Robert Schuman

Exploring the Implications of European Integration for The Anglophone Caribbean: From Lomé to EPA

- Wendy C. Grenade

Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series
Vol. 4  No. 17
December 2004

This publication is sponsored by the EU Commission.
The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series

The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series is produced by the Jean Monnet Chair of the University of Miami, in cooperation with the Miami European Union Center.

These monographic papers address issues relevant to the ongoing European Convention which concluded in the Summer of 2003. The purpose of this Convention was to submit proposals for a new framework and process of restructuring the European Union. While the European Union has been successful in many areas of integration for over fifty years, the European Union must take more modern challenges and concerns into consideration in an effort to continue to meet its objectives at home and abroad. The main issues of this Convention were Europe’s role in the international community, the concerns of the European citizens, and the impending enlargement process. In order for efficiency and progress to prevail, the institutions and decision-making processes must be revamped without jeopardizing the founding principles of this organization. As the member states negotiate the details of the draft constitutional treaty, the Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Papers will attempt to provide not only concrete information on current Convention issues but also analyze various aspects of and actors involved in this unprecedented event.

The following is a list of tentative topics for this series:

1. The challenges of the Convention: the ability to govern a supranational Europe or the return to intergovernmental cooperation?
2. How did the member states figure in the framework of the Convention?
3. The necessity to maintain a community method in a wider Europe.
4. Is it possible for the member states to jeopardize the results of the Convention?
5. The member states against Europe: the pressures on and warnings to the Convention by the European capitals.
6. Is it possible that the Convention will be a failure? The effects on European integration.
7. Similarities and differences between the European Convention and the Philadelphia Convention of 1787.
8. The role of a politically and economically integrated Europe in the governance of the world.
9. How important is European integration to the United States today?
10. The failure of a necessary partnership? Do the United States and the European Union necessarily have to understand each other? Under what conditions?
11. Is it possible to conceive a strategic partnership between the United States, the European Union and Russia?
12. Russia: a member of the European Union? Who would be interested in this association?

Miami European Union Center
University of Miami
1000 Memorial Drive
101 Ferré Building
Coral Gables, Fl. 33124-2231
Phone: 305-284-3266; Fax: 305-284-4406
Email: jroy@miami.edu
Web: www.miami.edu/eucenter

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Exploring the Implications of European Integration for The Anglophone Caribbean: From Lomé to EPA

Wendy C. Grenade*

The Jean Monnet Chair
University of Miami
Miami, Florida
December 2004

*Wendy C. Grenade is a PhD Candidate at the Department of International Studies and a Research Assistant at the European Union Center, University of Miami. Her research interests include regional integration, in particular the North-South dynamics of regionalization; Caribbean-EU relations and democratization. Previously Ms. Grenade worked with the Grenada Diplomatic Service and with the Government of Grenada in a number of other technical areas.
INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) is at a defining period in its history. It faces the twin challenge of ‘perfecting’ enlargement and ratifying the controversial Constitutional Treaty. These two processes have converged to locate the EU at a critical juncture in its integration process. However, while critical junctures are not new to the EU, the recent enlargement process and the uncertainty surrounding the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, render the current phase one of the most crucial moments in the history of European integration. This transition phase is significant as the EU attempts to bring the Union ‘closer to its citizens’, reevaluate its relationship with the developing world and assert its role as a global player.

The current juncture is significant not only for the EU, but may have far-reaching implications for other regions in other parts of the world. However, this is not a new phenomenon. This paper argues that throughout the evolution of the EU, a pattern has emerged where European integration, combined with other global processes, have been both a threat to, and one of the incentives for various kinds of regionalisms in other parts of the world. The creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 and the ongoing negotiations for the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) are often cited as the

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1 On May 1, 2004 ten new countries acceded to the EU: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania are preparing for accession by 2007, while on October 6, 2004 the EU Commission recommended to the EU Council that accession talks can begin with Turkey.

2 On Friday October 29, 2004 the EU’s new Constitutional Treaty was signed in Rome in the same room where the Treaty of Rome was signed to establish the EC in 1957. The EU-25 and three candidate countries signed the Constitutional Treaty which was unanimously adopted by them on June 18, 2004. The Constitution Treaty has its genesis in the Nice Treaty, 2001 and subsequent Laeken Declaration, 2001 which was part of a review of the EU Treaties aimed to prepare the EU for enlargement. The Laeken Declaration gave its mandate to a Convention to consider the key issues arising for the EU’s future development and identify the various possible responses for the way forward. The Convention met for sixteen months between March, 2002 and June, 2003 and submitted a draft Constitutional Treaty. Key features of the Constitutional Treaty include an EU President instead of a six-monthly rotating presidency; an EU foreign minister; and a new system of voting weights. National veto remains for foreign policy, defense and taxation. The challenge for the EU will be to gain the approval of the parliaments and peoples of Europe – at least 11 Member States are expected to have referenda on the issue (Andréani, 2004: 1). The Treaty is expected to come into force on November 1, 2006.

3 For an analysis of NAFTA vis-à-vis the EU see Chanona, 2003; Pastor, 2004.

4 For an overview of the FTAA see Wrobel, 1998. For comparative analysis between the FTAA and the EU see Granell, 2002; and Roy and Kanner, 2003.
United States’ response to the consolidation of European integration in the post Cold War era. The simultaneous deepening and widening of the European project has also impacted on other regions in different ways.

The paper specifically discusses the implications of European integration for the Anglophone Caribbean. Why the EU and the Anglophone Caribbean? As the paper demonstrates these two regions are historically entwined through colonial ties and post-colonial trade and aid arrangements. Much has been written about Europe and the Caribbean in the context of colonialism or post-colonialism or EU-Caribbean trade relations, within the broader context of the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States. There is also an emerging body of literature which examines the implications of European integration for the Anglophone Caribbean in the post-Lomé era. What this paper sets out to do is add to the discourse on European integration and the implications for the Anglophone Caribbean in general and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in particular. The paper begins by outlining the historical relationship between the EU and the Anglophone Caribbean through the framework of the Lomé Conventions. It then discusses some of the significant developments in the EU and in CARICOM during the late 1980s and 1990s. The next section analyses some of the challenges in the post-Lomé era, which threaten the traditional relationship between the EU and the ACP in general and the Anglophone Caribbean in particular. Finally the paper draws some broad conclusions and offers suggestions for further research.

Background to The Lomé Conventions

The early years of European integration coincided with the great wave of post-World War II decolonization. To some extent these two processes were interlinked as those European countries which previously focused their political and economic energies on their empires redirected their attention to Europe. However, decolonization did not completely sever the ties between European powers and their former colonies. Economically, European powers needed to secure guaranteed supplies of commodity products and raw materials, in the wake of two ruinous wars. Besides, former colonial powers still had political and cultural ties with their former colonies. Therefore, even as independence was granted to their colonies, the European powers sought to retain a degree of political and cultural influence over those countries, as well as preferential access to their markets. This underlying philosophy influenced post-colonial

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5 Unless otherwise indicated, ‘the Caribbean’ refers to the Anglophone Caribbean.
7 For analysis of the EU-ACP trade relations see European Community, 1996; Gonzáles, 2002; Lister, 1997; Payne and Sutton, 2001b; Ritto, 2002.
8 For an analysis on the post-Lomé era see Gibb, 2000; Sutton, 1995.
9 CARICOM was established in 1973 and currently has fifteen full Member States and five Associate Members. The Member States of CARICOM are Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago. Associate Member States are: British Virgin Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands Anguilla, Cayman Islands and Bermuda.
10 Van Ouderaren, 2000: 244.
relations between the European Community (EC) and former colonies of some of its key Member States. Therefore, the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the EC, included a provision for the economic and social development of former colonies of Member States. In this regard, an annex to the Treaty provided for the European Development Fund (EDF) which was to be financed by European Member States.

Consequently, the first Yaoundé Convention between the Association of African and Malagasy States (AAMS) and the EC was signed in 1963. This constituted the first step in the EC’s collective engagement with the former colonies of some of its Member States. The Yaoundé Convention provided eighteen African countries with preferential trade access to the European Community market as well as access to aid from the EDF. This Convention was renewed in 1969 and was due to expire in January 1975. Britain’s eventual accession to the EC in 1973, after initial setbacks, (along with Ireland and Denmark) meant that former British colonies became eligible for a similar arrangement.

Britain’s accession to the EC coincided with other developments in the Anglophone Caribbean. As colonial rule ended in the West Indies, former British colonies were seeking a viable path to development and nationhood. Therefore, as early as 1958, one year after the Treaty of Rome was signed, the West Indies Federation Movement was created with ten member countries. However, the federal venture was short-lived; coming to an end in 1962. Observers cite many factors for the federation’s failure. A key reason noted is that the federation was viewed as a British imposed project in that there was little or no popular support for it and as such it was “still born”. However, the failure of the Federation coincided with the period of independence in the Anglophone Caribbean and the determination to pursue the quest for development through regional integration. Therefore, an agreement establishing a Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) was signed in 1965 which came into effect in 1968. This new intergovernmental organization experienced economic success, as evidenced by export expansion from 85 million U.S. dollars in 1970 to 233 million in 1974. Imports expanded comparably during the same period. Beyond the initial benefits that Member States garnered from CARIFTA, however, the reality remained that CARIFTA’s economic potential was restricted by it being neither a customs union nor a common market. Some observe argue that CARIFTA did not go far enough in improving, much less transforming the economies of the region. Given the shortcomings of CARIFTA, a more comprehensive approach to integration was needed.

11 The ten nations of the federation included Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Montserrat.
12 Lewis, 1968:368. Some observers also contend that a political approach was chosen over an economic approach, with little agreement about the final purpose that federation would presumably serve; whether political or economic ends or both (see Brewster and Thomas, 1967; Milne and Stephen 1974).
As such CARICOM\textsuperscript{14} was established in 1973. As indicated earlier, this coincided with Britain’s accession to the EC which may have presented a challenge for its former colonies. For example, given its colonial history, the Anglophone Caribbean was tied to Britain politically, economically and socially-culturally.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, to preempt Britain’s accession, as early as 1972, Caribbean Heads of Government agreed that CARIFTA countries should seek as a group a single form of relationship with the European Economic Community.\textsuperscript{16} Additionally, at their historic 1973 Conference which established CARICOM, Heads of Government reaffirmed that CARIFTA countries should seek to achieve a group-relationship with the EC, without prejudice to the right of the non-independent countries to choose their own form of relationship with the EC.\textsuperscript{17} This collective approach to engage the EC was driven by the common predicaments of CARIFTA countries such as their historical legacy, small size and monoculture economies. It is necessary to note that the EC also favored a collective approach in its relations with former colonies of some of its Member States. Therefore, a series of events prepared the way for the Lomé Conventions, to which we shall now turn.

THE LOMÉ CONVENTIONS

In 1975 the EC and forty-six African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States entered into the first Lomé Convention, which provided for non-reciprocal trade concessions, development aid and institutional association with the EC. Cooperation focused on two key elements: economic and commercial cooperation, and development cooperation. The aim of the Convention was to establish a new model for relations between developed and developing states compatible with the aspirations of the international community towards a more just and more balanced economic order.\textsuperscript{18}

The Lomé non-reciprocal system of trade preferences benefited from a GATT (General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade) waiver, in particular, the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clause. As such, ACP countries were granted one-way trade preferences in return for Most Favored Nation Status (MFNS) with the EC. This was intended to increase ACP competitiveness and promote the diversification of the economies of ACP countries through privileged access for the majority of their products to the European market. ACP products included items such as

\textsuperscript{14} The Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) was established by the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas by the leaders of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The Treaty came into effect on 1\textsuperscript{st} August, 1973. According to the Treaty, the goals of regional integration are to change the centuries-old pattern of dependent under-development in the Caribbean countries, to overcome the conditions of under-employment and agricultural backwardness and to enhance the effective sovereignty of Member States of the region and the self-determination of its peoples. In this regard, the signatories of the Treaty embraced three broad objectives: economic integration (through a Common Market); functional Co-operation and common services in non-economic areas such as health, education and transportation and the co-ordination of foreign policies of Member States.

\textsuperscript{15} See Lewis, 1968 for a comprehensive account of the role of colonialism in shaping the political, economic and socio-cultural landscape of the Anglophone Caribbean.

\textsuperscript{16} CARICOM Secretariat, 1972: 3-4.

\textsuperscript{17} CARICOM Secretariat, 1973: 4.

bananas, sugar, rice and rum. The main financial and technical instruments of the partnership were the EDF and the resources of the European Investment Bank (EIB). The ACP States also benefited from lower prices due to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This arrangement was considered essential for ACP States since tariff preferences alone did not ensure access to the EU market at viable prices. As Table I shows, over the years, the number of ACP countries increased from the original forty-six to seventy seven. The EDF grew from ECU3.053,3 million in the first five-year period to ECU14.300 billion for the 1996-2000 funding cycle. This along with bilateral assistance from the EU Member States and other assistance provided from the EU budget, made the EU and its Member States by far the largest source of aid for the ACP States. Besides its tangible financial benefits, Lomé provided a framework for ACP countries to negotiate as a bloc. Thus the successful negotiation of Lomé was perhaps one of the early achievements of CARICOM.

Table 1: Evolution of The European-ACP Partnership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>No. of Countries</th>
<th>EDF Amount* (Including OC’Ts) in € millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Association System</td>
<td></td>
<td>569.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Yaoundé I Convention</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>730.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Yaoundé II Convention</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>887.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Lomé I Convention</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3.053.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Lomé II Convention</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Lomé III Convention</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>7.882.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Lomé IV Convention</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>11.583.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Lomé IV bis Convention</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>13.151.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Cotonou Agreement</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>14.300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: European Commission (cited in the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, 2000:12)

In summary, the Lomé Conventions (1975-2000) was one of the most enduring North-South arrangements in the post-colonial era. However, Lomé had its shortcomings and became incompatible with the new global trade regime as the international environment evolved. We shall return to this point later in the paper. However, it is necessary here to examine some of the other developments which were occurring in the EU and in CARICOM during the late 1980s through 1990s.

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19 In December 2000, Cuba became the 78th member of the group of ACP states.
RENEWAL - Late 1980s through Mid 1990s

After a lull in the 1970s, the late 1980s and 1990s witnessed a renewed impetus toward regional integration, particularly in Europe. The second and third waves of enlargement occurred in 1981 and 1986 when Greece and Spain and Portugal became Member States of the EC. This changed the borders of the EC with its Southern and Mediterranean neighbors. The Schengen Agreement which was signed in 1985 among seven Member States made arrangements for fast-track removal of internal border controls which became effective in 1995. Perhaps more important, the Single European Act (SEA) was signed in 1986 which was aimed to achieve a single market by December, 1992. In addition, since a single market could not be successful without a single currency, a plan on economic and monetary union was developed in 1989, and was confirmed in 1993 when the Maastricht Treaty came into force and led to eleven member states joining the euro in January 1999.20

In addition, the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 had major implications for the EU. Events in Eastern Europe necessitated a radical reorientation of EU policy toward its Eastern neighbors. The new political condition raised concerns about the spread of ethnic conflict, flows of refugees and other migrants and other forms of instability in Europe. Therefore, German reunification was viewed as a means to ensure stability. However, the Germany which existed after reunification in October 1990 was a much larger country of eighty million people and five additional Länder (provinces). This marked a major enlargement for the EU, although not often cited as such.

The dismantling of the Soviet Union and German reunification created a dilemma for the EU, which triggered a debate about enlargement. Those favoring enlargement argued that membership in a strengthened EU was probably the only way to ensure stability over the long term. However critics cited the fact that the costs and complications of enlargement would be enormous. The question arose as to whether widening the Union would derail plans to deepen, such as the creation of a single currency, a common foreign and security policy and increased powers for the central institutions. Another difficulty concerned where to draw the line in terms of which countries, how many and the criteria to be met. Despite the ongoing debate, by mid 1993 the then EU-12 took a decision in principle to begin accession talks with those countries just emerging from Soviet rule. Given the diversity and scope of the enlargement the EU embarked on an arduous and costly pre-accession process which was designed to prepare applicant countries for membership in the twenty-first century.21 Those combined initiatives consolidated the European integration movement and had implications for the Anglophone Caribbean and for CARICOM.


In 1989, CARICOM Heads of Government examined the implications for the Caribbean of the introduction of the 1986 Single Europe Act (SEA). They noted that the emergence of a Single Europe was a matter that gave rise to a certain degree of uncertainty and concern. They welcomed the assurance given by the European Community that ACP States would not be disadvantaged by that development but nonetheless were of the view that the concept of “free circulation” could pose a real threat to the Region’s traditional products, especially bananas. They further agreed that it was necessary to monitor effectively the implications of this process and agreed to participate actively in joint mechanisms established by the ACP and EC. Besides the implications of the SEA, the EU’s focus on Central and Eastern Europe Countries (CEECs) also gave cause for concern, particularly the shift in focus in the EU’s ‘pyramid of preferences’ which meant that the direction of EU aid had changed quite strikingly. In fact, “at the end of the 1980s ACP share had declined to less than a third and the CEEC/NIS share had exploded to more than a third. It is expected that enlargement will result in further aid diversion.” Consequently, the 1989 Grand Anse Declaration was a turning point for CARICOM. Major initiatives were agreed to which were intended to chart a new course for the twenty-first century. These included, the creation of a Single Market and Economy (CSME) to be established in ‘the shortest possible time’; free movement of skilled and professional personnel beginning with University graduates, visual and performing arts, sports and media; establishment of an Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians; and the establishment of an independent West Indian Commission for advancing the goals of the Treaty of Chaguaramas.

In addition, the workings of EU institutions and the EU’s visible success at simultaneously deepening and widening triggered a debate on the applicability of the EU model to CARICOM. In this regard, a major development was the 1992 Report of the West Indian Commission (WIC) which assessed CARICOM and made some prescriptions for the way forward. The report covered a wide range of concerns including governance and politics; economic conditions; security considerations; regional institutions and the mechanism of integration; deepening versus widening; the role of the Diaspora; education; social conditions; culture and sport. In general, the Commission found that although CARICOM had made notable progress in the areas of functional cooperation and foreign policy coordination, CARICOM suffered from ‘an implementation paralysis’ which was viewed as ‘a chronic CARICOM deficiency’. The WIC drew on the EU model and recommended, among other things: a mechanism for CARICOM to speak with one voice in trade negotiations; speeding up the proposed Single Market and economy; a Caribbean Court, a Council of Ministers, an Executive Commission to address the ‘implementation paralysis’, widening of CARICOM to include Suriname and Haiti (former Dutch and French colonies) and greater engagement with the Wider Caribbean.

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Therefore, in the 1990s many initiatives were launched which were geared to enhanced cooperation between CARICOM and the Wider Caribbean. A significant development was the Caribbean Forum of ACP States (CARIFORUM) which was formally established in 1992. CARIFORUM is a group of Caribbean countries which are signatories to the Lomé IV Convention. The Forum’s primary objective is to coordinate and undertake the monitoring of resources from the EDF for the purpose of financing regional projects in the Caribbean. Thus CARIFORUM became the European Commission’s main partner for all matters related to regional cooperation in the Caribbean. This process was influenced by Spain’s accession to the EU in 1986 and the need to incorporate the Spanish-speaking Caribbean (the Dominican Republic and Cuba) into the collective EU-Caribbean post-colonial arrangement. It is necessary to note that although Cuba became the 78th member of the ACP group in December 2000, and a member of CARIFORUM in October, 2001, Cuba is not a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement. This means in effect that Cuba is the only member of the ACP group that does not have a cooperation agreement with the EU. Some observers refer to this as an anomaly where Cuba belongs to an exclusive golf club without being able to play golf. However, this does not deny the growing cooperation between the Anglophone and Spanish Caribbean. In fact in 2000 CARICOM and Cuba signed a Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement and in 2001 CARICOM and the Dominican Republic signed a free trade agreement. These agreements demonstrate that there is an emerging partnership between CARICOM and the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, which is influenced to a great extent by the EU.

Second, with respect to the widening of CARICOM, on July 4, 1995 Suriname became the fourteenth Member State of the Caribbean Community. Haiti secured provisional membership on 4th July 1998 and on 3 July, 2002, Haiti became the first French-speaking Caribbean state to become a full member of CARICOM. As recommended in Time for Action, in 1997, a Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) was established to coordinate the Community's external negotiations and to speak with one voice in the international trade arena. Since its creation, the CRNM has been instrumental in hemispheric and international negotiations, such as Post Lomé IV; the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round; and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). In addition, in 1997 the Treaty of Chaguaramas was revised to support the emerging CARICOM project, in particular the proposed Caribbean Single Market which is scheduled to be established in 2005.

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26 A notable development was the establishment of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) in 1994 to promote consultation, cooperation and concerted action among all the countries of the Caribbean Basin comprising 25 Member States and three Associate Members.
27 The Member States of CARIFORUM are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. The UK and Dutch OCTs have observer status while active co-operation is pursued with the French DOMs.
29 See Bryon, 2000 for an analysis of Cuba and CARIFORUM, the EU and the United States.
30 Roy, 2003:8
Additionally, based on recommendation from the WIC, in 2003 CARICOM Heads of Government agreed, through the Rose Hall Declaration,\(^{31}\) to establish a CARICOM Commission or other executive mechanism, whose purpose will be to facilitate the deepening of regional integration in the area of the CARICOM Single Market and such other areas of the integration process as the Conference of Heads may from time to time determine. Currently proposals to operationalize the Executive Commission are being discussed by various organs of the Caribbean Community. This is part of wider proposals for institutional reform and options for governance currently being debated. What this suggests is that the emerging CARICOM model seems to be drawing on certain aspects of the EU model: such as the proposed single market, common court and executive commission. It is necessary to point out that there is an ongoing debate about the applicability of the EU model to the Caribbean, given the peculiarities of the Caribbean region. Some observers argue that CARICOM needs greater supranationality, particularly if the proposed single market is to be effective.\(^{32}\) Others caution that the Caribbean should “…tailor the EU model to suite the Caribbean landscape rather than mimic it.”\(^{33}\) This is a dilemma for CARICOM as it seeks to deepen integration, within the framework of a community of sovereign, independent states. This paper argues that even as CARICOM seeks to renew itself, it should draw lessons from the EU, particularly in terms of its common institutions, but tailor the emerging CARICOM model to suite the peculiarities of the Caribbean region. This becomes even more urgent as CARICOM grapples with the challenges of the post Lomé era.

THE POST LOMÉ ERA – Change and Continuity?

When the first Lomé Convention was signed in 1975 the EC needed to secure guaranteed supplies of commodity products and raw materials, while the Caribbean needed to have guaranteed markets for its products. This harmony of interests underpinned the Lomé Conventions and perhaps contributed to its endurance. However, the Lomé Conventions have often been criticized. Some observers argue that they “have not lived up to expectations”.\(^ {34}\) The point is also noted that only a handful of ACP countries – 10 at most – have had the know-how or have been able to profit from this advantage. Karl also observes that the overall share of the ACP countries in total EU imports have systematically fallen – from 6.7 per cent in 1976 to 2.8 per cent in 1999. In his view, although they are at that top of the pyramid of advantages offered by the EU to its development partners, paradoxically, the ACP countries are bottom of the list when it comes to exports to European markets. Why is this so? As Karl further points out, the structural problems inherent in the ACP economies which limit their competitiveness, the lack of investment and under-industralization, combined with economic difficulties arising out of the international environment, and the existence of sophisticated mechanisms of disguised protectionism at the very gateways of the European market, are all factors that led to the failure of the old system.\(^ {35}\)

\(^{31}\) The Rose Hall Declaration was an annex to the 24th Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, which was held in Montego Bay, Jamaica, 2-5 July, 2003. (see CARICOM Secretariat: 2003).

\(^{32}\) Brewster, 2003.

\(^{33}\) Hinds, 2003:1.

\(^{34}\) Karl, 2002: 21.

\(^{35}\) Ibid
The shortcomings of Lomé, combined with the demands of the changing global environment, required a new approach to EU-ACP development cooperation at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In particular, the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and the accompanying rules-based trade regime was a critical development which challenged the preferential Lomé arrangements. The ruling of the WTO panel on the EU banana regime\(^{36}\) was a defining moment for EU-ACP relations. This ruling had a significant impact on the Anglophone Caribbean. A recent study\(^{37}\) conducted, using St. Lucia as an example, estimated that at best 27,064 jobs, and at worst 31,064 jobs, were lost from the banana fall-out between 1994 and 2000.\(^{38}\) However, despite the inherent contradictions between trade liberalization and development, the new global order requires changes to traditional ‘discriminatory’ arrangements. The EU has been obliged to meet the legal requirements stipulated under WTO law. The institutional nature of the present international trading environment superseded national and regional commitments to retain long-term trading relationships.\(^{39}\) Therefore the EU had to revise its trade relations with the ACP, reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and institute other internal reform measures to ensure WTO compatibility.

Consequently, on the eve of the twenty-first century, a landmark EU Green Paper signaled a paradigm shift in EU-ACP relations. The Green Paper noted that Lomé Conventions, which had been the framework for trade and development aid ties between the EU and ACP States since 1975, was one of the most important facets of the EU’s external activities. However, it pointed out that the world was becoming a very different place. New challenges had arisen and as such both the EU and its partners had new preoccupations.\(^{40}\) The Green Paper also emphasized that, as the 21st century dawns, relations between the European Union and the ACP countries should be put on new footing to take account not only of changed political and economic conditions for development but also of changed attitudes in Europe. The Green Paper reiterated that “the colonial and post-colonial periods are behind us and a more politically open international environment enables us to lay down the responsibilities of each partner less ambiguously.”\(^{41}\)

The Green Paper also referred to the significance of the multipolar world and the need for the EU to make its presence felt in all regions of the world. It indicated the EU’s intention to strive to forge its external identity through a more effective and more global common foreign and security policy, an effective and differentiated development policy, and a multilateral trade policy designed to open up markets in accordance with negotiated common rules.\(^{42}\) The Green Paper also emphasized that, the EU’s external relations have also been marked by new initiatives concerning developing countries and economies in transition. It has concluded association agreements with most European countries of the former East bloc, which were then applying for

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\(^{36}\) For an account of the banana trade dispute see Clegg, 2002; Stevens, 1996; Sutton, 1997.  
\(^{37}\) Nurse and Sandiford, 1995.  
\(^{40}\) European Commission, 1996: 2.  
\(^{41}\) EC, 1996: 7.  
\(^{42}\) EC, 1996:2.
membership. At the same time, the document indicated, the EU was supporting the process of economic and political change in the republics of the former Soviet Union and had concluded trade agreements with several of them. As such the document indicated that the EU’s cooperation policy with the ACP countries would be restructured around three core areas: poverty alleviation; institutional dimension and the public sector and trade and investment. Therefore, this marked the beginning of the post-Lomé era.

Lomé IV expired in February, 2000 and the Cotonou Agreement was subsequently signed in June 2000, and entered into force on 1 April 2003. One of its main objectives is to foster the smooth transition of the ACP states into the world economy, in full conformity with the provisions of the WTO. The new agreement is designed to address the inadequacies of the Lomé Conventions through the inclusion of a wide range of innovative provisions for expanded cooperation, political dialogue and in the areas of trade and economic cooperation, including direct assistance to the productive sectors. It was also agreed that new WTO compatible arrangements governing trade between the ACP Group and the EU would be put in place by 2008. What is significant is that, unlike Lomé, the Cotonou Agreement commits the EU and CARIFORUM to asymmetrical trade liberalization. From a Caribbean perspective, this can be problematic, as small states are being forced to negotiate reciprocal agreements with unequal partners. According to the Cotonou Agreement, the EU and the ACP have five years in which to set up Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). This is so, since on January 1, 2008 the waiver obtained from the WTO at the Doha Ministerial Conference will end and it will have to be replaced by a new framework that must be WTO-compatible. The main objective of the economic and trade cooperation as outlined in Article 34 of the Cotonou Agreement is to foster “the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy with due regard to their political choices and development priorities, thereby promoting their sustainable development and contributing to poverty eradication in the ACP countries.” Unlike the Lomé Conventions, a significant feature of the EPAs is that they will be negotiated between the EU and a divided ACP – six ACP geographic regions. Another notable feature of the EPAs is that they will continue to reserve special treatment for the poorest ACP countries (the Least Developed Countries – LDCs). The EU also promotes regional integration within ACP states as one of the underlying elements of the EPAs.

For the EU, regional integration and the EPAs are not means in themselves but instruments to achieve the objective of sustainable development and a launching pad for effective beneficial integration into the world economy. Nonetheless, the EPA negotiations are occurring at a complex time both for the EU and CARICOM. The EU is grappling with its own internal challenges, viz ‘perfecting ‘ enlargement, ratifying the Constitutional Treaty, developing a defense and security policy, competing with other global powers and bringing the Union closer to its citizens. Therefore, the newly emerging EU entity is certain to have implications for the EU’s relations with the developing world, and the Caribbean in particular. As Clegg observes,
the unprecedented EU enlargement means the EU will have a lot of work to do to ensure that the Union is secure. He foresees a period of internalization which will divert attention away from regions such as the Caribbean. In his view the EU is likely to concentrate more resources on the East and the Mediterranean than the Caribbean area. Clegg emphasizes that “from the United Kingdom’s perspective, there will be more and more concern for the Caribbean to deal with Europe and not the UK itself.”47 This underscores the theme of this paper that this new era seems to mark the beginning of end of the traditional relationship between the EU and the Caribbean and a new kind of relationship is emerging.

For the Caribbean region, there are two related aspects of the EPA negotiations. The first is built around the Caribbean integration process and the second is the CARICOM-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement. From the Caribbean’s perspective, the EPA builds on the “enduring relationship” between the EU and CARICOM which has faced its share of challenges, “precipitated at times by outside forces.”48 As was the case in previous historical epochs, the Caribbean continues to face many challenges as it negotiates the EPAs in the twenty-first century. First, there are economic disparities within CARIFORUM states. For example countries such as Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados are much more economically developed compared to Guyana, some of the Windward Islands and Haiti.49 The challenge will be to find a common bargaining position among countries with diverse levels of development. Another major challenge relates to the various trade negotiations which are simultaneously ongoing at the hemispheric and global levels: the FTAA; a number of bi-laterals with Latin America; the EPAs and the Doha Round of the WTO. This process is further complicated since the EPAs are required to be compatible with the FTAA and both agreements have to be WTO compatible. Further, unlike the Lomé Conventions which were non-reciprocal, WTO-compatibility requires reciprocity. This requires transitional arrangements and skillful negotiations.

At the same time CARICOM is preparing to launch the Single Market and the Caribbean Court of Justice by 2005 and the Single Economy by 2007. Concurrently, CARICOM grapples with global challenges such as the illicit drug trade, the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other non-traditional security threats. Therefore CARICOM is at a critical phase which is shaping and being shaped by the emerging global landscape. Amidst all the uncertainty, what is clear is that the post-Lomé era represents more change than continuity in the long-standing relationship between the EU and CARICOM. As Bryon observes, Europe has had a multifaceted impact on Caribbean integration in the past. However, she asserts, now that Europe is changing and expanding, its colonial history is going to be downplayed. In Bryon’s view, in the future, the EU’s Near Abroad will be more important in EU’s foreign policy, since its has more geo-strategic relevance. Bryon points out that the Anglophone Caribbean has become a part of Latin America in Europe. As Bryon aptly observes, this is forcing CARICOM countries to realize the need to depend less on external forces to shape its integration process, and instead to realize that

48 P. J. Patterson, Prime Minister of Jamaica, 2004: 3.
49 See Appendix IA&B for select economic indicators of CARICOM countries.
integration must be shaped from within. This paper supports this view and argues that there has been a paradigm shift from Lomé to the current post Lomé era. This shift has been triggered by global events which are redefining the long-standing EU-CARICOM relations.

### CONCLUSION

Some broad conclusions can be drawn. First, Europe has contributed to both disintegration and integration of the Caribbean. Colonialism fragmented the Caribbean into Anglophone, Francophone, Spanish and Dutch colonies. This process created strong political, economic and cultural linkages between individual European empires and individual Caribbean territories. This fragmentation acts as a serious barrier to greater unity within the Wider Caribbean. For instance language and other cultural differences undermine regional integration within the Caribbean Basin as a whole. However, the process of European integration also helped to integrate the Caribbean. The period of decolonization coincided with the World Wars in Europe and the beginning of European integration. The long-standing Lomé Conventions, though yielding mixed results, helped to strengthen solidarity among ACP countries in general and the ACP-Caribbean group in particular. In this way, the EU helped to facilitate cohesiveness in the South the post-colonial era. What is uncertain is the future development of EU-ACP relations in general and EU-Caribbean in particular. Further research is needed to assess the Lomé and post Lomé periods and the implications for the EU and CARIFORUM countries.

Second, European integration was and still is both a threat to and an incentive for Caribbean integration. For example, Britain’s accession to the EC in 1973 coincided with other internal developments within CARIFTA countries and may have been one of the external incentives for the Anglophone Caribbean to move beyond the loose free trade CAFRIFTA arrangement to establish CARICOM. Similarly, Spain’s accession to the EU in 1986 influenced the formation of CARIFORUM and strengthened relations between the Anglophone and Spanish Caribbean. However, closer cooperation with Latin America has its own challenges, since, historically, Latin American countries were viewed as competitor economies and culturally different from the Anglophone Caribbean. In addition, the recent EU enlargement to include Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) present an enlarged EU market with potential opportunities for CARIFORUM states. This is one of the motivating factors for the CSME. In addition, an enlarged EU acts an impetus for Caribbean integration in the post-Lomé period. Yet, the EU-25 has implications for EU development policy, which may negatively affect the Caribbean. Therefore this paper emphasizes that European integration is both a threat to and an incentive for Caribbean integration. Therefore there is scope for a research agenda which empirically examines the implications of European integration for CARICOM.

Third, external factors play a major role in regional integration processes. This paper argues that as the international environment becomes more complex, the goals of regional integration movements often run at cross purposes with each other. For example, the 1996 EU Green Paper

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pointed out the EU’s intention to assert its role as a global competitor and simultaneously support the cause of the developing world. This paper argues that as globalization intensifies, these objectives will become even more contradictory, since great power competition and trade liberalization often run counter to development goals. The outcome of the EPAs will indicate the extent to which the EU can effectively balance its roles between being a global competitor and displaying solidarity with the developing world. For CARICOM, the challenge has always been how to reduce the threat of marginalization, given its vulnerability. This was the case at the end of colonialization, and it is even more so in this global era with a multiplicity of external global challenges. The case of the EU and CARICOM calls for a research agenda which analyses the relationship between globalization and regionalization. Further research is also needed on the North-South dynamics of regionalization and the role of external factors in the post Cold War world.

In summary, as the EU and CARICOM enter yet another phase in their historical relationship, many questions arise: what will be the outcome of the Constitutional Treaty and the future of the EU? How will an EU-27 or perhaps even Turkey’s accession affect the EU’s development policy? Since the new face of the EU comprises Member States who were not colonial powers, will this cause a further shift in EU-CARICOM relations? In terms of Caribbean integration: what model will emerge? Will CARICOM ‘mimic’ the EU or create institutions in keeping with its peculiarities? Will the CSME be effective without some measure of supranationality? Will the EPAs contribute to development in ways that Lomé could not? The journey from colonialization to globalization was a long and arduous one for key Member States of the EU and the Caribbean and the future seems uncertain at best.


# GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>Association of Caribbean States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAMS</td>
<td>Association of African and Malagasy States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARIFORUM</td>
<td>Caribbean Forum of ACP States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARIFTA</td>
<td>Caribbean Free Trade Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCJ</td>
<td>Caribbean Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEECs</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRNM</td>
<td>Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSME</td>
<td>Caribbean Single Market and Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTAA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area of the Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFNS</td>
<td>Most Favored Nation Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIC</td>
<td>West Indian Commission</td>
</tr>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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### APPENDIX I (A)

**SELECTED INDICATORS OF CARICOM MEMBER STATES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>AREA (Sqmiles)</th>
<th>AREA (Km²)</th>
<th>POPULATION (Persons)</th>
<th>DENSITY (/Km²)</th>
<th>GDP AT CURRENT MARKET PRICES (EC$Mn)</th>
<th>GDP PER CAPITA AT CURRENT MARKET PRICES (EC$)</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,947 2002</td>
<td>25,450 2002</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>4</td>
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Source: CARICOM Secretariat
(http://www.caricom.org)
Updated, March, 2004
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<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>TOTAL EXPORTS (EC$Mn)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>TOTAL IMPORTS (EC$Mn)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>INTRA-REGIONAL EXPORTS (EC$Mn)</th>
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<td>2001</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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</table>

r means revised  
p means provisional/preliminary  
. Data not available  
Data above is for the latest year available for each Member State.

Source: CARICOM Secretariat  
(http://www.caricom.org)  
Updated: March, 2004