Security, Borders, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union

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Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series
Vol. 4 No. 15
May 2004

This publication is sponsored by the EU Commission.
The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series

The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series is produced by the Jean Monnet Chair of the University of Miami, in cooperation with the Miami European Union Center.

These monographic papers address issues relevant to the ongoing European Convention which concluded in the Summer of 2003. The purpose of this Convention was to submit proposals for a new framework and process of restructuring the European Union. While the European Union has been successful in many areas of integration for over fifty years, the European Union must take more modern challenges and concerns into consideration in an effort to continue to meet its objectives at home and abroad. The main issues of this Convention were Europe’s role in the international community, the concerns of the European citizens, and the impending enlargement process. In order for efficiency and progress to prevail, the institutions and decision-making processes must be revamped without jeopardizing the founding principles of this organization. As the member states negotiate the details of the draft constitutional treaty, the Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Papers will attempt to provide not only concrete information on current Convention issues but also analyze various aspects of and actors involved in this unprecedented event.

The following is a list of tentative topics for this series:

1. The challenges of the Convention: the ability to govern a supranational Europe or the return to intergovernmental cooperation?
2. How did the member states figure in the framework of the Convention?
3. The necessity to maintain a community method in a wider Europe.
4. Is it possible for the member states to jeopardize the results of the Convention?
5. The member states against Europe: the pressures on and warnings to the Convention by the European capitals.
6. Is it possible that the Convention will be a failure? The effects on European integration.
7. Similarities and differences between the European Convention and the Philadelphia Convention of 1787.
8. The role of a politically and economically integrated Europe in the governance of the world.
9. How important is European integration to the United States today?
10. The failure of a necessary partnership? Do the United States and the European Union necessarily have to understand each other? Under what conditions?
11. Is it possible to conceive a strategic partnership between the United States, the European Union and Russia?
12. Russia: a member of the European Union? Who would be interested in this association?
Security, Borders, and the Eastern
Enlargement of the European Union

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May 2004

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SECURITY, BORDERS, AND THE EASTERN
ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

In 2003 the European Union adopted its first security strategy, which identified the key threats and challenges to European security, its strategic objectives, as well as the possible means for addressing these objectives. The document, presented by CFSP\(^1\) High Representative Javier Solana, was an important milestone in the development of the EU as a regional security actor with potential to play a global security role. The strategy, entitled “A Safer Europe in a Better World,” also signified that the security of Europe was indivisible from that of the rest of the world, and especially its immediate neighborhood.

As European integration deepens, there is a growing perception that the member states cannot adequately protect their societies as a result of their borderless frontiers, resulting in an increasing internal insecurity. The current round of enlargement is also implicated in this process, as it poses a number of challenges in this area. This enlargement brings the European Union’s eastern border deep into the territory of the former Soviet Union in the Baltic region, and reaches states that are still in the process of institution-building. The management of these new borders will have a significant impact on the stability of the rest of Europe, which finds itself outside the EU, as well as on the internal security of those who are inside. This essay aims to look at some of the discursive links between security and the eastern enlargement of the European Union and the role of security in creating the two “Europes,” as witnessed by the renewed emphasis on the new eastern external border of the EU. It argues that it is primarily societal security threats that have been important in the context of enlargement, contributing to the implementation of internal security policies, whose effects are sometimes conflicting with the overall objective of peaceful, stable and prosperous Europe.

The article begins by looking at the linkage between the lifting of internal borders and non-traditional military threats, such as immigration and organized crime. It then examines how the eastern enlargement has been implicated in the securitization of these cross-border activities and the policy responses to the perceived security deficit. It concludes by discussing some of the consequences of the strengthening of the external borders of the EU on its new members as well as on its new neighbors to the east.

**Internal Security and Freedom of Movement in the European Union**

The European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003 lists terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failures, and organized crime as the key global challenges and threats to European security.\(^2\) The latest Eurobarometer, on the other

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\(^1\) Common Foreign and Security Policy.


[http://europa.eu.int](http://europa.eu.int)
hand, shows that ninety percent of the general public consider fighting unemployment as the EU’s top priority, closely followed by maintaining peace and security on the continent and fighting terrorism (89%), fighting poverty and social exclusion, organized crime and drug trafficking (88%), and fighting illegal immigration close behind (83%). Hence, there appears to be a convergence of perception among decision-makers and the public alike regarding terrorism and organized crime as key threats. Maintaining peace and stability, fighting unemployment, illegal immigration and drug-trafficking also top the list of security concerns for ordinary Europeans as well as their top decision-makers. While peace and stability and the containment of regional conflicts are clearly among the more traditional security concerns, the “softer” security issues came to top the agenda in the 1990s, and especially since the September 11th attacks on New York and Washington.

As the European Security Strategy acknowledges, “the post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked.” The completion of the common market and the gradual disappearance of borders among the member states of the European Union were accompanied by the continuous strengthening and increasing importance of their external borders. Processes of globalization in general, and more concrete events, such as the opening of the former Eastern bloc, among others, contributed to the increasing profile of borders on the European Continent. Border-controls are intended to preserve the European Union from a wave of unwanted immigrants and refugees, terrorism, drug- and human-trafficking, and other types of organized crime.

The removal of internal borders within the EU created a discourse on the “security deficit,” which in turn, led to a renewed emphasis on the policing of the external borders of the Union and placed immigration firmly into the security frameworks of the member states, and subsequently EU-wide. Portrayed as a root cause of perceived threats to economic well being, social and political order, and cultural and religious identities (especially in the context of immigration from North Africa and the Middle East), in the 1990s migration was securitized as an existential threat to society, thereby justifying the need to take extraordinary measures to protect it. According to the security framework developed by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, “securitization” refers to a process where “the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.” Security, then, is a subjective dynamic, where an issue becomes a matter of security when it is presented as such; in other words, security is a “speech act.”


6 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 23-4.

Some of the earliest examples of the securitization of migration in Europe can be found throughout the text of the Schengen Agreement. For example, Title 1, Art. 7, provides for the approximation of the signatories’ visa policies as soon as possible “in order to avoid the adverse consequences in the field of immigration and security that may result from easing checks at the common borders,” and the application of visa and admission procedures “taking into account the need to ensure the protection of the entire territory of the five States against illegal immigration and activities that could jeopardize security.” The 1990 Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement also connects migration and asylum with terrorism, transnational crime, and border control, and locates it in a framework regulating the security of the internal market. Most recently Javier Solana, High Representative of the EU for CFSP, stated in a speech to the European Parliament that “massive flow of drugs and migrants are coming to Europe and affect its security. These threats are significant by themselves, but it is their combination that constitutes a radical challenge to our security.” These statements clearly imply the necessity of measures directed at cross-border movements of migrants and drugs, with the goal of keeping Europe safe. Significantly, they also group immigration and criminal activity, such as drug trafficking, on the same scale as security concerns requiring immediate attention. The linkages created between immigration, organized crime, and even terrorism contributed to what Didier Bigo calls an “internal security field” in Western Europe, which places illegal immigration, crime and terrorism on a single security continuum. Most often this process takes place within the political discourse, where the securitization of an issue enables actors to propose means for finding a solution for the security problem and claim competence to deal with it.

Terrorism has become the main politically related violent threat to the societies of the European Union. In response to the attacks in the United States and especially after the Madrid bombings, the EU accelerated the implementation of existing measures and introduced new ones for combating terrorism, including the adoption of common definition of terrorism, and an EU-wide arrest warrant, among others. While Europeans were not unaccustomed to battling terrorism, prior to September 11 the efforts were focused primarily on terrorist groups who were...

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12 David Carlton defines terrorism as “significant levels of violence perpetrated by politically-motivated sub-state actors who may or may not be to some degree sponsored by, but who will not normally be directly controlled by, sovereign states.” in Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe. eds. Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre. (St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1993): 167 -181
active on a national level, and whose demands were concrete and negotiable. In contrast, the emphasis has now shifted to international terrorism, with its global financial networks, communications and operations.\textsuperscript{13} Terrorism is also a threat that is rooted within Western societies, thereby making possible the connection between open borders and immigration – from the Middle East in particular - with facilitating terrorism.\textsuperscript{14} As Ole Wæver argues, at least in part, this fear is again rooted in the ethnonational fear of foreigners and justifies support for repressive internal security practices.\textsuperscript{15} Framing the issue of terrorism in this way often implies that it is immigrants who are at the root of these problems, and tighter policing seems to be the proposed solution.

The existing discourses on migration in Europe have been grouped along four different dimensions: the economic discourse of threat, which focuses on job losses and the financial burden of immigration; discourses of solidarity, which focus on democratic values and human rights; discourse of security, with emphasizes criminality and social security; and the discourse of positive diversity, which includes multiculturalism, and brain drain from the “push” regions, among others.\textsuperscript{16} For example, Jef Huysmans argues that in the EU the securitization of migration has occurred mainly along the dimensions of identity, public order, and welfare systems, which fall under the categories of economic threats and security discourses. This view appears to agree with Wæver’s argument that immigration threatens the collective identity of a society, and by association, its welfare provisions. Huysmans argues that as immigrants are not part of “us,” therefore, they should not benefit from the welfare state, which rightfully belongs only to nationals. In other words, the notions of social solidarity and distribution of welfare become intertwined with notions of nationality and citizenship. Since immigrants and refugees are not citizens of a member state, they are not seen as members of that community, and therefore, should not fully share the benefits of the internal market, such as free movement, and welfare provisions. This linkage between nationality and welfare entitlements is what Huysmans refers to as “welfare chauvinism.”\textsuperscript{17}

The next sections will look at how the eastern enlargement of the European Union is implicated in the internal security concerns of the European Union. It argues that the widespread perception of a wave of economic immigrants from the new members has led to fears about the labor markets and welfare of the “old” members, and resulted in restrictions on the free

\textsuperscript{13} Cameron, Fraser, Cosijn, Hendrik, and Herrberg, Antje. \textit{Tackling Terrorism and Dealing with Rogue States}. The European Policy Centre, EastWest Institute. (Brussels 31 October 2002).

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid. 25


movement of labor. Moreover, the eastern border of the enlarged EU reaches states, which the Union sees as exporters of illegal immigration, drug- and human-trafficking, and organized crime. Hence, as the new external border of the EU is becoming increasingly more scrutinized, it contributes to the disruption of long-standing economic and social relationships in the border regions, and ultimately a new dividing line between the “ins” and “outs” of the integration process.

**Enlargement and Security in the European Union**

The present round of enlargement is undoubtedly a project without a precedent in the brief history of European integration in terms of its scope and transformational effect. It adds to the complexity of the EU, changes its profile, reaches new neighbors, and establishes a more complex power in the world. It also divides Europe in two, with the “other” Europe being either anxious to get in, or feeling excluded. Since the new enlargement is only an intermittent step toward the final reaches of the European Union, its future, and perhaps final, borders are still a matter of speculation. As the dividing line between those who are on the “inside” and those on the “outside,” the eastern border is also a contributor to the identity definition of those on both sides of the border. In the meantime, the new eastern border is perceived as the source of some of the main security threats to the EU, since the new members are countries of transit for illegal immigrants and drug- and human-traffickers from further east. As a result, this external border of the EU has been further strengthened and even militarized.

The expansion to the east was a form of foreign policy that was intimately tied to maintaining peace and stability on the continent. From its inception the eastern enlargement was legitimized as a tool for achieving lasting peace and security, as well as conditioned by the ability of the candidate states to maintain such relations. Following the collapse of communist regimes in the Central and Eastern European countries, the potential for ethnic conflicts, economic disruptions, political instability and their spillover effects on the then European Community led Western European leaders to emphasize the need for promoting good neighborly relations among these countries, helping stabilize their economies, and improve minority rights, among others. According to the Commission “enlargement – both for the EU, the candidate states and their neighbors -- is rightly viewed as being part of an overall security endeavor on the European continent as is enlargement of NATO.” Even though security concerns are hardly mentioned in the admission criteria, those have played a prominent role in the enlargement process. For example, at the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, when the decision to enlarge was announced, the European Commission stated that the prospect of membership would “provide an element of stability against a background of continuing turbulence in the former Soviet Union and the tragedy unfolding in the former Yugoslavia and diminish tension in a region where confidence and stability are suffering from the absence of a viable security

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18 For a detailed analysis of the discursive links between the eastern enlargement of the EU and security, see Atsuko Higashino, “The Role of Security in the EU Enlargement Eastwards,” Paper Presented at the CGES Conference, February 20-21, 2004, Washington, DC.

architecture.”\textsuperscript{20} Hence, the possibility of accession in the European Union, albeit at a distant future date, was seen as an incentive for the associated countries to continue to transform their political as well as economic systems, and as an instrument for maintaining stability in the eastern part of the continent. Thus, enlargement was presented as the mechanism intended to deal with the problems of peace and stability. “Desecuritization,” according to Buzan \textit{et al}, refers to a process in which issues are shifted out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere.\textsuperscript{21} For example, integration is often presented as the solution to the fragmentation and violence of Europe’s past, i.e., integration is the desecuritized effect of the securitized threat. Enlargement, as a continuation and geographical expansion of integration, suggests expanding this project of ensuring peace and security to the eastern part of the continent, thereby being desecuritized. More specific security concerns regarding good neighborly relations and minority rights became de facto accession preconditions with the Pact on Stability in Europe, which was signed in 1995. The Pact, which was a joint action under the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, promised a framework for “lasting good-neighborliness” in Central and Eastern Europe. This policy instrument was another step, which linked enlargement to security.

While potential territorial disputes or ethnic problems may have constituted a cause for concern, it was primarily non-traditional security concerns emanating from Central and Eastern Europe that caused growing anxiety in the EU. Among those, migration, organized crime, drug-trafficking and human smuggling gradually came to the forefront of the debate. Enlargement was seen both as the solution to some of these problems and as the source, due to the permeability of the candidate countries’ borders. As Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that, “Without enlargement western Europe will always be faced with the threat of instability, conflict and mass migration on its borders.”\textsuperscript{22} In this particular case, Mr. Blair presents enlargement as the solution to the threats of instability, conflict and migration, thereby making the link between enlargement and internal security, and obtaining a desecuritizing effect.

In line with this reasoning, the eastern enlargement was arguably the most important factor behind the development of justice and home affairs in the EU since the creation of the third pillar. Enlargement itself can be seen as a policy intended to enhance internal security. For example, Lykke Friis argued that by enlarging the EU would move its borders to the east, effectively creating a \textit{cordon sanitaire} between the member states and the near abroad, where the problems governments faced were even more severe, while simultaneously forcing the CEECs to reduce the permeability of their borders and strengthen their judicial systems. The adoption and implementation of the JHA \textit{acquis} was seen as critical, since otherwise the EU would in fact be internalizing the very same problem against which it was trying to protect itself, facilitated by the visa-free regime and the free movement of labor after accession. By insisting that the candidates adopted the JHA \textit{acquis}, the EU could minimize the import of security problems once the

\textsuperscript{20} European Commission. \textit{Towards a Closer Association with the Countries from Central and Eastern Europe.} (Brussels, 18 May 1993) 1-2.


\textsuperscript{22} “Blair Attacks Two-Tier Europe,” \textit{BBC News}, 6 October 2000, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk}. 

CEECs became members. In the meantime, growing stability in the region and resumed economic growth would reduce the number of immigrants.\(^23\)

Giving due consideration to the political, economic, and social upheavals that took place in the post-communist countries in the process of transformation, and recognizing the considerable prosperity gap that still exist between the two parts of Europe, it is easy to understand the expectations of mass emigration from the region. Enlargement would also make the Union more vulnerable to illegal migrants, drug-smuggling and money laundering, since the new members with become transit countries for illegal immigrants from further east, the Middle East, or Central Asia.\(^24\) Although the expectations of large-scale immigration from the CEECs never materialized,\(^25\) nonetheless cross-border movements became securitized in the political discourses in Western Europe, thereby contributing to the rise of right-wing political parties\(^26\) and organizations. Securing the eastern borders became one of the priorities of the EU in its relationship with the candidate countries, including provisions for financial assistance and expertise.

Most recently the acknowledgment of the historical significance of enlargement has come simultaneously with the declared desire of political leaders across the European Union for the need to protect their labor markets from the wave of immigrants from the East, which the freedom of movement would potentially unleash. The argument is that low cost workers from the new members will migrate west and take away jobs from the local labor force, and drive down wages. As a result, all of the current member states except Ireland have imposed restrictions on the free movement of labor that could extend for up to seven years. The perception of threat is evident in the words of Prime Minister Tony Blair, explaining why Britain would impose restrictions: “It is important that we recognize that there is a potential risk from these accession countries,” Mr. Blair told parliament, “We will take whatever measures are necessary to make sure that the ‘pull factor’ which might draw people is closed off.”\(^27\) In this


\(^{25}\) In 1999, the number of candidate country nationals who were legally employed in the EU was approximately 290,000 out of total 5,280,000, or 6% of all foreign workers and 0.2% of the labor force. The majority of these workers – almost 70% - are in Germany and Austria, where they account for approximately 10% of all foreign workers, and 0.4 and 1.2% respectively of the total labor force. The number of undocumented workers and migrants was estimated at approximately 600,000, most of whom engage in short-term work while abroad (“working tourists”) or cross-border trading (“trading tourists”). The latter groups are generally low-cost and flexible alternatives to local labor, in other words, the feared cheap labor competing with the local workers for scarce jobs, but some of them are engaged in areas already abandoned by the local labor, such as household tasks, care, and other personal services. European Commission. Information Note: The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement. Annex 1. Brussels. (6 March 2001): 26-28.

\(^{26}\)For example, Jorg Heider whose far right Freedom Party entered the Austrian government in 2000, was an opponent of enlargement, arguing that “enlargement was a declaration of war on his country.” “Crime Without Frontiers?” BBC News. 10 March 1998. http://news.bbc.co.uk.

case the “danger” to the welfare system of the United Kingdom that workers from the new member states could represent is securitized with the assertion that any necessary measures would be taken to prevent it from occurring. The result of similar discourses throughout the EU, including those members who initially favored opening their labor markets to the citizens of the new members, such as Spain, Sweden, and the UK, has been the adoption of policies establishing transition periods that could last up to seven years, even though the free movement of labor is a key principle of the integration process.

In the case of the eastern enlargement it is potential large-scale labor movements and the permeability of the new border, and hence importation of criminality and possibly terrorism, that are seen as threatening, thereby pointing to the predominance of economic and security concerns in the various discourses. Since security is constructed through language, the way that an issue is framed determines the structure of the discourse, which potentially can affect reality. The transition periods for the free movement of labor have been adopted by the member states regardless of the number of studies, which show that immigration from the East will be considerably less than the expected “flood” of immigrants. The latest study sponsored by the European Commission suggests that only about 1% of the working populations of the ten new members, or about 220,000 per year, are willing to move west. Moreover, those who would move are young, well educated or enrolled in institutions of higher education, and single persons, which in fact raises the issue of “brain drain” from the sending countries rather than an overwhelming wave of unskilled immigrants.28

Enlargement, Security, and the Militarization of Borders

The issue of securitizing migration through speech acts has been well developed over the past decade, with due consideration given to the impact of securitizing rhetoric of national political leaders, EU officials as well as media representations, which have all pointed to the dangers of migration to the societal security of Western Europe. Discursive practices, however, may not be sufficient in explain how speech acts have been translated into sets of restrictive national immigration policies, the emergence of pan-European immigration regimes and seemingly ever-expanding enforcement of border controls at the edges of Europe. Didier Bigo, for example, contends, that securitization cannot be separated from non-discursive practices, as “it is of the same nature as non-discursive practices, technologies at work, effects of power, struggles and especially institutional competition in the security field.” Securitizing rhetoric necessitates a process of extensive mobilization of resources in order to become the dominant discourse. Hence, the completion of the securitization process depends on the ability of certain actors in society, namely, security professionals to create “power/knowledge” which overlays immigration with organized crime, unemployment, and even terrorism. Everyday fears are then linked to the dangers of influx of migrants, requiring security professionals to use their knowledge in order to

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assure and protect the public, as well as anticipate new dangers. Security agencies do not simply respond to threats; they take part in creating them by objectifying them in their routine work, in the way they put their statistics together, in the hierarchy given to different dangers, in the priorities they set, in the technical solutions available, in the know-how they think they possess. The securitized issues also have to be taken up by political actors. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, for example, the issues of immigration and xenophobia moved out of the periphery and into mainstream domestic politics in a number of EU member states, including Austria, France, Denmark, and Holland. Investigating the way discursive practices influence the process of securitization, however, is not the purpose of this section. Instead, it will look at some of the effects the expected wave of immigration with the accompanying trends of importing organized crime, drug-trafficking, and even terrorism into the EU have affected the new eastern border of the Union.

It has been argued that the perceived security deficit that came with the abolition of the internal borders has been the primary rationale behind furthering integration in the area of police cooperation and external border controls. The concept of internal security has progressively expanded both geographically – by extending police activities beyond national boundaries and becoming more interconnected, and structurally, through extending the scope of policing beyond the realm of crime control. Steps have been taken toward harmonizing criminal justice systems and institutionalizing cross-border law enforcement cooperation, and increasing the budget and staff of Europol. Other scholars, however, argue that the most important reasons for the Europeanization of police activities have to do with the struggle between and within various law enforcement agencies for larger budgets and legitimacy, as well as the move toward the costlier alternative of technological surveillance at a distance. These measures were further strengthened in the wake of the terrorist attacks September 11, including the EU-wide arrest warrant. As Peter Andreas argues, the hardening of the external borders of the EU to ensure the free mobility of its citizens has occurred along commonly agreed rules and procedures. “Indeed, border control and the policing of CTAs (clandestine transnational actors) are areas of activity in which the EU is arguably starting to resemble and behave like a traditional, territorial state. All new members must adopt the Schengen system as a condition of entry.”

The extension of the emerging European border regime to the candidates as a major component of the accession process enabled the EU essentially to thicken its borders by utilizing its neighbors as buffers. In addition to this transference of policy, another important trend is the militarization of borders, manifested in the increasing usage of military technology and interventions of armed forces in the efforts to curtail the flow of illegal immigrants. Poland, for

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example, which has long border with Ukraine, is well on its way to militarizing its borders, as the resort to military equipment becomes indispensable when all else fails in ensuring the security of the eastern borders. Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic are all following suit. While the militarization of the eastern border is heralded as a success in fulfilling the membership obligations of the European Union, there is also the apprehension among the new members about the disruptive impact of this process on their relations with neighboring countries. Specifically, this emphasis on restrictive border policies undermines the headline goal of European foreign policy, namely, continent-wide stability, ending regional conflicts, and furthering economic integration. It also testifies to the pre-eminence of the internal security of the EU over the foreign policies of the new members, and de facto gives law enforcement agencies powers that traditionally have been part of the external relations of the Union. They also concern issues of freedom and democracy as they undermine the principle of non-intervention of the military in domestic civilian life.”

These developments also suggest another fundamental difference between the old and new member states of the EU: the former are much more internal-security minded, whereas regional stability is still a priority for most of the new member states. The integration process eliminated the possibility of large-scale violence in Western Europe and the relative peace and stability in its immediate neighborhood to the east have allowed the current members to focus on aspects of security other than the traditional military ones. The CEECs, on the other hand, because of their long-standing economic, social, cultural, and political linkages with their neighbors further east, emphasize the importance of bilateral relations. Those countries that are left out or have no prospect of joining the EU any time soon, are even more susceptible to the effects of instability in the region. This divergence in the objects of security is a contributing factor in the creation of the two “Europes” that currently seem to exist.

The concept of free movement of persons within the EU, and the even tighter border around this area, especially with its militarization, are linked to the inclusive/exclusive character of the emerging European immigration policy.\(^{34}\) In line with Malcolm Anderson’s argument that borders are identity makers,\(^ {35}\) one side effect of the emerging EU immigration regime, epitomized by the Schengen area, is that it creates an in-group and out-group of Europeans. The in-group is composed of EU citizens, whereas the out-group comprises those Europeans whose “Europeanness” is questioned, at least in the prevalent discourse. This delineation constitutes the basis for defining “us” and “them,” the former being the citizens of wealthy, liberal democracies of Western Europe, and the latter being the much poorer and not yet assimilated the liberal values of the European “community of values” inhabitants of those countries that have been left out. For the new member states, becoming one of the in-group involves adopting exclusionary rules toward their neighbors to the east; in other words,”admission to the club of well-to-do

\(^{33}\) Bigo 235.

\(^{34}\) Agnieszka Weinar, Securitization and Humanitarianism – Polish Migration Policy and the Communities of Meaning. Paper presented at the CGES Conference, February 20-21, 2004, Washington, DC.

members depends on taking over the rules of exclusion of non-members.”36 For the ten countries that will accede in May 2004 this also means that their perceptions of the “other” have also had to change as part of their adaptation to the EU; in other words, the process of joining the EU has triggered a gradual process of creating the “other” as the foreigner from the East and the South.

Security, Border Policies, and Expansion of the European Union

It has been argued that a number of the internal security threats, especially terrorism, are territorially unbound, in other words, neither their origins nor their targets are confined to any particular state or territorial unit. Yet, ironically, both the United States and the European Union have responded to the terrorist threat by fortifying their borders with the rest of the world, especially with that part of it that happens to be poorer, politically more volatile, and culturally different. This further exacerbates the effects of exclusion of those less fortunate and different from the security of the gated communities that the European Union and the United States have become. The issue of the free movement of labor for the new members, in conjunction with the new enlargement, and the ongoing debate on what Europe is and where it ends, all compound the problem of identity with some very real implications.

Hence, while both the single market and the Schengen agreement are intended to ensure the free movement of people, for those in Eastern Europe and they are perceived as elements of a discriminatory regime. As Jan Zielonka points out, “Schengen has become a symbol of exclusion of the poor and allegedly less civilized European nations by wealthy and arrogant superior ones.”37 In this sense, borders are also a matter of discourse, dependent upon the context in which they are used. Future rounds of enlargement, including the expected accession of Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the discussions of the eventual membership of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, among others, give rise to new fears because of the possibility of importing minority problems into Europe. As Bigo questions, “Freedom of movement will have had its day. It will apply to some sections of the Union’s membership but not to others. How should we react to this argument that destroys the European idea? Can we accept a division of an enlarged EU into two zones, one with freedom of movement and one without?”38 While freedom of movement is perhaps the most tangible benefit for the citizens of the new member states of the EU and a key symbol of the “return to Europe,” its gradual extension is an example of short-term economic interests and domestic political concerns taking precedence of the notion of European citizenship.


38 Bigo 234.
The practical effects of this new dividing line include alienating the EU’s current or future neighbors, and possibly their protracted instability, disrupting economic and social ties on both sides of the border, infringing on free trade, jeopardize the existing system of civic rights and freedoms, and the cost of border-monitoring. First and foremost, however, it has been argued that there is little evidence to suggest that the attempts to control organized crime, terrorism, and immigration along EU’s external borders have been effective. On the contrary, “a hard border creates extra demand for organized cross-border crime.”39 Eberhard Bort concurs that,” human trafficking is a consequence of frontier restrictions, rather than of open borders. The higher the obstacles for border crossings, the greater the need for the ‘illegal’ to seek the aid of ‘experts,’ and the higher the price, and the risk for the illegal immigrant.”40

It is also necessary to disassociate the concepts of migration and criminality, since only a fraction of the border crossings into the EU are illegal in nature. In addition to border policing, tackling the problems of illegal immigration and organized crime may require a more focused attention on their sources within the societies of Eastern European states, and particularly their unstable institutions and economies. The prosperity gap between Eastern and Western Europe further compounds the necessity to provide financial as well as organizational support for these countries, as well as an incentive for the successful completion of their political and economic transformations. The perspective of EU and NATO memberships, for examples, provided perhaps the most important incentive for the soon-to-become members from Central Europe to stay the course of transition, and it continuous to do so for Turkey’s continued democratization. While restrictive border policies may appear to protect against the perceived threats, in the long run they may prove counterproductive for the development of cross-border cooperation, and the stability of Europe as a whole.41

Conclusion

This article has attempted to show linkages made between the eastern enlargement of the European Union and security concerns. In particular, non-military security issues such as immigration, organized crime, and terrorism have been grouped together to form single security continuum, which has been securitized with respect to the cross-border activities from and through Central and Eastern Europe. Migration was transformed from a managerial issue into a security one, with policy implications for the external borders of the enlarged EU. This transformation was facilitated by the particular historical context as well as by domestic political concerns. The securitization of immigration also blurs the boundaries between legitimate governance and political exploitation of the issue.


41 See for example, Bort 206.
The redefinition of Europe in institutional terms -- namely, the prospects for EU and NATO enlargements -- contributed to stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe which were undergoing difficult political and economic transformations, some amid a process of nation-building as well. While these developments provided the basis for transmitting liberal values to the CEECs and thereby ensuring the consolidation of their democracies, the peace, stability, and prosperity that Europe’s enlargements sought to ensure may well be undermined with the shifting of the external borders of the enlarged EU further east. In other words, the main goal of European foreign policy – peace and stability – of which enlargement is a critical part, may well be endangered by policies dictated by the strict enforcement of external borders. In a global security environment characterized by insecurity and risks, there is a necessity for a comprehensive approach to security problems, including addressing their root causes. An enlarged and stronger EU of pan-European proportions can play this role, extend the zone of stability to the neighboring regions, and contribute to the strengthening of international order. The realization of this potential security role, however, rests with the political will of its member states.

Works Cited


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