimately, the EU’s role as a global actor were


presented as being at stake. International law as implied by these organizations was also among the principles which were seen as threatened by the intent of the United States to “go it alone,” and thereby, the necessity for a European alternative. The inability of the member states to take action following declarations even led to questioning the future of European integration in the areas of foreign and security policies, and ultimately, Europe’s political future. Hence, the inability of the EU to achieve a consensus over Iraq could be portrayed as having implications not only for the capacity of the EU to influence world events, but also for the success of the integration process itself.34

The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union came into being with the Maastricht Treaty as a pillar in the EU structure. While the goals for the CFSP are ambitious indeed,35 their practical attainment has been far less successful. As with all common policies of the EU, which are decided by unanimity, decision-making, institutional make-up, and ultimately, national interests of the member states are all factors that have contributed to the fact that the CFSP is still considered to be in its “embryonic” form. If, however, foreign policy is seen more than just the pursuit of narrow national interests, it can be argued that the CFSP has moved well beyond the “coordination” implied in the treaty provisions. Foreign policy has long become part of the integration process, where EPC/CFSP officials have conformed to the rules of precedent even prior to their formal treaty legalization, thereby making unilateral foreign policy declarations the exception rather than the rule.36 The intergovernmental bargaining that takes place in CFSP decision-making inevitably leads to a change the member states’ interests. In other words, their foreign policy interests and objectives emerge as a result of the interaction at the domestic, national, and European levels, whereby the member states gradually become socialized into a shared community of values.37

The European Security and Defense Policy is a central part of the CFSP in order to “implement a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defense policy.”38 The Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999 of forming a rapid reaction force of 60,000 capable of being deployed within 60 days and able to remain in the field for up to a year was declared operational at the Laeken Summit in December 2001. The rapid reaction force is intended to handle primarily the “Petersberg’s Tasks,” which include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis management. The EU member states will also provide up to 5,000 police officers for international crisis missions. The agreement on “Berlin plus”, which was finalized in December 2002, assured access to NATO planning, assets

35The Treaty on the European Union lists the objectives as follows: “to safeguard common values, fundamental interests, and independence of the EU; to strengthen the security of the EU and its member states in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; to promote international cooperation; and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Treaty on the European Union. Title V Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Article J.1.
and capabilities for the EU initiative, thereby giving it an impetus for actual implementation. As the Petersberg Tasks suggest, territorial defense is not intended as an objective for the EU’s RRF. In addition, officials within the EU and NATO, have taken pains to point out that “there will be no standing European force.” Hence, conflict prevention and crisis management are the cornerstone of the security paradigm underpinning the pursuit of European civilian and military security capabilities. Of particular interest in the following years will be the practical implementation of the “division of labor” and geographic scope between the EU’s rapid reaction force and the one to be created by NATO.

The Accession Countries and European Foreign and Security Policies

The accession countries played a small part in the debacle of EU’s CFSP over the most recent Iraqi crisis. In two separately published letters, virtually all candidates from Central and Eastern Europe expressed their support for the United States, thereby prompting a terse reaction from President Jacques Chirac, and alternatively, the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld division of the continent into “old” vs. “new Europe.” President Chirac essentially told the candidates that their actions had jeopardized their chances of joining the Union and more loyalty to the European family was expected of them. President Chirac’s admonition clearly suggested a “kinship” duty of the accession countries toward their future partners in the EU. Chirac’s statement echoed the argument that the main justification for developing European defense capabilities within the EU rather than NATO was that member states would arguably be more motivated to invest efforts in the name of Europe than NATO. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, on the other hand, suggested that the dispute over Iraq was in essence about protecting “European sovereignty” and that the actions taken now would determine the development of Europe over the next 10 to 15 years. Sovereignty as a concept is preserved almost entirely for the territorial state and implies that there is no international “actor above the state that can compel it act in specific ways.” In this particular context, it arguably refers to the ability of the EU to formulate its positions and take action independently of the United States, thereby justifying the French and German positions as acting in the name of Europe’s sovereignty. The supposition that the developments surrounding the crisis with Iraq will have an impact on the evolution of the European project suggests that that course and success of European integration was at stake. By taking a stand against the position of France and Germany, the two member states who have traditionally charted the course of integration, and in support of the United States, the CEECs could thereby be seen as putting in peril the future of the integration process.

The pending expansion of NATO to include in its ranks most of the same countries which will be joining the EU is an issue that has contributed to the discussion over the future role of the CEECs in the transatlantic relationship. The new members are clearly more Atlanticist in their foreign policies and in favor of maintaining close ties with the United States. This is partly due to geography and recent history, among other factors: in the absence of viable security alternative from the European Union and in view of the proximity of Russia, the United States clearly represents a security actor that can deliver protection.\(^{33}\) Poland, the largest of the accession countries, is striving to position itself as part of the bridge between the United States and “old Europe,” which the rest of the new members would be a part of. Poland sent 200 troops to fight in Iraq and it is set to oversee one of the four sectors in Iraq is to be divided. Bulgaria and Romania, set to join NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007, let their bases be used as staging posts and are eager to have the United States set permanent military bases in their territories. In view of the proximity of the Middle East and Central Asia to the southeastern periphery of Europe, such a move seems justifiable strategically, but may come at the expense of closing down some bases in Germany.\(^{44}\)

This cooperation with the United States has been interpreted as providing the basis for deepening the rift between the “old Europe” and the United States, as well as between the two “Europes.” This view is supported by the intended defense cooperation between Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg through forming a “core” group for conducting operations in which other members may not want to join. The accession countries tend to view suspiciously such initiatives suspiciously as they would undoubtedly like to participate the decision-making of the EU in all issue areas on an equal footing. In addition, the increased membership will undoubtedly move the center of gravity in the EU away from France in particular, thereby helping to set a less counterbalancing agenda.

The support of the new members, such as Poland, however, may also help bridge the gap between the United States and Europe by drawing more NATO countries in the “coalitions of the willing,” which seem to be the preferred approach by the US.\(^{45}\) The new members are also likely to bring their own traditions, experiences, and interests to the intergovernmental politics of the ESDP, and CFSP in general. Although some of them do have specialized forces, such as the nuclear decontamination units of the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, and have engaged in cooperation, such as the Baltic battalion, few of them have troops sufficiently well-trained to engage in high intensity conflicts.\(^{46}\)

### The Impact of Enlargement on the Scope and Effectiveness of CFSP

Traditional foreign policy analysis would suggest that the eastern enlargement would inevitably have a negative effect on the functioning and content of the nascent CFSP. First, it

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\(^{33}\) Baun, Michael. “EU Intergovernmental Politics After Enlargement.”

\(^{44}\) “Is Poland America’s Donkey or Could It Become NATO’s Horse?” The Economist 8 May 2003 [www.economist.com](http://www.economist.com).

\(^{45}\) Ibid.

\(^{46}\) Cameron, Fraser and Herrberg, Antje. “What Security Capabilities for the EU?” Security Trialogue Project Brief.
The European Policy Centre. EastWest Institute. 10 March 2003.
would be more difficult to develop coherent foreign policy based on shared interests and objectives among potentially twenty-seven member states than among fifteen. The range of issues that the new members will likely be diverse, thereby further testing the institutional framework of CFSP. On the other hand, if European foreign policy is viewed in a framework that allows for interaction and mutual influence between the national and European levels, then the outcome may be different, particularly in the long term as the socialization of the new members into the EU’s culture of governance.

Second, extending the borders further to the East and South will bring new issues to the fore, among which security is likely to be the most salient one. At the beginning of the new century, the most pressing security concerns have shifted from Europe’s center to its periphery, and further to the Middle East and Central Asia. The potential for a renewed instability in the Western Balkans remains primarily an European concern, especially with the United States focused on the war on terror and increasingly less interested in the Balkans. As the European Union prepares to take over the peace-keeping operations in Bosnia, having already taken charge of the NATO mission in Macedonia in March 2003, and the inauguration of the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia in January 2003, one might ask the extent to which the Western Balkans are an area of external policy for the EU.

In addition to diverse foreign policy interests, an increased membership will mean different neighbors for the EU, and thus new relations with third states. After enlargement, the EU will border Ukraine and Russia, and contain Kaliningrad as a Russian enclave between Poland and Lithuania. Russia has not objected to the eastern enlargement and having the states of Central and Eastern Europe as EU members will inevitably enhance the relations with Russia, which considers itself a great European power. Thus, the “eastern dimension” of EU’s external policy is likely to be accentuated, as the new members led by Poland will push for policies aimed at stabilizing the new external border of the Union, particularly the relations with Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Russia. Hungary and Slovenia, along with eventual members Bulgaria and Romania would presumably be interested in stabilizing the Balkans, for example. The new members would also join the current member states in their emphasis of a specific neighboring geographic area as well as the emergence of sub-regional blocks.47 While it is clear that enlargement will bring considerable benefits to the Central and Eastern European states, including security, it will inevitably draw a new line of division. In contrast to more internal-security minded current member states, because of their long-standing economic, social, cultural, and political linkages with their neighbors to the east, the new members are likely to have a strong interest in ensuring that the EU’s new borders do not become the new dividing line between the zone of peace, stability, and prosperity from the rest of the continent.48

The European Union has proven itself as a capable civilian actor and the strong attraction of its social model, and the values and principles it embodies are perhaps best exemplified by the successful political and economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe. The domestic structures of the current member states of the European Union have experienced an ever-growing

48 Baun, “EU Intergovernmental Politics After Enlargement.”
degree of Europeanization as a result of decades of integration.\textsuperscript{49} In parallel to this process of transference of European policy-making in domestic politics, the degree of integration achieved so far in Europe can be explained at least in part by the shared common purposes and values, acceptance of the rule of law and the authority of common institutions, and behaving in other aspects as if bound by formal legal rules. Similarly, the prospect for EU membership for countries from Central and Eastern Europe placed the Union in a very strong position to influence their internal politics. Taking advantage of the desirability of EU membership, the Union has used its influence vigorously and across the board in pressuring these countries into implementing market policies, transparency in the bureaucratic and political systems, and democratic human rights regimes. The implementation of the policies has led to a degree of internalization of the principles, norms and values of liberal democracy prevalent in the European Union. The conditionality of accession has been the primary instrument through which the candidate countries are becoming more like the current member states. Thus, enlargement involves both the formal extension of supranational institutions to the applicant states but also their socialization into a structure of governance, which would guide their behavior in the long term.

It can be expected that much like the increasing influence of Brussels over the conduct of domestic policies and politics of the current members, the foreign policy interests of the prospective new members are likely to alter as a result of the interaction of the domestic, national, and European. In the long run, although the content of CFSP in a wider Europe may change, cooperation in this area is likely to continue as part of the broader process of Europeanization and socialization.

Intergovernmental politics and decision-making, however, are the essence of common policies, such as the CFSP. In the short-term, it has been predicted that following enlargement, the pattern of decision-making in the European Union will be based upon various issue-based, shifting coalitions. Member states are likely to form alliances with others when their interests on a particular issue converge, rather than establishing permanent power bloc coalitions.\textsuperscript{50} These flexible and shifting coalitions are likely to depend on the issues at hand and reflect structural cleavages, such as geography, wealth, and size, among others. In this case, the enlargement is unlikely to change significantly the intergovernmental bargaining over CFSP, but will rather reinforce existing trends.\textsuperscript{51} It should also be emphasized that having a common European foreign and security policies does not entail their existence in lieu of the national foreign and security policies of the member states. Having been under Soviet domination for over four decades, the Central and Eastern European countries are keen on preserving their sovereignty in foreign policy, and thus, would resist pressures to conform to any common European foreign policy that runs counter to their national interests; to them full membership in the Union would entail precisely that, especially in the area of foreign and security policies. That is why they are likely to resist efforts by the United Kingdom to concentrate more power in foreign and security policy making into hands of the big member states, which, save Poland, none of the new

\textsuperscript{49} Europeanisation is defined as a process through which the national policies of the member states are reoriented to such a degree that the European Union’s political and economic dynamics become part of the national politics and policy-making. Ladrech, Robert. “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 32.1 (1994): 69-88.


\textsuperscript{51} Baun, “EU Intergovernmental Politics After Enlargement.”
members are. Again, in view of the fact that intergovernmental politics in the European Union involves not just national governments of member states and their perceived national interests, but also rules, norms, and values that are part of the supranational governance of the Union, it is likely that these will have a socializing effect on the new member states and, in time, transform the nature of their interests. Their accession may, in fact, speed up the process toward sharing diplomatic and other facilities in third countries. With the exception of Poland, the accession countries are relatively small and with limited resources. The challenge that may arise in this area – inherent to the current membership as well – is overcoming the national mentality of diplomats and the relative inexperience with Union’s machinery.52

The socialization effect of being gradually phased in EU governance and the convergence of interests in general is evident on a number of issues. While their siding with the United States in the crisis with Iraq brought about references to the CEECs as the “Trojan horse” for the US in the EU, the record shows that most of these states routinely vote with the EU in other multilateral bodies, such as the UN, and in support of the Kyoto Protocol and non-proliferation, among others. Strongly multilateralist in the conduct of international relations, their positions on a number of foreign policy issues coincide with those of the Europeans. Their voting patterns are a sign that they are becoming increasingly socialized into the EU’s way of conducting business as they come nearer to membership.53 Hence, while the eastern enlargement will help thwart the evolution of the EU as a counterweight to the United States on principle, it will also help create a stronger Europe with a common voice in the international scene.

Conclusion

The redefinition of Europe in institutional terms through the prospects for EU and NATO enlargements have contributed to stabilizing parts of Eastern Europe, which were undergoing difficult political and economic transformations, some amid a process of nation-building as well. The peace, stability, and prosperity that Europe’s enlargements sought to ensure, however, may be undermined with the shifting of the external borders on the new EU further east and the strong emphasis on restrictive border control policies. This contradiction has been well and frequently noted by a number of scholars, but so far has had little policy, albeit substantial political effect in the domestic politics of the member states.

The enlargement of the European Union is likely to enhance its presence on the global scene. While it has proved its capabilities as a civilian power and has emerged as an important regional security actor, its global role in the foreign and security policy field remains unclear. Although the foundations for common policies in this area exist, without political will, value convergence, and institutionalization, the European Union can hardly hope to play the same role as it does in other areas or become a viable alternative to an increasingly unilateralist United States. In a global security environment characterized by insecurity and risks, there is a necessity for a comprehensive approach to security problems, including addressing their root causes. An enlarged and stronger EU of pan-European proportions can play this role, extend the

52 Cameron, Fraser. The Europe We Need. The European Policy Centre. www.theepc.net.
zone of stability to the neighboring regions, and contribute to the strengthening of international order. The realization of this potential security role, however, rests with the political will of its member states.
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