

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT- A CRUEL NECESSITY?¹

Aleksandra Chauhan

Department of Political Science
University of South Carolina
Columbia, SC
alekschauhan@bellsouth.net

Prepared for delivery at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association South, Miami, Florida, November 3-5, 2005.

ABSTRACT

Mueller (1989) says that war is merely an idea. If war begins in the minds of men, then thinking has to be properly conditioned a priori to the performance of violent acts. This paper is an attempt to solve a puzzle of origins of international conflict based on two propositions: (1) Conflict is an inherent aspect of societal systems. (2) The occurrence of international conflict is contingent in the character of our leadership, their normative images of themselves and “the others”, and their desire to maintain themselves in power. Neither the occurrence nor the outcome of conflict is completely and rigidly determined by objective circumstances. Political leaders are held accountable for their foreign policy actions, and because they desire to maintain themselves in power they choose policies with an eye to their personal political future. That means that they choose in such a way that they do not precipitate an internal overthrow of their authority while also avoiding external removal. Thus decisions to go to war are endogenous to the domestic political setting of the leaders. The potentially powerful political consequences of the diversionary action are demonstrated in case studies of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin which illustrate the conditions under which domestic political opposition and elite insecurity led to the external use of force in two wars in Chechnya.

1.1. INTRODUCTION-NEW WORLD ORDER

After his execution, the body of King Charles I was placed in the Banqueting House in Whitehall. According to an often-cited tradition, at 2.00 o'clock in the morning a heavily disguised Oliver Cromwell inspected the body closely, shook his head and sighed, ‘Cruel necessity.’

Is war a necessity then? Is conflict between states a necessity? Or, is conflict *per se* a necessity?

Cromwell lived in the seventeenth century, the period in which the context of human affairs was changing dramatically. The major societies, especially in Western Europe, were undergoing the internal transformation and the worldwide emergence of networks of interaction caused by the development of new-style empires and large state systems that came to dominate global political and military affairs. Many of the wars were either “political/greedy wars” or “defensive wars”. But is the twenty first century any different?

As Huntington (1996) notices, today’s world is the one in which cultural identities –ethnic, religious, civilizational -are central, and cultural affinities and difference shape the alliances, antagonisms, and policies of states. It’s an era in which global politics is shaped by cultural and civilizational tides. These cultural forces draw people together but also drive them apart. For him, the security of the world requires acceptance of global multiculturalism. The world has changed, and so have the images of conflict and the groups participating in conflicts.

In this “new world order”, or “new world disorder” (Lake & Rothchild, 1998) many worry that *ethnic* conflicts are preponderant, and because they can and do spread across borders; they are contagious and could set off an epidemic of catastrophic proportions. The “sudden explosion” of ethno-religious conflicts around the globe following the end of the Cold War represents a significant change in political relations and a mere artifact of the ways in which we construct and categorize our ideas and thinking on international conflict.²

Mueller (1989) says that war is merely an idea. If war begins in the minds of men, then thinking has to be properly conditioned a priori to the performance of violent acts.

Although my immediate aim in this study is to analyze decisions to go to war as endogenous to the domestic political setting of the leaders, I hope to present the diversionary actions of Yeltsin and Putin in a context of broader inquiry of international conflict. As such, this paper is an attempt to solve a puzzle of origins of international conflict based on two propositions: (1) Conflict is an inherent aspect of societal systems. (2) The occurrence of international conflict is contingent in the character of our leadership, their normative images of themselves and “the others”, and their desire to maintain themselves in power. I will demonstrate that neither the occurrence nor the outcome of conflict is completely and rigidly determined by objective circumstances. Political leaders are held accountable for their foreign policy actions, and because they desire to maintain themselves in power they choose policies with an eye to their personal political future. That means that they choose in such a way that they do not precipitate an internal overthrow of their authority while also avoiding external removal. Thus decisions to go to war are endogenous to the domestic political setting of the leaders.

Two questions underlie my research: Is conflict a necessity? Are we “prisoners of war”?³ They have many facets and to find the answer, we need to understand the concepts of conflict and war and their use in the literature. Accordingly, my work will replicate prior research, and thus contribute to the cumulative basis of knowledge. It will also enable me to clarify important concepts and ideas concerning international conflict and the decision-making process leading to it. Choosing Yeltsin and Putin and their decisions to go to war with Chechnya as my case studies allowed me to apply a body of existing theories on “diversionary concept of war” or “scapegoat hypothesis”, which

theoretically are grounded in the conflict/cohesion or in-group/out-group hypothesis (Simmel, 1898; Coser, 1956).

The research, in both the collection and treatment of data, will rely heavily on qualitative historical and comparative methods. My choices regarding methods are informed by arguments that methods should not be an end in themselves but rather should be used for the purpose of addressing questions by theory (McCrea and Markle, 1989). Qualitative data used in this study will be obtained primarily from European and American newspapers, reports, media archives, and presidents' diaries. The existing literature on international conflict, diversionary theories and Chechen Wars will also be critically analyzed. To give depth and meaning to the causal concepts, I have drawn on the extensive body of literature that has been developed by scholars and activists in the fields of international conflict and Chechen Wars. This study is not aimed at testing of theory in any formal sense, but at understanding how international conflict originates and demonstrating that for Yeltsin and Putin the internal political considerations have been fundamental to external policy selection.

The research strategy to be used in this paper is the case study. Yin (1984, p.23) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon with its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and text are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used”.

I have attempted to ensure the validity of data. However, in a study of this nature, getting the whole story is obviously impossible. It is the nature of qualitative research that not all data can be presented. The data used in these case studies are not exhaustive. Not all actors, claims, events, or documents can be presented. Given the time constraint

and language barrier, some documents and speeches were difficult to locate, while other suffer from lack of complete information about the actors and their specific positions. The question here is when do we stop bringing in new data? According to Merriam (1988), the search for documents is guided by the researcher's emerging design. She notes that it is flexible yet systematic process that allows the researcher's hunches and tentative hypotheses to serve as guides in the "accidental" discovery of valuable data. Thus, it could be argued that data collection is completed when specific trends persist over time, and when generalizations can be made. To insure the validity of these data, they need to be compared with future historical patterns and theory.

1.2. THE PUZZLE OF CONFLICT AND WAR IN THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES

All theorists of international relations recognize the problem of war as a central one. The stability of the international system is usually defined in terms of its proximity to or remoteness from the occurrence or likelihood of large-scale war. For most of history, intellectuals and scholars have pondered what causes war.

One of the classic approaches is that of K. N. Waltz (1959). He distinguishes three images of international relations, or levels of analysis, in terms of which we usually try to analyze the causes of war. According to the first image, war is traceable to human nature and behavior. Partisans of the second image seek the explanation of war in the internal structure of the state. The third image postulates the causes of war in the condition known to the classical political theorists as international anarchy – that is, the absence of those instruments of law and organization that would be efficacious for

peacekeeping. In other words, according to Waltz's third image, a deficiency in the state system makes it necessary for each state to pursue its own interests and ambitions and to act as judge in its own case when it becomes involved in disputes with another state, thereby making the recurrence of conflict, including wars, inevitable and giving rise to the expectation of war as a normal feature of the state system.⁴

Within these three images there are still plenty of other factors that play some role in the onset of war.⁵ For example, states that dispute territorial issues have a higher probability of going to war than other states (Hensel, 2000; Huth, 2000; Starr & Siverson, 1990). Certain kinds of alliances increase the probability of going to war involvement (Gibler, 2000; Maoz, 2000; Snyder, 1984; Walt, 1985). Building up one's military in the context of ongoing militarized disputes makes it more likely that this dispute or one within a few years will escalate to war (Sample, 2000). Because the predominant modern images of war are primarily rationalistic, especially focusing on the loss of control, contemporary scholars have been concerned with the process by which disputes among states escalate into a violent conflict (e.g., Maoz, 1995; Gochman, 1995; Siverson and Miller, 1995). That is, the prominent perspective on the study of war is the study of the process of social conflict, including the occurrence of stages of conflict, or a conflict dynamic, that escalates through threat and coercion to the use of violence, and finally the large-scale use of violence⁶. This conflict-process perspective has many variants, almost all of which are concerned with the causes of war. According to Starr (1995), the overall model seems to rest on the analysis of the sequences of a series of *choices* which occur within different combinations of conditions. That implies the need to take into account both opportunity and willingness as jointly necessary conditions.

Luterbacher (1984) noted that two different theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches are usually taken in studying problems of peace and war, conflict and cooperation: “These can be conceived on the one hand as resulting mostly from national decision-making processes within governments. On the other hand, a large body of literature views the causes of international political actions, and wars in particular, as broad sociopolitical forces and movements that are beyond the control of any particular rulers.... The distinction between “rational” and “sociological explanations” is not always so clear-cut for particular authors. However, ...every author tends to favor one or the other conception in the end.”

I believe that, as opportunity and willingness, both of the concepts are intrinsic to international conflict. As Luterbacher pointed out, typically, social paradigms focus either on the social systems, or on the individuals, but not on both. The integration of the two existential levels is usually either assumed or at least implicitly endorsed. I consider both the social system and individual as crucial to the credibility of the analysis of international conflict; therefore, my model of international conflict is based on two propositions:

1. Conflict is an inherent aspect of societal systems.
2. The occurrence of international conflict is contingent in the character of our leadership, their normative images of themselves and “the others”, and their desire to maintain themselves in power

2.1. CONFLICT AS AN INHERENT ASPECT OF SOCIETAL SYSTEMS

Is conflict a necessity? Are we prisoners of war?

To avoid confusion, I will start with delineating the boundaries of the meanings of the concepts included in my questions.

International war is one form of social conflict- undoubtedly the most important single form in terms of its potential consequences for the individual and nations. However, there are many other forms of social conflict.⁷ The term *conflict* is defined in many different ways and has been studied from various perspectives.⁸ According to M. Deutsch (1973), a *conflict* exists whenever *incompatible* activities occur (italics in original). The incompatible actions may originate in one person, group, or nation.⁹ An action that is incompatible with another action prevents, obstructs, interferes, injures, or in some way makes the latter less likely or less effective. Conflict is also determined by what is valued by the conflicting parties (M. Deutsch, 1973).¹⁰ As such, conflict is an interaction involving humans. Moreover, it is a form of socialization. This is a very important aspect that Coser brings to our attention. No group can be entirely harmonious, for it would then be devoid of process and structure. Groups require disharmony as well as harmony, dissociation as well as well as association. Thus, a certain degree of conflict is an essential element in group formation and the persistence of group life. Simmel (1955, 93) argued that conflict with an out-group increases the cohesion and political centralization of the in-group, and generalized to international relations: “war with the outside is sometimes the last chance for a state ridden with inner antagonisms to overcome these antagonisms, or else to break up definitely.” Coser (1956) modified many of Simmel’s propositions. He contends that the cohesion of the in-group will be increased

only if there already exists some minimal level of internal cohesion and only if it is generally perceived that the external threat menaces the group as a whole and not just some part of it. Otherwise, external conflict will lead to internal conflict and disintegration rather than cohesion. The in-group/out-group or conflict-cohesion hypothesis has been so widely accepted among social scientists that Dahrendorf (1968, 58) suggests that it has acquired the status of a general law: “It appears to be a general law that human groups react to external pressure by increased internal coherence”¹¹. Conflict has many *positive functions* (Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1956). It prevents stagnation, it stimulates interest and curiosity, it is the medium through which problems can be aired and solutions arrived at, it is the root of personal and social change. In addition, conflict demarcates groups from one another by strengthening group consciousness and awareness of separateness and thus helps establish group and personal identities; i.e. external conflict often fosters internal cohesiveness. Reciprocal “repulsions” maintain a total social system by creating a balance between its various groups.

Moreover, conflict acts as a stimulus for establishing new rules, norms and institutions; it’s an agent of socialization for both contending parties. It reaffirms dormant norms and intensifies participation in social life. Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (1994) say that conflict is necessary to achieve justice. And M. Deutsch (1973) while stressing the positive functions of conflict comes to the conclusion that fortunately, “no one has to face the prospect of conflict-free existence”.

However, social conflicts that attack or threaten core values and basic concerns may be dysfunctional for social systems (Himes, 1980). The consequences of such conflict tend to be maladjustment and disintegration. Actually, function and dysfunction

of conflict are not dissociated. A dysfunctional limitation or maladaptation may be the price a social system has to pay for a functional gain. Moreover, for instance the above-mentioned cohesion- building consequences of external conflict are recognized by group leaders who often attempt to use this phenomenon to their own advantage (Simmel, 1956). Thus, Coser (1956) argues that groups may actually search for enemies with the deliberate purpose or the unwitting result of maintaining unity and internal cohesion, and Wright (1955) suggests that war or fear of war has often been used to integrate states. Similarly, the anthropologists Kluckhohn (1949) suggests that if aggressive impulses within a society are sufficiently strong and disruptive, that society may attempt to preserve its cohesion by initiating an external war to displace that aggressiveness.¹²

Is conflict a necessity, then?

Once we look at the positive functions of conflict it does seem like conflict is the essential part of our life and it is the very means of balancing and maintaining a society. So, how do we come to the paradox that at the same time conflict is the major problem of our times? How do beneficial conflicts become malignant?

As stated by Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (1994), what often happens is that the positive functions of conflict are swamped by the harmful consequences that derive from the use of heavy contentious tactics. In the throes of insult, threat, and even physical assault, it is difficult to savor the positive functions of conflict. When people deal with conflict by contending, each trying to do well at the other's expense, a set of moves and countermoves tends to result that drives conflict to increase to intensity. Participants become enmeshed in a web of interactions and defensive –offensive maneuvers that worsen instead of improve their situation. They become independent of their initiating

causes and conflict processes themselves serve to perpetuate and intensify the conflict (M. Deutsch & Shichman, 1986). Social psychologists refer to this increase in intensity as *escalation*. In fact, escalation is the key concept to understanding the process of conflict transformation that may lead to harmful outcomes and crisis. As pointed out by Starr (1995) escalation captures the notion of “process”. It is a phenomenon which is driven by choice, and as such, helps to identify different paths, or switch-points in decision trees, as parties move towards or away from higher levels of conflict. This process, capturing both opportunity and willingness, facilitates us in bringing together a variety of situations and processes normally studied separately in regard to war. Understanding the escalatory process and its various forms, and recognizing the possibility of reversing that process is crucial to our attempt to answer the question of conflict as a necessity. Since conflict *is* an inherent aspect of societal systems and it has *positive functions* maybe we should shift our attention from eliminating or preventing conflict to finding the channels through which we can make it productive (M. Deutsch, 1973)?

Are we prisoners of war, then?

In order to answer this question we also have to comprehend the circumstances in which war, the most extreme form of conflict, occurs. Although it is clear that wars do not take place in a vacuum, the relationship between war and society is less clear. The operative questions therefore become, how much does a society affect the wars in which it is involved? And, conversely, how much do wars influence the societies in which they occur?

The view that war affects society seems fairly widely accepted but there is considerable dispute on whether the effects are good or bad. It has been argued that war

is a vehicle of progress and the cause of all that is good in civilization. The finer human instincts, e.g. self-sacrifice and heroism, and social energy are activated by war. A nineteenth-century German sociologist put the view well: “War is an ordeal instituted by God, who places the nations in the balance. Its red hammer is the welder of men in cohesive states and nowhere but in such states can human nature adequately develop. The only alternative to war is degradation.” A Frenchman writing at the same time said: “War is a condition of progress. It is the cut-whip which prevents countries from going to sleep” (Farrar, 1978). Others reject this view and assert that war hinders progress and is the result of a residue of barbarism beneath the veneer of civilization. War persists because humans were predatory hunters for millions of years and were farmers for only a few thousand years. Human hunting instincts thus emerge in the form of violence.

There is considerable disagreement over how much society affects war. The question is whether the shape of a society –i.e., its political organization, technology, even perhaps its art, religion and intellectual life -determines the way wars are fought in terms of military organization and tactics and strategy. Most observers seemingly agree that the social and political structure determines the military organization and that technology affects the conduct of war (O’Connell, 1995; Rapoport, 1989). The economy is likewise a determinant. John Stuart Mill and other nineteenth-century liberals believed that war was caused by trade barriers; a free-trade society would have no wars because nations would specialize, become interdependent, and be unable to fight a modern war. Marx took the opposite view: war and trade barriers are the inevitable result of capitalistic competition for resources and markets (Waltz, 1954). It is also argued, however, that society does not determine the cause or conduct of war. Wars occur in both

primitive and civilized societies and the conduct of war is often similar despite political, social, economic, and other variations. As a consequence, there is little correlation between the way a society is structured and the way its military forces are organized.¹³

In my reasoning I follow Vasquez (2000) who states that “war is a social invention for the use of force; therefore, the goals of war, the ways in which it is fought, and the situations that are handled by war will vary accordingly to the cultural traditions of the global system.” And since society is a system, system dynamics are the integral part of political behavior and must be taken into account in any meaningful analysis leading to nontrivial theory of international conflict. I want to emphasize the fact that system outcomes are the result of complicated interaction patterns which are a function of people operating in complementary, reciprocal, or even opposed roles. As Katz (1961) says, there is no social structure apart from the interrelated habitual actions and attitudes of people.

Sociologists have provided a definition of conflict between groups. But the term *conflict* must embrace not only intergroup but also interpersonal and intrapersonal phenomena. Society would not need to be concerned about conflict within the individual if it were not for the plausible assumption that there is a significant relationship between conflicts within the inner structure of the individual and conflicts in the external social order. No theory of conflict can ignore this relationship. The internal and external can never be completely separated. Neither can the one ever be reduced completely to the other and derived solely from it. Psychological states alone cannot explain social behavior, and social conditions alone cannot explain individual behavior. Thus, it is also

valid to speak about a psychological disposition in an individual to form associational ties as strategy both of goal-directedness and conflict management.

Mueller (1989) says that war is merely an idea. If war begins in the minds of men, then thinking has to be properly conditioned a priori to the performance of violent acts. Thus, dispositions to violence are also contingent on the character of our leadership, their normative images of themselves and “the others”, and their desire to maintain themselves in power.

2.2. IMAGES OF OURSELVES AND “THE OTHERS”

The psychological approach to politics is inevitable, and irreplaceable. As Susser (1992) has written, there would be virtually universal agreement, for example, that Lyndon Johnson’s character is critical for understanding the United States’ role in the Vietnam War. Who would wish to disavow the intimate link between Hitler’s psychopathology and the phenomenon of national socialism? Could we consider severing Stalin’s personal idiosyncrasies from the great purges of the 1930s or Saddam Hussein’s from the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991? Would anyone seriously contend that the dramatic power needs exhibited by many political leaders are explicable without psychological categories? In short, the psychological aspect of political behavior is manifest and critical even though our ability to get at it with precision and reliability leaves much to be desired.

Is conflict a necessity? Are humans prone to conflict?

According to psychologists, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that from the very dawn of life, living organisms have been constantly subjected to the disrupting

effects of conflicting tendencies to action. Whenever and wherever they have moved, the forces inciting them to action have been opposed by other agencies demanding either alternate responses or the cessation of action; for even the simplest movement cannot be executed unless the friction and inertia of bodily members are overcome; and no movement can long continue if the chemical products of fatigue are allowed to accumulate or if competing muscular contractions are not inhibited. For the individual organism, then, conflict is an inevitable consequence of an inherent capacity to act in any manner and especially of the ability to perform a multiplicity of acts (J. Brown, 1957).

Conflicts vary, their consequences vary and the conditions under which they occur vary. Personality characteristics of the policy makers may have a critical impact on the decisions to engage in an international conflict and the resolution of conflict situation.¹⁴ Since many national leaders probably possess psychological characteristics such as power orientation and high dominance, and employ various ego defense mechanisms to protect against feelings of low-self esteem, the likelihood that they will be psychologically predisposed to back down in the face of threat from external opponents is probably fairly low. If we add to the aforementioned traits that of risk acceptance, the personal fuel mixture becomes highly volatile¹⁵. Finally, psychological stress brought on by the crisis may have a deleterious effect on the ability of decision makers to make rational calculations.¹⁶

Moreover, a number of studies have shown that not only personality, but the “belief system” of the policy makers is a vital factor in making decisions¹⁷. A decision-maker acts upon his “image” of the situation rather than upon “objective” reality, and it has been demonstrated that the belief system-its structure as well as its content-plays an

integral role in the cognitive process¹⁸. Within the broader scope of the belief-system-perception-decision-making relationship there has been a heightened concern for the problem of stereotyped national images as a significant factor in the dynamics of the international system¹⁹. K. Boulding, for example, has written that “the national image is the last great stronghold of unsophistication.... Nations are divided into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ –the enemy is all bad, one’s own nation is of spotless virtue” (Boulding, 1959).

The relationship of national images to international conflict is clear: decision-makers act upon their definition of the situation and their images of states –others as well as their own. These images are in turn dependent upon the decision-makers’ belief system, and these may or may not be accurate representations of “reality”. Thus it has been suggested that international conflict frequently is not between states, but rather between distorted images of states (Wright, 1957). The belief system composed of a number of “images” of the past, present, and future, includes all the accumulated, organized knowledge that the organism has about itself and the world (Miller et al, 1960). It may be thought of as the set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received. It orients the individual to his environment, defining it for him and identifying for him its salient characteristics. National images may be denoted as subpart of the belief system. Like the belief system, these are “models” which order for the observer what will otherwise be an unmanageable amount of information (Bauer, 1961).

In this connection two familiar psychological mechanisms deserve special attention: rationalization and projection. Rationalization, which is giving oneself morally good reasons for doing what one wants to do for less praiseworthy reasons, operates

largely by influencing perception of the concrete facts themselves. Projection comes close to what Bakan (1965) has called “the externalization of necessity”.²⁰ According to Gladstone (1959), projection is the defense mechanism which is most relevant for understanding the conception of the enemy.²¹ In fact, Zur (1987) notices that *all* wars in the last century have been *perceived* by all participants as defensive against an external hostile offensive enemy (italics in original). Repression, denial, splitting, projection and displacement are the key elements in understanding the creation of the enemy in Holy and defensive wars. Jungian and psychoanalytic theories link the creation of the enemy to experiences early in life and the development of the ego and superego²². As children grow, they initially internalize bad and threatening objects in an attempt to master anxiety, fear and discontent. Later on, as Zur argues, we split the ‘good’ self from the ‘bad’ self, which is projected onto the enemy.

Besides the basic characteristics us-them, good-evil split, the dynamics of what Zur calls “enemizing” contain four basic important elements: the mirror image, the coexistence of contradicting qualities, the dynamic nature of the image of the enemy, and the need to dehumanize it. We should be especially mindful of the effects of domestic political pressures on national leaders and of the tendency of “hawkish” factions to increase their power in times of crisis and confrontation. The need to mobilize the public against the external opponent and in favor of greater military expenditures requires that the enemy be painted as immoral, irrational, and implacably hostile. This has internal implications, granting greater influence to the hard-liners and making later face-saving gestures and compromises more difficult. Efforts to defuse conflict spirals are difficult because of one’s own previous acts and pronouncements and because of the domestic

implications of compromising or reversing previous hard-line policies. Elite fears that domestic opponents will be able to brand compromise and conciliation as appeasement stifle creative conflict resolution.

The psychological exploration of enemy-making is not to imply that every policy maker uses it as a tool for justifying his egoistic fears or desires to enter into conflict but uncovering the roots of belief systems we hold helps us in dealing more rationally and effectively with real dangers. Unfortunately, the split of good and bad, holy and evil, and ultimately us and them, lies at the root of modern war and it does start in the minds of men.

2.2. ELITE SURVIVAL AND DIVERSIONARY STRATEGIES

As White (1965) states is, to understand this whole egoistic side of our nature – the cluster of motives that Horney calls “power, prestige, and possessions” –which often masquerades in moral guise (as self-defense, defense of others, defense of freedom, courage, fulfillment of commitments, etc.) is basic to any deeper understanding of the psychology of human conflict. Prudent leaders make choices that they think will help them retain power (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2001). They recognize the existence of opposition and the designs of others on the office they hold, and they consequently select policies to minimize the opportunities available to those seeking to remove them from office. Thus the leader who adopts policies that reduce the security of the state does so at the risk of affording political opponents the opportunity of weakening the leader’s grasp on power. The desire to remain in power thus provides the linchpin between the threats

and uncertainties of the international system and the inevitable imperatives of fending off the domestic opposition.

The pursuit of a belligerent foreign policy by political elites in order to deflect popular attention away from internal socioeconomic and political problems, unify the nation against an external threat, and thereby increase their own domestic political support is an old theme in international relations. It is advanced in such classic international relations works as Wright's (1942) *A Study of War* and Rosecrance's (1963) *Action and Reaction in World Politics*. Research on this perspective is mainly grounded in historical case analyses including such theoretically well-informed historical works as those by Joll (1984), Kennedy (1980), and Mayer (1981), as well as chapters on great power wars in Rotberg and Rabb (1988).²³

At the core of this perspective is the idea that war proneness of states can be traced to the fears of a ruling elite who perceive they will lose control to a mounting domestic opposition (e.g., the fears of pre-WWI conservative elites in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia that nationalist and socialist forces were undercutting their dominance in the political system). As claimed by Hagan (1994), domestic political imperatives impinge on national security considerations because domestic opposition is severe; the entire ruling establishment (not just the current government leadership) views itself vulnerable to overthrow by anti-systemic elites in the wider political system, and in the most extreme situations the consequences of such an overthrow are intolerable. Even though opposition may stem from domestic issues quite unrelated to international affairs, foreign policy becomes engulfed by domestic considerations because leaders manipulate themes of nationalism and foreign threats as a way of diverting attention away from

domestic problems and enhancing the legitimacy of the regime. As maintained by Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995), leaders care about keeping themselves in power – they seek to maximize their reselection and, through the opportunities offered by continuing in power, to promote their own policy objectives. To achieve their objectives they must anticipate effects their policies will have on the politically relevant domestic audience.

Although much of this activity is symbolic, it is not all theatrical. Historical cases suggest that ongoing domestic crises create a systematic bias for confrontation, if not war, in foreign policy. Recent research also indicates that presidents have cynically exploited the rallying effect for partisan purposes. Ostrom and Job's results (1986) suggest that presidents have routinely used military force to raise their public approval rating, divert attention from a weak economy, and bolster their party's chances in national elections. Morgan and Bickers (1992) find that a president is more likely to become involved in a militarized dispute when his popularity within his own party is low. Accordingly, they suggest, "aggressive foreign behavior [may be] a useful tool for dealing with domestic problems" (p.26). Furthermore, and theoretically more persuasive, elites may find themselves trapped by their earlier scapegoating rhetoric and politically unable to back down in the international arena given the prospect of domestic revolution²⁴.

Such diversionary actions can be pursued against internal as well as external targets. I use the definition of diversionary behavior broadly to include military and diplomatic actions undertaken for the purposes of enhancing one's internal political support, although I focus primarily on military actions. As stated by Levy (1992), one can make a further analytic distinction between two alternative mechanisms through which

the external use of force can advance an elite's domestic political interests (it may also backfire or have no effect). One involves the acquisition through military action of tangible resources which can be used to alleviate internal problems or perhaps co-opt disaffected groups, as Lenin (1939) suggests in his theory of imperialism. The other involves the rallying of the population around the patriotic symbols of the nation, as more commonly suggested in the conflict-cohesion literature (Polsby 1964; Waltz 1967; Mueller 1973; Brody 1984). If the first occurs it is usually reinforced by the second, but the second can occur in the absence of the first.

Policymakers do care about the security of their state (though perhaps not necessarily as their paramount concern), and it is almost impossible to believe that the problem of maintaining or enhancing security does not enter into the calculations they make with respect to the policies that should be pursued. Levy (1992) points out that it is one thing to argue that the diversionary motivations contributed to the outbreak of certain wars, but quite another to evaluate its relative causal weight in the processes leading to those wars; to assess the frequency with which diversionary action occurs; or to identify the internal and external conditions under which it is most likely to arise. Political elites confronted by internal opposition do not always respond with belligerent foreign policies. They usually prefer to eliminate or mitigate the sources of internal social or economic problems, or perhaps co-opt some of the opposition. If necessary, they may identify internal targets to serve as scapegoats, or (particularly in authoritarian regimes) they may attempt to suppress their domestic opposition directly and in some cases violently (Blainey, 1973). If they choose to engage in external diversionary action, they may prefer hostile diplomatic actions or perhaps limited military actions that fall short of war

(though such actions can trigger an escalation to war). A choice to use substantial military force against another state (or other actor) also depends on one's assessment of the adequacy of one's military capabilities for this purpose, on the presence of a "legitimate" external target that would facilitate low-risk military actions without creating domestic opposition on moral grounds, on the availability of viable nonviolent alternatives, and on other variables discussed in this paper.

Bodin (1955:168) said that "the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion and civil war is to keep the subjects in amity one with another, and to this end, to find an enemy against whom they can make common cause". Does it mean, then, that we *are* the prisoners of war? Is conflict a necessity?

3. YELTSIN'S WAR AND PUTIN'S WAR- CASE STUDIES

Neither the occurrence nor the outcome of conflict is completely and rigidly determined by objective circumstances. A decision to go to war takes time and is made usually by a body of experts who have a detailed knowledge on the necessity and the possible (assumed) outcome of it. It is a process which is set in a complex context.

As I stated earlier, I consider both the social system and individual as crucial to the credibility of the analysis of international conflict, therefore, my model of international conflict is based on two propositions: (1) Conflict is an inherent aspect of societal systems. (2) The occurrence of international conflict is contingent in the character of our leadership, their normative images of themselves and "the others", and their desire to maintain themselves in power. The central theme of this paper is thus to

demonstrate the potentially powerful political consequences of the diversionary action in case studies of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin and to illustrate the conditions under which domestic political opposition and elite insecurity led to the external use of force in two wars in Chechnya.

Political leaders are held accountable for their foreign policy actions, and because they desire to maintain themselves in power they choose policies with an eye to their personal political future. That means that they choose in such a way that they do not precipitate an internal overthrow of their authority while also avoiding external removal. Thus decisions to go to war are endogenous to the domestic political setting of the leaders.

BORIS YELTSIN

The reasons underlying Russia's attack on Chechnya have been the subject of much speculation. According to Kremlin officialdom, Russia was compelled to use military force against the renegade Chechen government in order to restore the constitutional order and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. After coming to power during the chaos of the fall of 1991, Dudayev, a former Soviet air force general, declared independence for his republic of 1.3 million people. Russia never recognized Chechnya's independence. As maintained by official rhetoric, therefore, Moscow had to reassert its authority over Chechen territory both to secure its international borders and to protect Russian citizens terrorized by the criminal Dudayev regime (McFaul, 1995, Yeltsin, 2000).

In fact, Lieven (1989) believes that the Dudayev government's refusal to sign some form of federal or confederal treaty must be judged the most important factor. Without it, though tension and covert Russian attempts to get rid of Dudayev might have continued, there would have been no war. With regard to Dudayev, Russian ministers were "willing to wound, but afraid to strike" (p.84). The president's advisors convinced him to create an anti-Dudayev opposition group, headed by Umar Avturkhanov (a former militia man) and Salambek Khadzyev (a bureaucrat working in Moscow). A force of anti-Dudayev volunteers was assembled by Russia's Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), the successor organization of the KGB, under the personal supervision of the head of the FSK, Sergei Stepasin.²⁵ According to the FSK's plan, a puppet government was to be set up after the volunteer force had taken Grozny. This puppet regime would then legitimize the introduction of Russian troops into Chechnya. On November 26, 1994, the volunteers began to march on Grozny, the capital of the rebellious republic. However, Chechen troops loyal to Dudayev routed the ill-assorted pro-Moscow force without much difficulty.

Yeltsin regarded Dudayev's victory as a personal insult (Shevtsova, 1999). On November 28, he demanded that the Chechen leader disband his armed units and threatened to impose a state of emergency in the republic if Dudayev failed to comply. Then, without waiting for any response to this demand, Yeltsin issued a decree ordering the Chechens to lay down their arms by December 15, an impossible target. No one in Moscow was very concerned about the feasibility of the deadline, however. At a meeting chaired by Yeltsin on November 29, the Security Council without much debate approved a plan to use the Russian military against the defiant republic. On December 2 the

Russian military began air strikes against targets on Chechen territory. The decision to resort to air strikes suggests that Moscow was not interested in securing negotiations, but rather wanted to intimidate the separatists and to send a warning to other recalcitrant republics. On December 11, 1994- four days before the ultimatum deadline- three columns of Russian army units moved to Chechnya.

Besides the official motive, a number of other explanations have been advanced to account for the Chechen debacle. Chief among these was the oil pipeline which runs from the oilfields of Azerbaijan through Daghestan and Chechnya to the Russian port of Novorossiisk, and in this context, fear of and rivalry with Turkey and fear of growing Turkish influence. Lieven (1989, 85) says that Russian officials state that the impossibility of Russian ever recognizing Chechen independence is based on the fear that if the Turks could set up an embassy in Grozny, they would turn Chechnya into “a base behind our lines”. This apprehension about Turkey is rooted in old Russian national anxieties, but also in the new and very uncomfortable awareness that Russian forces around the Black Sea are now very inferior to Turkish ones. That is to say, it is not that Chechnya is important in itself, but that it lies on the routes to much more important places.

Some Russian commentators in turn have suggested that high-ranking military officials maneuvered and pressured Yeltsin to order the attack in an attempt to demonstrate the army’s usefulness in a post-cold war world and thus to ensure that it would be properly funded in the future from a tight federal budget.²⁶

While some of these factors evidently played a role in precipitating the Russian attack on Chechnya on 11 December 1994, the degree to which they did so is limited.

As John Kenneth Galbraith has said, politics is not the art of the possible; it consists in choosing between the disastrous and the unpalatable (cited in Shevtsova, 1999 p.111). Yeltsin in 1994 chose the disastrous option. Undoubtedly, preserving the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation was a major objective of the offensive in Chechnya. But Dudayev had declared Chechnya's independence three years before. Why did Yeltsin not move then to preserve Russia's territorial integrity?²⁷ Why, then, did Yeltsin decide to use massive military force against Chechnya? Was it to save the Russian Federation or his presidency?

At the time of the Chechen crisis, the president's popularity rating had fallen precipitously. Many of his old promises remained unfulfilled, and his new promises were no longer believed. Whereas previously all his failures could be blamed on his enemies, especially the parliament, Yeltsin now lacked strong opponents. He was sole master of the political situation, and thus sooner or later he would have to answer for the country's unsolved economic problems, the deteriorating living standard of a substantial part of the population, and the collapse of people's hopes²⁸. This made the outlook for Yeltsin's regime dim, especially with the approaching December 1995 parliamentary elections and the June 1996 presidential elections. There is evidence that the Yeltsin administration thought that a 'small victorious war' would increase their domestic popularity, especially given the sources of ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy in the December 1993 parliamentary elections, when his party gained almost a quarter of the vote²⁹. This seemed- wrongly- to indicate a strong current of militant nationalism in Russia. The election results apparently showed Yeltsin's inner circle of advisers the need to change the president's image, rhetoric, and allies. If Yeltsin was going to win reelection in June

1996, he had to act and talk more like Zhirinovsky and less like the “democrats”.³⁰ The goal was not for Yeltsin to mimic Zhirinovsky, but rather for him to position himself as a candidate between Zhirinovsky and the reformers, or better yet as the candidate who personified both of these different political platforms. Soon thereafter, Yeltsin presented his first State of the Federation speech (*Poslanie Prezidenta*), in which he called for the strengthening of the state, highlighting first and foremost his plans to crack down on crime. Yeltsin also got tough, at least rhetorically, with his opponents –e.g. Latvians, NATO, or Most Bank. Bombing Chechnya was the most dramatic but not the first demonstration of Yeltsin’s new machismo (McFaul, 1995). Colonel Sergei Yushenkov, then head of the Duma Defence Committee, says that he was told this January 1995 by Oleg Lobov, Secretary of the Security Council and a key figure in the ‘security clique’ around Yeltsin that the President needs a small victorious war, like the USA had in Haiti, so his prestige may rise (Shevtsova, 1999); Lobov asked him therefore ‘not to make so much noise’ in opposing the war. Andrei Piontkovsky has also stated that they expected the war to be popular and to stimulate Russian national feeling in support of the President. In this they were wrong. In Piontkovsky’s words, ‘They had everything ready for an imperialist strategy – except an imperial people’ (quotes from Lieven, 1989, p.87). Public opposition to the use of force was widespread even before the intervention.³¹

Moreover, as stated by Lieven (1998), the Russian events of September-December 1993 guaranteed the success of the Russian liberal-capitalist revolution of the 1990s, and the survival of the Yeltsin administration in power. It also had fateful results for relations between Russia and Chechnya. For not merely did Yeltsin’s defeat of the Communist and nationalist parliamentary opposition free the Russian government to

think about its lesser irritation, but the formalization of a new Russian constitution made Chechnya's refusal to sign a union treaty even more starkly apparent. While bilateral negotiations between Moscow and the other republics continued through 1994, Chechnya's independence became the exception rather than the rule- and was a major eyesore for a Russian president seeking to consolidate and strengthen state power.

Another causal factor to Yeltsin's new political orientation, and a consequence of the December 1993 elections, was a deepening division between Yeltsin and his immediate circle of advisers on the one hand and reformist political leaders and organizations on the other. Because their political origins were quite different, the alliance between Yeltsin and the "democrats" had always been flaccid. Yeltsin rose to power as a populist, anti-corruption, anti-Moscow, Communist party boss from Sverdlovsk. Ultimately, Yeltsin's maverick style clashed with the staid practices of the Communist party elite in Moscow. He was forced to look beyond the Soviet establishment for political allies. He eventually found new comrades among the liberal, Western-oriented democratic movements that had mobilized primarily in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the Urals. This powerful alliance swept Yeltsin into power in June 1991, resisted the August 1991 coup attempt, and then formed Russia's first modern noncommunist government.

The alliance, however, never fused into one political organization. Yeltsin never joined the anti-Communist coalition Democratic Russia but instead stayed "above" party politics. Moreover, tension between Yeltsin's aides from Sverdlovsk and the team of young economists around Yegor Gaidar plagued Gaidar's tenures as first deputy prime minister and prime minister. By the time of the December 1993 parliamentary elections,

Yeltsin refused to endorse Gaidar's Russia's Choice, even though several of his cabinet ministers were members of this electoral bloc. After the election, the gap between these two camps widened further (McFaul, 1995). Gaidar and Borys Fyodorov, the liberal finance minister, resigned from Yeltsin's government, leaving just one member of Gaidar's original team – First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais – within shouting distance of the president. Over the course of 1994, however, the president and his Kremlin advisers became even more isolated from reformist political organizations as well as the government and its leader, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. The decision to invade Chechnya was made without consulting Russia's reformist forces. Even the Russian government and the liberal presidential advisers in the Kremlin played only a marginal role in the deliberations. Yeltsin's Kremlin entourage isolated the president from all political forces opposed to the war (Gall and de Waal, 1998; Shevtsova, 1999).³²

The decision to invade Chechnya was made very quickly and there is no easy answer to the old Russian question: "Who is to blame?" The fateful decision was taken in great secrecy in a Kremlin that was impenetrable to the outside world. Certainly, Yeltsin's subordinates withheld information from him or distorted it in some way, but all the thick fog of Kremlin intrigues should not disguise a central fact: the president was the person who decided everything. Yeltsin had the last word on the decision to go to war. At the end of 1994, in an address on Russian television, the president acknowledged that he was completely in charge of all decisions made in regard to the Chechen problem (Yeltsin, 2000). When they committed Russian forces to the war, the president and a majority of the members of the Security Council were convinced that what awaited them was an easy victory- almost an unimpeded tour of the Caucasus. It was a clear, calculated

and ruthless decision made by a politician who, in the final analysis, always made up his own mind. Once his mind was made up, the military machine was set in motion and there was no turning back. It exposed the lack of any proper decision-making in the Kremlin. The Security Council merely endorsed a decision taken privately by Yeltsin and a few advisors and there was no mechanism for dissenters to register their objection. The former dissident Sergei Kovalyov saw it as a purely Soviet chain of events in which the most important thing was not to make the best decision, but to ensure that the boss was always right: “It is a law of Soviet politics. Not a single adviser in the Soviet system can allow himself to say something different from what the boss want to hear. That means he falls out of the system, he is not playing by the rules....”³³

Yeltsin has been known to be a person of an obstinate and irascible character. Especially towards the end of his first term, as his health problems started to amass, he began to show increasing signs of suspiciousness, irritability, and harshness. Unable or unwilling to listen to reason, he would often not consider compromise. Curiously perhaps for a man who as First Secretary of Sverdlovsk had a reputation as an effective and hands-on administration (Bonet, 1995), as president he showed little taste for the details of government. As he himself has admitted in his memoirs, when not faced with an immediate challenge he had tendency to relax and loosen the reins. Worse: not merely did he leave most policy-making to his subordinates, but there is very sign that he actually encouraged them to fight with each other so as to strengthen his own grip on power (Yeltsin, 1994, 2000).

Many observers, especially among the Chechens themselves, blamed the resumption of war in 1999 on the Russian government’s failure to fulfill the more than

fifty agreements it signed with Chechnya in the wake of the 1996 peace accord. The agreements were supposed to provide for reconstruction of the devastated country. Perhaps it never intended to do so. In May 1997 Presidents Yeltsin and Maskhadov signed the Treaty on Peace and the Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. The first principle on which the two sides agreed was “forever to repudiate the use and the threat to use military force to resolve whatever disputes may arise.” The status of Chechnya was supposed to be decided peacefully through diplomacy by the year 2001. Evidently someone in Moscow wanted to give war another chance- and many of Maskhadov’s enemies in Chechnya were more than willing to oblige.

VLADIMIR PUTIN

Vladimir Putin appeared on the national stage unpredictably. He had no political ties and was unknown to the public. This absence of ideological engagement made it possible for the ruling team to shape Putin’s image in whatever way they desired³⁴. Thus, as suggested by Shevtsova (2005), he could be presented as a liberal, a conservative, or a patriot. However, for the new premier-barely known outside the Moscow Ring Road- to be taken seriously as Russia’s leader, there had to be a perceived need among the Russian public that Putin would step in to fill. The need was clear after the financial crash of 1998 and from the moment Primakov took office. Weak Russia needed a strong state and a leader with a tough image who was ready to stop the rot. Both the political class and the masses needed to feel the need for a new authoritarian rule. An occasion quickly arose: the invasion of the Russian republic of Dagestan by separatists from neighboring

Chechnya on August 2, 1999. The separatists supposedly took advantage of the confusion in Russian political life to attempt to create a radical Wahhabite Islamic state in Chechnya and adjacent regions. But by a strange coincidence, they attacked Dagestan when preparations were already under way in Moscow for a transfer of power (Politkovskaya, 1999; Shevtsova, 2005). And why didn't Moscow stop the invasion? Why did the Russian power ministries calmly watch the open massing of armed separatists in border regions? Moreover, a brigade of Interior Ministry troops that had been protecting the border between Chechnya and Dagestan was quickly removed just before the invasion. Some Russian journalists wrote openly that people close to the Kremlin, primarily Berezovsky, might have pushed the Chechen fighters to attack Dagestan to increase the Russian people's sense of vulnerability and pave the way for a change of rule.³⁵ "Why did Chechnya happen before Yeltsin's reelection? Why is there now Dagestan before these elections?" asked *Profil* on August 30, referring to the parliamentary elections scheduled for December. In fact, human rights activist Sergei Kovalev spoke about this openly, as did Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov, who, by the way, separated himself from the actions of the fighters who attacked Dagestan. In his interview with the Spanish newspaper *La Guardia*, Maskhadov said the following: "As for Dagestan, I can declare with full responsibility that Berezovsky, Voloshin, Magomedev and Putin all knew. We absolutely did not need either Dagestan or the conquest of alien territory. It was all programmed by Moscow. Dagestan was an excuse for war" (as cited in Shevtsova, 2005 p.411).

Moreover, the bombing of apartment blocks in Buinaksk (Dagestan) (4 September, 62 dead), Moscow, Guryanov Street (9 September, 100 dead); Moscow,

Kashirskoe Highway (13 September, 124 dead) and Volgodonsk (15 September, 19 dead) created a climate of fear and, to a degree, retribution against Chechens³⁶. The explosions were terrifying acts of murder, all the more so because no warnings had been given and no responsibility claimed. The Russian authorities laid the blame on “Chechen terrorists”- only to get a stout denial from Shamil Basayev that he was involved. However, the involvement of Chechens in these atrocities remains a matter of controversy. The conspiracy theorists have posed some challenging questions. How come Basayev was accused of randomly killing civilians in Moscow, when he had never targeted civilians before? And wasn't it true that the main beneficiary of the bombing was the new administration of Vladimir Putin?

The explosive used was hexogen, which had allegedly been manufactured in a bomb-making factory in Chechnya. Among many versions explaining the bombings is the one actively propagated by Berezovsky later, namely that the FSB either deliberately or by omission was responsible for the bombings (Sakwa, 2004). The events, soon after the four actual bombings, in Ryazan where a ‘dummy’ bomb, explained as a test exercise by the FSB, was found in an apartment block primed and ready to explode, still requires full explanation.³⁷ The “Public Commission to Investigate the 1999 Explosions in Moscow and Volgodonsk and the Ryazan Exercises”, chaired by State Duma deputy Sergei Kovalev, was an independent attempt to get to the bottom of the tragedy. The Commission in effect took the place of what should have been a parliamentary commission, but the Duma had refused to set one up. A film sponsored by Berezovsky (*Attack on Russia*), released in March 2002, accused the government headed

by Putin of being guilty of the crime, but the evidence is said to be at best circumstantial³⁸.

The trouble with these very serious charges is the meager scraps of evidence produced in support of them: a small group of foreign captives, a few brazen quotations from the Chechen warlords and an Islamic website preaching holy war, www.kavkaz.org. Set against this are some good reasons to be skeptical in the absence of more concrete facts. The Islamic website was set up by the hard Islamic wing of the Chechen rebels with the explicit aim of attracting foreign support; their claims about an Islamic holy war can easily be interpreted as an opportunistic recruiting drive. The Russians have a vested interest in naming Osama bin Laden, as that helps to blunt Washington's criticism of its conduct in Chechnya. Despite its talk of battalions of Islamic volunteers, the Russians have only been able to produce half a dozen foreigners taken captive out of the hundreds of Chechen fighters that have fallen into their hands. The report on the atrocities issued by the RF Prosecutor General's office in April 2003 concluded that the "foreign citizens Khattb and Amu Umar" were the organizers of the attack with the involvement of Khakim Abayev, Denis Saitakov, the brothers Zaur and Timur Batchaev, Yusif Krymshamkhalov and Alam Dekkushiyev. Some of these had already been killed in fighting in Chechnya, and the trails of Krymshamkhalov and Dekkushiyev were to follow. Nevertheless, the jury remains out on who was responsible for the atrocities. Ever since, a question has lingered over Putin's presidency: Who has done it? Why no one has been convicted of 9/99 attacks? Why the investigation was suppressed? Witnesses disappeared? Inquisitive journalists intimidated? Critical TV stations closed down? (RFE/RL Newline, 21 March 2002).

These questions maintain their rhetorical quality but what is important is that these events gave rise to mass support in Russian society for a strong leader and order. The “antiterrorist operation” begun by Vladimir Putin allowed him to demonstrate that he could respond firmly to growing fears.³⁹ Putin’s image as an “iron chancellor” was created and sustained by his uncompromising approach to the Chechen problem. The campaign that Putin waged made no fine distinctions between separatists and terrorists, political rebels and bandits.⁴⁰ The Russian public was encouraged to identify all Chechens as enemies and an intense wave of xenophobia, cultivated from the top down, swept through the country. The official media fuelled the hysteria, portraying the conflict in deterministic good-and-evil terms. As Russian troops went into Chechnya, the three main television channels went to reports by young fair-haired boys in their twenties, always in among the Russian armed forces; they talked about the success of “our boys” against the “terrorists”, while the Chechen rebels on the other side were never killed, always “destroyed” (Politkovskaya, 1999).

Putin’s use of street language in a press conference on 8 September, where he used the underworld jargon of “soaking the bandits in the John”, appeared at first as if it would be a public relations disaster, but in the end it only reinforced Putin’s image as a man of the people (Sakwa, 2004). Far more importantly, at the press conference Putin insisted: “Russia is defending itself. We have been attacked. And therefore we must throw off all our syndromes, including the guilt syndrome” (Yeltsin, 2000). Yeltsin gave Putin a free hand: “I wanted people to start getting used to Putin and to perceive him as the head of state” (Yeltsin, 2000 p.337). Yeltsin explains Putin’s surge in popularity in this way: “Putin got rid of Russia’s fear. And Russia repaid him with profound gratitude”

(Yeltsin, 2000 p.338). Putin quickly came to epitomize Russia, its sufferings and its aspirations and thus he was to become “the president of hope”. If one can believe his “astonishingly frank self- portrait” – as a collection of Putin’s interviews with Russian journalists was called- Putin did not expect the popular support to last. But after just four months of war Yeltsin decided to resign the presidency early, putting Putin in an excellent position to move from acting president to the real thing with elections in March 2000. As stated by Evangelista (2002), renewal of the war against Chechnya, supported by an increasingly docile and servile Russian press, secured Putin’s victory. Did Putin seize the opportunity to promote his political prospects by escalating the conflict? Some observers believe so. According to Aleksandr Iskandarian, director of Moscow’s Caucasus Studies Center, for example, “This was a war fought on TV screens to boost the popularity of the president” and ensure his election”.⁴¹ Oleg Odnokolenko put it this way: “The strategy is clear. The generals, supported by public opinion, need a victory to justify the peculiarities of the national military reform which was completed recently. Putin, since he has been named the official "successor", needs a victory in Chechnya no less than Yeltsin needed the Khasavyurt peace accords in 1996. This is because Yeltsin cannot count on any other victorious spurts before the elections, for instance rapid economic growth”⁴².

Undoubtedly, the causes of the second Chechen War are rooted not only in the political instincts of Vladimir Putin but in the unique characteristics of the Chechen situation⁴³. For instance, there was little doubt that the Russian military and political elite had difficulty in coming to terms with the implications of the Khasavyurt agreement and the prospect of Chechen independence. A number of military officers, closely linked with

the first war, including Kvashnin, the Chief of the General Staff, and Kazankov, the Commander of Russian Troops were eager for revenge.⁴⁴ Moreover, the first war had left many issues unsettled. Chechnya remained politically weak, and potentially a destabilizing presence in the North Caucasus region. As soon as Maskhadov was elected president in 1997, he faced determined internal opposition. The rift with the radical Basaev, his deputy prime minister, in spring 1998 destroyed the last chance of establishing some kind of basis for statehood. Chechnya descended into anarchy and became one of the most dangerous places in the world (Ross, 2004). Separated by an economic quarantine from the rest of the Russian Federation, the local GDP seemed driven by the kidnapping trade. During the interregnum the republic languished without any genuine legal, economic, or law enforcement infrastructure (Meier, 2005).

According to any traditional or universally accepted version of the laws of war, Russia's legal right to prosecute this war is incontestable (Lieven, 2004). Since the onset of thinking about the laws of war, such laws have been divided into the *jus ad bellum* (the right, or lack of it, to make war) and the *jus in bello* (the rules governing the conduct of war). Regarding *jus ad bellum*: Chechnya is an internationally recognized part of Russia's territory in rebellion against its sovereign. Throughout history and all over the world today, states have reacted to armed secessions with armed repression.⁴⁵ Legally, therefore, Russia certainly had the right to retaliate.

But of course, legality and morality are not the same. As I was attempting to illustrate, morally, the issue of Russia's latest intervention in Chechnya is less clear. Putin staked his own rise to power on military success in Chechnya and achieved it with the capture and destruction of the Chechen capital, Grozny, in March 2000. The uneven

struggle, however, continues, pitting regular Russian troops and paramilitary formations against Chechen fighters. Atrocities mount, matched by terrorist incidents⁴⁶. Putin undoubtedly managed to “bang the hell out of those bandits”, but he fell far short of fulfilling his “historical mission” of “resolving the situation in the North Caucasus” (Putin, 2000 p.139). If he managed to preserve the Russian federation from further disintegration, it was despite rather than because of his policy in Chechnya⁴⁷.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Conflict has an inside and an outside dimension. It arises out of the internal dimensions of individuals acting singly or in groups, and also out of external conditions and social structures. At all levels of analysis, larger organized aggregates of human beings affect smaller aggregates and individuals, and vice versa. Individuals and groups are in constant interaction. I think that the internal and external can never be completely separated. It is the very interplay between psychological and social processes that can work as an antidote to deterministic approaches to international conflict.

In this paper, I have tried to show that a broad knowledge of the social science of human conflict is necessary in making governmental decisions. Almost seventy years ago, Ehrlich provocatively wrote: “At the present as well as at any other time, the center of gravity of legal development lies not in legislation, nor in juristic science, nor in judicial decision, but in society itself” (1936). As my model of international conflict suggests conflict is an inherent aspect of societal systems therefore if we are concerned about international conflict, we should look for help in the larger discipline of human conflict which provides us very insightful and valuable information on the structure of societal

relations. The disposition to conflict is an inherent aspect of societal systems. The structure of societal relations creates and recreates the disposition, in individuals, to conflict. Thus, the aggregated dispositions to conflict are partly inherent, as posited in my first proposition, but they are also largely contingent.

Furthermore, the occurrence of international conflict is contingent in the character of our leadership, their normative images of themselves and “the others”, and their desire to maintain themselves in power. Geller & Singer (1998) say that the presence or absence of certain factors increases the probability of the onset and seriousness of contests of power. Structural forces influence and shape decisions, but do not determine them entirely. In this sense, the conditions conducive to war may be present, but due to the element of *human choice*, the last step remains indeterminate!

As the definitions of conflict, which I have chosen for this paper, suggest, conflicts exist psychologically for the parties involved. The point of this paper was to show that neither the occurrence nor the outcome of conflict is completely and rigidly determined by objective circumstances. This means that the fate of the participants in a situation of conflict is not inevitably determined by the external circumstances in which they find themselves. Whether conflict takes a productive or a destructive course is thus open to influence even under the most unfavorable objective conditions. Similarly, even under the most favorable objective circumstances, psychological factors can cause a conflict to take a destructive course. The importance of “real” conflict cannot be denied; yet, the psychological process of perceiving and evaluating are also “real”, and they are involved in turning objective conditions into experienced conflict (Deutsch, 1973).

Political leaders are held accountable for their foreign policy actions, and because they desire to maintain themselves in power they choose policies with an eye to their personal political future. Choosing Yeltsin and Putin and their decision to go to war with Chechnya allowed me to demonstrate the potentially powerful political consequences of diversionary action, and compelled me to look more closely at the conditions under which domestic political opposition and elite insecurity lead to the external use of force.

Consequently, I showed that they *ex ante* tried to avoid policies that they believed would *ex post* foreshorten their hold over the perquisites of political leadership. As Levy & Vakili (1992) say, the domestic unrest or conflict and the political insecurity of elites is not a sufficient condition for war or even for the external use of force short of war. But neither is it a necessary condition for war, for most wars probably do not involve an attempt to divert attention away from internal problems. In a relatively small number of cases, however, the diversionary motivation can be a critical factor, and perhaps even a necessary or sufficient condition for the use of force in that specific case. For both Yeltsin and Putin the decision to go to war with Chechnya served well to boost their images as strong leaders who can lead the country through next term of presidency. Thus their decisions to go to war were endogenous to their domestic political settings. Broadly speaking, in these preliminary case studies on Yeltsin and Putin I was able to show that two Russian leaders decided to go to war with Chechnya based on similar set of motives, which is their desire to maintain themselves in power. Yeltsin deliberately chose not to deal with Dudayev as someone deserving of any respect. He seemed determined to settle the Chechen situation by force rather than by making concessions. Yeltsin's advisers pushed for a "short victorious war" to boost the president's sagging popularity, and those

who had doubts kept silent or were forced out. Valery Tishkov (the former minister of nationalities) believes that the decision to begin war was not inevitable. "I am firmly convinced that until November 23, 1994, the Chechen war was not fatally inevitable and there were possibilities for resolving the crisis. All Yeltsin had to do was lift the telephone receiver and call Dudayev, who would immediately have flown to Boris Nikolayevich's side for discussions. Yeltsin merely needed to overcome his personal ambitions" (as cited in Shevtsova, 1999 p.113).

Putin's ascension coincided above all with a sharp increase in a large part of society of feelings of insecurity, personal defenselessness, and fear- a direct consequence of two events: the invasion of Chechen extremists in Daghestan, and the explosions in apartment buildings in Moscow and several other Russian cities. Putin at the time was a political nonentity, known for his loyalty to the president, but not for much else. The "antiterrorist operation" that he began allowed him to demonstrate that he could respond firmly to growing fears. As a result, he received broad approval for his conduct of the war, essentially escalating it. And his crude determination, expressed in crude language, to eliminate "terrorists" and "bandits" further boosted his popularity.

Due to the limited scope of this paper, I was not able to establish a link among other aspects of my model of international conflict, such as the character of the leadership and their normative images of themselves and "the others". However, from the references I made, it seems clear that both Yeltsin and Putin possess psychological characteristics such as power orientation and high dominance, and used various ego defense mechanisms to protect themselves against feelings of low-self esteem. For example, the wars have been perceived by the leaders as defensive against the external hostile

offensive enemy- Chechen warlords. As stated by Shevtsova (1999), the traditional Soviet solution to political instability was to find an enemy to distract people's attention from explosive social problems, and somewhere in the back of his mind, Yeltsin may have hoped that a successful solution of the Chechen problem would strengthen his position and help to solve urgent domestic issues.⁴⁸ It also meant that he could strike back at the irritating "nobody", Dudayev. Putin also needed right circumstances to present himself as a leader worthy people's votes. His lack of a political biography and clear political preferences made him in effect, a "blank slate". He searched for an enemy against which to rally society and consolidate the regime and the Chechen war seemed to be a rising necessity.

In fact, the origins of Russia's wars with Chechnya defy easy summary. Undoubtedly most of the factors that previous studies have identified played some role: the legacy of Soviet ethnically defined political institutions; Chechnya's historical grievances amplified by power-hungry politicians; the strategic location of Chechnya, astride major oil and transportation routes; and Moscow's concern that Chechnya's successful bid for independence would lead to the breakup of the Russian Federation. The unnecessary and even criminal Russian armed intervention of December 1994, and the bloody and destructive war that followed can be seen as a direct cause of much of the pathological behavior emanating from Chechnya between 1996 and 1999. Not only was that intervention a great deal less justifiable than that of 1996, but the memory of the futile bloodshed of 1994-1996 and the ferocity of the Chechen resistance should have given the Russian leadership pause before embarking again on a war in Chechnya. Warfare, and especially anti-partisan warfare, is inherently savage. Before you engage in

it, you have a moral obligation to be very sure indeed that all other policies have been exhausted, and that there is no better alternative.

Accordingly, even if we answer in favor of conflict as a necessity, I don't think we should be compelled to think of ourselves as prisoners of war! War should be understood as an unnecessary, consumptive, and duplicitous "enforcement" of incompatible demands and expectations. Conflict and war are not inevitable simple because they are natural social processes. The human world is human made, and real peace-with freedom, dignity, and justice-can exist if people set themselves that task of learning how to bring it about! As Boulding (1962) emphasizes: "the essence of the drama of conflict is likewise its resolution; it is not the conflict as such that makes the drama but the resolution of the conflict as meaningful process through time; it is the process of conflict toward some kind of resolution which gives it meaning and which makes it good." M. Deutsch's (1986) "Crude Law of Social Relations" may seem too obvious but we have to remember that in the "new world order", where interdependence is the pervasive rule, cooperation is a group activity. As Marshall (1999) indicates, democratization is not political end nor a procedural characteristic, nor an institutional attribute, *it is a state of mind*, a beginning, a means, and an obligation to pursue, provide, and maintain the preferred goals of peace and prosperity. Thus transformation of conflict resolution into a constructive process requires cooperative choices that can be made only by the actors themselves.

This study certainly yielded some interesting data and insights about the emergence international conflict in general and the decision-makers in particular. Based

on the outcome of this thesis, certain matters should be more thoroughly explored in other case studies and applications.

Second proposition of my international conflict model states that the occurrence of international conflict is contingent in the character of our leadership, their normative images of themselves and “the others”, and their desire to maintain themselves in power. However, in my case studies I was only able to elaborate on the political survival of Yeltsin and Putin. Certainly, a thorough analysis of the characters and belief systems of the Russian presidents would reveal many crucial factors and their implications in both Yeltsin’s and Putin’s decision-making process. A theory of diversionary behavior must ultimately be integrated into a theory of political processes and decision-making.

In this study a few references have been made to the Chechen leaders and their standpoints. Very likely there are many interesting lessons that can be learned from the study of their perspective. Moreover, it seems very important to give an exhaustive analysis to other aspects of the origins of the Chechen Wars, which have only been indicated in this paper. Further studies need more closely to examine the long lasting relationship between Russia and Chechnya and Russia and other former USSR states.

NOTES:

¹ I would like to thank Professor Harvey Starr to whom I am indebted for helpful advice and assistance in preparation of this paper. I am also grateful to Professor Gordon Smith and Professor Joel Samuels for their remarks and thoughtful reflections.

² Other sources on ethnic conflict are e.g. Brown (1996), Connor (1994), and Nahaylo & Swoboda (1990). For more general treatments of ethnicity and social conflict, see e.g., Bromley (1984), Horowitz (1985), Gurr (1993), and Lake & Rothchild (1998).

³ In a collection of empirical studies on war, the editors pose a crucial task (Gochman and Sabrosky, 1990): “Since war is a reality of our time and place, we need to ask whether we are, perforce, prisoners of war.”

⁴ Waltz (1959) does not conclude that anarchy is *the* cause of war. He thinks of it as a permissive cause, while the other two images are the efficient and proximate causes; they are the very context for war.

⁵ Regardless of the number of studies on war, there is still no agreement on the causes of war. No single general theory of conflict and war exists that is acceptable to social scientists in their respective disciplines. Merely to contemplate the need for it, however, serves to warn us against what A. North Whitehead called “the fallacy of the single factor.” We cannot identify any single cause of conflict or war; the putative causes are not only multiple but they have kept multiplying throughout history (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001).

⁶ See e.g. Most & Starr, 1983; Rummel 1979; Smoke, 1977.

⁷ For example: civil war, revolution, coup, guerrilla insurgency, political assassination, sabotage, terrorism, threats, displays of force, economic sanctions and reprisals, psychological warfare, propaganda, labor-managements disputes, divorce contests and legal wrangling over the custody of children, intrafamily fights, and felonious crimes, etc.

⁸ A good outline of the history of systematic treatment of conflict by sociologists can be found in “The Sociology of Human Conflict”, written by R.C. Angell (1965).

⁹ Such conflicts are called *intrapersonal*, *intragroup*, or *intranational*.

¹⁰ Even the classical example of pure conflict –two starving men on a lifeboat with only enough food for the survival of one –loses its impact if one or both of the men have social or religious values that can become more dominant psychologically than the hunger need or the desire for survival.

¹¹ For more information about the systematic empirical research on the in-group/out-group hypothesis see Levy (1989).

¹² Also, in time of war the nation may lose governmental and economic efficiency, but the war may also generate enhanced integration and heightened capacity for concerted and rapid action.

¹³ This view is part of the nature-nurture debate. For further development of this line of reasoning, see Lorenz (1966).

¹⁴ Waite (1990) agrees that we are beholden to Freud, Erik Erikson, Heinz Kohut, and all those “personalists” who remind us that history is about people-human beings not only of flesh and blood but of emotions, fantasies and irrational convictions. That is why his discussion on the role of personality that played in Germany’s decisions to go to war in 1914 and 1939 involves both history and psychology.

¹⁵ See, for example, the application of prospect theory to international relations (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Levy, 2000).

¹⁶ On the impact of stress on the decision-making process see, e.g. Nicholson (1992), Holsti (1990), Janis & Mann (1977).

¹⁷ E.g., Rokeach, 1960; Smith et al, 1956; Snyder et al, 1954.

¹⁸ See for example: Boulding, 1956; Festinger, 1957; J.C. Ray, 1961

¹⁹ E.g. Bauer, 1961; Boulding, 1959; Osgood, 1959; Wheeler, 1960; Wright, 1957.

²⁰ The mythological figure of Satan and the primitive concept of being “possessed” by evil spirits are two illustrations of an extremely widespread human tendency to ignore evil in the spontaneous acts of the self and to see the causes of behavior rather as inherent in forces that are somehow alien to the self, “forcing” the self to do what it does.

²¹ On other unconscious motives that causes black-and-white thinking, e.g. aggression; see Berkowitz, 1962; Dollard et al, 1939; McNeil, 1965.

²² See, e.g. Fornari, 1974; Freud, 1961/1931; Jung, 1970

²³ There is also extensive quantitative political science research on this topic (e.g., studies in Wilkenfeld, 1973), but most have found little cross-national correlation between domestic and foreign conflict. More

bounded research designs, however, have provided support for the idea of the presidential use of force in the manner in this perspective (Gaubatz, 1999; James and Oneal, 1991; Ostrom and Job, 1986; Russett, 1990).

²⁴ World War I is often used as an example of this phenomenon (see, e.g., Lebow, 1981; Levy, 1989).

²⁵ As indicated by Shevtsova (1999), the FSK hired a considerable number of Russian officers, who had not been paid their regular military salaries for months, to form the core support force for the anti-Dudayev opposition. The FSK promised volunteers an easy and rapid victory and substantial remuneration afterward.

²⁶ See for example, *Moscow News* 16 December 1994, p.2.

²⁷ As for method, the Russian federal government had managed to resolve several other secessionist crises through negotiation and compromise.

²⁸ The Russian economy deteriorated rapidly in 1994. The GDP fell by 15 per cent (the decline in 1993 was 13 per cent). The volume of industrial production fell by 20.9 per cent and agricultural output by 9 per cent. (OMRI 26 January 1995, no.19).

²⁹ Dorida Elliott of *Newsweek* notes that Yeltsin was keen to boost his sagging popularity and saw the invasion of Chechnya as an ideal way of achieving this objective. Stephan Kiselyov of *Moscow News* argues that “if electors begin to dream of a firm hand capable of establishing order in the country, if electors lean more and more towards the national patriotic ideal then Yeltsin, as always happens, begins to anticipate the events” (*Moscow News* 23 December 1994, p.2 Who Stand to Gain from the Invasion?). Moreover, Yuri Burin, a commentator for *Moscow News*, points out that it is “quite obvious that the war was started not because of Dudayev’s separatism but simply for the sake of war, regarded by its organizers as an ideal means to retain two main acquisitions of the *perestroika* epoch- power and property.” (*Moscow News* 20 January 1994, p.2).

³⁰ Zhirinovskiy’s victory shifted Russian politics to the right; it put on the agenda the issue of a revivalist Russia and ‘defence’ of ethnic Russians living outside Russia itself, and it coincided with an upsurge of racism in Moscow against ‘people of Caucasian nationality’. Chechens, Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis were routinely harassed by the police (Gall and de Wall, 1998).

³¹ In a briefing paper for the Russian cabinet of early August, based partly on military advice of the army commanders in the North Caucasian Military Region, the FSK warned that a military operation to suppress Chechnya would be slow and would involve heavy casualties both among the troops and the civilian population, especially of Grozny. Military intervention would irritate the non-Russian autonomous republics like Tatarstan, would tend to make Dudayev into an anti-Russian symbol, and would stir up the other Caucasian nations and increase the power of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples. The paper warned of the prospect of a long partisan and terrorist war (Lieven, 1989).

³² The momentum behind massive military action against Chechnya built in the fall of 1994 when the incentives increased for those with growing influence over the president, while those against war were pushed to the margins of the decision-making process. By the end of November, the “party war”, as it was dubbed by the liberal Russian press, was in control of the Kremlin and was determined to resolve the Chechen crisis by force (more on the “party of war” see, for example, McFaul, 1995; German, 2003).

³³ Yury Kalmykov, the Justice Minister arrived a little late at the Security Council meeting. He was immediately told that all the members of the Council were about to vote on the use of force in Chechnya. Yeltsin was at his most gruff and bearish. “From the President’s tone of voice I understood that he had already decided on force to resolve the question and that it was useless to discuss it.” Kalmykov recalled almost two years later (as cited in Gall and de Waal, 1998).

³⁴ Faced with a serious challenge, not from the communists but from a faction of the party power –led by such political heavy-weights as former prime minister Yeugeni Primakov and Moscow mayor Yuri Luzkhov, and supported by regional leaders including Tatarstan president Shaymiev and St. Petersburg governor Vladimir Yakovlev- the Kremlin clique (often referred to as Yeltsin’s family) sought a candidate who could guarantee its power and privilege and who could also win a national election.

³⁵ Shevtsova (2005) talks about rumors that right before the invasion Berezovsky allegedly met in France with Shamil Basayev, one of the Chechen separatist leaders who led the attack by the Chechen separatists on Dagestan, and Alexander Voloshin, the head of Yeltsin’s presidential staff. Basayev is one of the most famous of the Chechen warlords, long suspected of having ties to the Russian secret services. See “Attention, Camera!”, *Profil* November 27, 2000, pp.18-20. Similar suggestions of conspiracy are found in Politkovskaya (1999).

³⁶ In September 1999 after these events, 40 percent of Russian citizens polled ranked the need for “personal security” first among priorities of “social guarantees”. Twenty –eight percent did not consider it a priority. “Crime” and “instability” took first place on a list of irritants for Russian citizens, with 47 percent and 46 percent, respectively. VTsIOM poll, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 16 December 1999.

³⁷ Some of the survivors of the Ryazan’s exercise remained skeptical of the government’s position. Aleksei Kartofelnikov, the first to spot the FSB agents on the night of September 22, was well aware of the link to the Chechen War. “The government started bombing Chechnya next day,” he remembered. But he was reluctant to accept Chechen responsibility for the apartment bombings. “I know Chechens. I served with them in the army. They are good people. How can one suspect them of such a thing? How can one suspect it of anybody?” Another resident, Ivan Kirikin, “a scrappy 67-year old who talks through a cigarette”, was more cynical. “Whom should I believe- what the government says or what was in the basement?” he asked. “I don’t think the Chechens would blow up a residential house. You have to ask – who is responsible for the war? Who needed the war? The government, of course.” As Maura Reynolds, who interviewed many of the residents, concludes: In Ryazan “the government’s assertions have made little headway against residents’ suspicions. There are too many details that don’t fit. And there’s the undeniable fact that the bombings led to the war, and the war fed the rise of Vladimir V. Putin” (as cited in Evangelista, 2002 p.84).

³⁸ While denying the claim, the Kremlin made sure that Russian TV would not show the footage, screened by human rights groups to limited audiences. Still, allegations against Putin have been the talk of the country ever since the tragedy. VTSIOM (the Public Opinion Studies Center) released its polls on public reaction to them. The results show that 38% of those polled firmly deny that Russian secret services could be involved; 6% as firmly believe they were; 37% believe that, though not proven, such an involvement should not be ruled out; and 19% are undecided. The polls hardly bode well for Putin.” (Yuri Zarakhovich, *Time Magazine* Apr. 19, 2002).

³⁹ 46 percent of those polled supported the introduction of troops into the republic, 43 percent expressed doubts about the purpose of this step, and 11 percent had difficulty answering. VTSIOM polls, 28-31 January 2000. *Polir.ru*.

⁴⁰ *United Press International*, September 14, 1999, “Putin: Terrorism is Russia's problem”.

⁴¹ Maura Reynolds, “Moscow Has Chechnya Back- Now What?”, *Los Angeles Times*, June 19, 2000.

⁴² *What The Papers Say (Russia)*, “To the Kremlin through Chechnya?” 29 September, 1999.

⁴³ For a good analysis of other underlying factors see Evangelista, 2002.

⁴⁴ Traynor, I., “Russian general’s personal war”, *Guardian* 6 November 1999

⁴⁵ By contrast, the number of cases in which a territory has separated peacefully from its sovereign state is extremely small. For instance, in the great majority of cases, the US has backed the existing internationally recognized sovereign: the Kurdish revolt against Turkey being only on example.

⁴⁶ Representatives of three human rights organizations told a RFE/RL audience on July 28, 2005 that the Russian government's war in Chechnya was creating terrorism, not stopping terrorism in the region. They all agreed that Chechnya was the "worst human rights situation in the entire OSCE region," and that the sixth year of the war was proving to have "the same rate of violence [against the population] as past years." The conflict in Chechnya was described as "not a war on terrorism," but a "war against the population," which is "creating terrorism." The Russian government's policy of "Chechenization of the conflict" has not brought stability to Chechnya; rather "the civilian population is now stuck between the Russian [military] forces and also are targets of the Russian-backed Chechen government forces." "Fright is the main condition" of the people in Chechnya, one of the representatives said.

⁴⁷ On preserving the territorial integrity of Russia see, statement of Paul A. Goble, RFE/RL, Washington, DC, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations US Senate, 107th Congress, 1st session (18 July, 2001).

⁴⁸ Alexei Pushkov, editor of *Moscow News*, argued that when Russian servicemen were taken prisoners of war in late November 1994, “we may have reached the point where Yeltsin’s domestic image is more important to him than the risks of intervention.”(*Christian Science Monitor* 2 December 1994, p.6).

REFERENCES:

- Abelson, R. 1986. "Beliefs are like possessions". *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior*, 16:224-256.
- Allison, G.T. 1971. *Essence of Decision*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Angell, R.C. 1965. "The Sociology of Human Conflict. In E. B. McNeil, ed. *The Nature of Human Conflict*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Arendt, H. 1969/1972. "On Violence." In *Crises of the Republic*. San Diego: Harvest/Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Aron, L. 2000. *Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Bakan, D. 1965. Contribution to Symposium on "The Legitimation of Evil". American Psychological Association. Chicago.
- Bauer, R. A. 1961. "Problems of Perception and the Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 5: 223-9.
- Berkowitz, L. 1962. *Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis*. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
- Blainey, G. 1973. *The Causes of War*. New York: Free Press.
- Bloch, Jean de. 1903. *The Future of War*. Boston: Ginn.
- Boent, P. 1995. *Lord of the Manor: Boris Yeltsin in Sverdlovsk Oblast*. Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center.
- Boulding, K. E. 1956. *The Image*. Ann Arbor: University Michigan Press.
- _____. 1959. "National Images and International Systems." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3: 120-31.
- Brecher, M. & J. Wilkenfeld. 1989. *Crisis, Conflict and Instability*. Oxford: Pergamon.
- Bremer, S.A. & T.R. Cusack, eds. 1995. *The Process of War: Advancing the Scientific Study of War*. Luxemburg: Gordon and Breach Publishers.
- Breslauer, G. 2002. *Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brody, R. 1984. "International Crises: a rallying point for the president?" *Public Opinion* 6(6):41-3.60.
- Bromlei, I.V. 1984. *Theoretical Ethnography*. Moscow: General Editorial Board of Foreign Publications, "Nauka" Publishers.
- Bronfenbrenner, U. 1961. "The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social Psychologist's Report." *Journal of Social Issues* 17: 45-56.
- Brown, A. & L. Shevtsova, eds. 2001. *Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin: Political Leadership in Russia's Transition*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Brown, J. 1957. "Principles of Intrapersonal Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1(2): 135-53.
- Brown, M. 1996. *The international Dimensions of Internal Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Bruk, S.I. 1986. *Ethnodemographic Processes: The World Population at the Threshold of the 21st Century*. Translated by Valeri Epstein. Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. 1981. *The War Trap*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- _____. 1983. "An Expected Utility Explanation of Conflict Escalation : A Preliminary Analysis." In *Conflict Processes and The Breakdown of International Systems*. Vol.20(2). Ed. Zinnes, D.A. Denver, CO: University Of Denver.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. , J. Marrow, R. Siverson & A.Smith. 2001. "Political Survival and International Conflict." In *War in a Changing World*. Z. Maoz, A. Gat, eds. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- Conner, W. 1994. *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Cooper, E. & M. Jahoda. 1947. "The Evasion of Propaganda." *Journal of Psychology* 23: 15-25.
- Coser, L. 1956. *The Functions of Social Conflict*. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe.
- _____. 1968. *Continuities In The Study Of Social Conflict*. New York: The Free Press.
- Deutsch, K.W. 1967. "Changing Images of International Conflict". *Journal of Social Issues*. 23: 91-99.
- Deutsch, K.W. & R. Merritt. 1965. "Effects of Events on National and International Images." In *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis*. Ed. H. C. Kelman. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Deutsch, M. 1973. *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

- Deutsch, M. & S. Shichman. 1986. "Conflict: A Social Psychological Perspective". In *Political Psychology*. Ed. M. Hermann. San Francisco : Jossey-Bass Publishers.
- Dollard, J.,L. Doob, N.Miller, O.Mowrer & R.Sears. 1939. *Frustration and Aggression*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dougherty, J.E. & R.L. Pfaltzgraff, eds. 2001. *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*.5th ed. Boston: Longman.
- Dunlop, J. B. 1998. *Russia Confronts Chechnya*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Ehrlich, E. 1936. *Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law*. Walter L. Moll, trans. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Evangelista, M. 2002. *The Chechen Wars*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Falkowski L.S. 1979. *Psychological Models in International Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Farrar, L.L., jr. 1978. *War: A Historical, Political, and Social Study*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, Inc.
- Festinger, L. 1957. *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Fornari, F. 1974. *The Psychoanalysis of War*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Freud, S. 1961(orig.in 1931). "Why War?" In J. Strachey, ed. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. London: Hogarth.
- Geller, D.S. 2000. "Material Capabilities: Power and International Conflict". In *What Do We Know About War?* Ed. J.A. Vasquez. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Geller, D. S. & J. D. Singer. 1998. *Nations at war: a scientific study of international conflict*. New York : Cambridge University Press.
- George, A. 1980. *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- German, T. C. 2003. *Russia's Chechen War*. New York: Routledge Curzon.
- Geva N. & A. Mintz. 1997. *Decision-making on War and Peace: the cognitive-rational debate*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Gibler, D.M. 2000. "Alliances: Why Some Cause War and Why Others Cause Peace". In *What Do We Know About War?* Ed. J.A. Vasquez. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Glad, B.ed. 1990. *Psychological Dimensions of War*. Newbury Park, CA.: Sage Publications.
- Gladstone, A. 1959. "The conception of the enemy." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (3)2: 132-137.
- _____. 1962. "Relationship Orientation and Processes Leading toward War." *Background* 6: 13-25.
- Gladstone, A. & M. Taylor. 1958. "Threat-related attitudes and reactions to communications about international events." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2: 17-28.
- Gochman, C.S. 1995. "The Evolution of Disputes". In *The Process of War: Advancing the Scientific Study of War*. Eds. Bremer, S.A. & T.R. Cusack. Luxemburg: Gordon and Breach Publishers.
- Gochman, C.S. & A.N. Sabrosky.eds.1990. *Prisoners of War? National States in the Modern Era*. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.
- Guetzkow, H. 1968. "Some Correspondence Between Simulation and Realities in International Relations." In *New Approaches to International Relations*, ed. M.Kaplan. New York: St. Martin's.
- Gurr, T.R. 1993. *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Hagan, J. 1994. "Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness." *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38: 183-207.
- Hensel, P.R. 2000. "Territory: Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict". In *What Do We Know About War?* Ed. J.A. Vasquez. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Herrmann R. K. & M. P. Fischerkeller.1995. "Beyond the enemy image and spiral model: cognitive – strategic research after the cold war." *International Organization* 49(3):415-50.
- Himes, J.S. 1980. *Conflict and Conflict Management*. Athens: The University of Georgia Press.
- Hinde, R.A. and H.E. Watson. 1995. *War: A Cruel Necessity? The Bases of Institutionalized Violence*. London: Tauris Academic Studies.
- Holsti, O. 1962. "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.vol.6.
- Holsti, O., R. North, and R. Brody. 1972. "Perception and Action in the 1914 Case". In *Quantitative International Politics*, ed. J.D. Singer. New York: Free Press.
- Holsti, O. 1990. "Crisis Management." In Glad, B. ed. *Psychological Dimensions of War*. Newbury Park, CA.: Sage Publications.

-
- Horowitz, D.L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Huntington, S.P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order*. New York: Touchstone Book.
- Huth, P.K. 2000. "Territory: Why Are Territorial Disputes between States a Central Cause of International Conflict". In *What Do We Know About War?* Ed. J.A. Vasquez. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Ikle, F. C. 1971. *Every War Must End*. New York, : Columbia University Press.
- Janis, I.L. 1982. *Groupthink*. (2nd.ed.). Boston: Houghton and Mifflin.
- Janis, I.L. & L. Mann. 1977. *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment*. New York: Free Press.
- Janis, I.L. & M. B. Smith. 1965. "Effects of Education and Persuasion on National and International Images." In *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis*. Ed. H. C. Kelman. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Joll, J. 1984. *The Origins of the First World War*. London, UK: Longman.
- Jung, C.G. 1970. *Analytical psychology : its theory and practice*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Katz, D. 1961. "Current and Needed Psychological Research in International Relations", *Journal of Social Issues* 17: 69-78.
- Kelman, H.C. ed. 1965. *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Kennedy, P. 1980. *The Rise and the Anglo-German Antagonism*. Boston: Allen and Unwin.
- Klineberg, O. 1965. *The Humand Dimension in International Relations*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Kluckhohn, C. 1949. *Mirror for Man: The Relation of Anthropology to Modern Life*. New York: Whittlesey House.
- Knezys, S. & Romanas S. 1999. *The War in Chechnya*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.
- Knorr, K. 1976. *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Leng, R. J. 2000. "Escalation : Crisis Behavior and War". In *What Do We Know About War?* Ed. J.A. Vasquez. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Lenin, V. 1939. *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. New York: International Publishers.
- LeVine, R. A. 1965. "Socialization, Social Structure, and Intersocietal Images." In *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis*. Ed. H. C. Kelman. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Levy, J. 1983. "Misperception and the Causes of War." *World Politics* 36: 77-99.
- _____. 2000. "Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory." In Midlarsky, M. I.ed. *Handbook of War Studies II*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- Levy, J. & L.Vakili. 1992. "Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes: Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case". In *The Internationalization of Communal Strife*. Ed. M.I. Midlarsky. London: Routledge.
- Lieven, A. 1998. *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russia Power*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lorenz, K. 1966. *On Aggression*. New York : Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Luterbacher, U. 1984. "Last Words About War?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (3)28:166.
- Maoz, Z. 1995. "The Onset and Initiation of Disputes". In *The Process of War: Advancing the Scientific Study of War*. Eds. Bremer, S.A. & T.R. Cusack. Luxemburg: Gordon and Breach Publishers.
- _____. 2000. "Alliances: The Street Gangs of World Politics-Their Origins, Management, and Consequences, 1816-1986. In *What Do We Know About War?* Ed. J.A. Vasquez. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Maoz, Z. & A. Gat, eds. 2001. *War in a Changing World*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- Marshall, M.G. 1999. *Third World War: System, Process, and Conflict Dynamics*. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Mayer, A. J. 1981. *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War*. New York: Pantheon.
- McClelland, C. A. 1962. "General Systems and the Social Sciences." *A Review of General Semantics* 18: 449-68.
- McFaul, M. 1995. "Eurasia Letter: Russian Politics after Chechnya." *Foreign Policy*, 99: 149-165.
- McNeil, E.ed.1965. *The Nature of Human Conflict*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

-
- Midlarsky, M. I.ed. 2000. *Handbook of War Studies II*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- Miller, G. A., E. Galanter & K. H. Pribram. 1960. *Plans and the Structure of Behavior*. New York: Holt.
- Midlarsky, M. Ed. 1992. *The Internationalization of Communal Strife*. London: Routledge.
- Mintz, A. and N.Geva.eds. 1997. *Decision Making in War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rinner.
- Morgan, T. & K. Bickers. 1992. "Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(1): 25-52.
- Morgenthau, H. 1973. *Politics Among Nations*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Most, B. & H. Starr. 1983. "Conceptualizing 'War': Consequences for Theory and Research." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27: 137-59.
- Most, B. & H. Starr. 1989. *Inquiry, Logic and International Politics*. Columbia, SC: University Of South Carolina Press.
- Mueller, J. 1973. *War, Presidents and Public Opinion*. New York: Wiley.
- _____. 1989. *Retreat from doomsday: the obsolescence of major war*. New York: Basic Books.
- Nahaylo, B. & V. Swoboda. 1990. *Soviet disunion: a history of the nationalities problem in the USSR*. New York : Free Press.
- Nicholson, M. 1992. *Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Nikolaev, Y. 1996. *The Chechen Tragedy: Who is to Blame?* New York: Nova Science Publishers.
- Nisbett, R.E. & L.Ross. 1980. *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- O'Connell, R. 1995. *Ride of the second horseman: the birth and death of war* New York: Oxford University Press.
- Osgood, C. E. 1959. "Suggestions for Winning the Real War with Communism." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3: 311-25.
- Ostrom, C. & B. Job. 1986. "The President and the Political Use of Force." *American Political Science Review*, 80(2): 541-66.
- Politovskaya, A. 2001. *A Dirty War*. London: The Harvill Press.
- Polsby, N. 1864. *Congress and the Presidency*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Putin, V. 2000. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Putnam, R. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42(3): 427-460.
- Rapoport, A.1960. *Fights, Games, and Debates*. Ann Arbor: University Michigan Press.
- _____.1989. *The origins of violence*. New York: Paragon House.
- Ray, J. C. 1961. "The Indirect Relationship between Belief System and Action in Soviet-American Interaction." Unpublished M.A. Thesis: Stanford University.
- Ray, J.L. 2000. "Democracy: On the Level(s), Does Democracy Correlate with Peace?". In *What Do We Know About War?* Ed. J.A. Vasquez. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Raymond, G.A. 2000. "International Norms: Normative Orders and Peace". In *What Do We Know About War?* Ed. J.A. Vasquez. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Rokeach, M. 1960. *The Open and Closed Mind*. New York: Basic Books.
- Rosecrance R. 1963. *Action and Reaction in World Politics*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Rosenau, J. ed. 1967. *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*. New York: Free Press.
- Ross, C. 2004. *Russian politics under Putin*. New York: Manchester University Press.
- Rotberg R. & T. Rabb, 1988. *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rubin, J., D.Pruitt & S.H.Kim. 1994. 2nd ed. *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement*. New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company.
- Rummel, R. 1979. *Understanding Conflict and War*. Vol.4, *War, Power, Peace*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Russett, B. & J. Oneal. 2001. *Triangulating Peace*. W.Norton.
- Russet, B., H. Starr & D. Kinsella. 2000. *World Politics: The Menu For Choice*. Boston/New York: Bedford/St.Martin's.
- Sakwa, R. 2004. *Putin: Russia's Choice*. New York: Routledge.

- Sample, S.G. 2000. "Military Buildups: Arming and War". In *What Do We Know About War?* Ed. J.A. Vasquez. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Scott, W. A. 1965. "Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images." In *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis*. Ed. H. C. Kelman. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Semmel, A. K. & D. Minix 1979. "Small-Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Experimental Approach." In *Psychological Models in International Politics*. Ed. L.S. Falkowski. Boulder,CO: Westview.
- Shevtsova, L. 1999. *Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Shevtsova, L. 2005. *Putin's Russia*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Simmel, G. 1955. *Conflict*. New York: Free Press.
- Singer, J.D. 2000. "The Etiology of Interstate War". In *What Do We Know About War?* Ed. J.A. Vasquez. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Siverson, R.M. & R. A. Miller. 1995. "The Escalation of Disputes to War". In *The Process of War: Advancing the Scientific Study of War*. Eds. Bremer, S.A. & T.R. Cusack. Luxemburg: Gordon and Breach Publishers.
- Siverson, R.M. & H. Starr. 1991. *The Diffusion of War: A Study of Opportunity and Willingness*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Smith, M.B., J.S. Bruner & R.W. White. 1956. *Opinions and Personality*. New York: Wiley.
- Smoke, R. 1977. *War, Controlling Escalation*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Snyder, R.C., H.W. Bruck & B.Sapin. 1954. *Decision-making as an Approach to the Society of International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sorokin, P.A. 1937. *Social and Cultural Dynamics*. New York: American.
- Sprout, H. and M. 1962. *Foundations of International Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand.
- Starr, H. 1995. "Advancing the Scientific Study of War: Commentary". In *The Process of War: Advancing the Scientific Study of War*. Eds. Bremer, S.A. & T.R. Cusack. Luxemburg: Gordon and Breach Publishers.
- _____. 1997. "Democracy, Peace, and Integration in the Westphalian System." *Anarchy, Order, and Integration*. Michigan.
- Steinbruner, J.D. 1974. *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Stoessinger, J.G. 1974. *Why Nations Go To War*, 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Strachey, J.ed. 1961 (orig. in 1931). *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. London: Hogarth.
- Stuart, D. & H. Starr. 1981-82. "The "Inherent Bad Faith Model" Reconsidered: Dulles, Kennedy, and Kissinger". *Political Psychology* Fall/Winter, 1-33.
- Susser, B. 1992. "Psychology and Politics". In Susser, ed. *Approaches to the Study of Politics*. New York: Macmillan.
- Talbott S. 2002. *The Russia Hand*. New York: Random House.
- Trenin, D. V. & A. V. Malashenko. 2004. *Russia's Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Tsebelis, G. 1990. *Nested games: rational choice in comparative politics*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Vasquez, J.A.ed. 2000. *What Do We Know About War?* Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Waite, R.G.L. 1990. „Leadership Pathologies: The Kaiser and the Fuhrer and the Decisions for War in 1914 and 1939." In *Psychological Dimensions of War*. Ed. B. Glad. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Waltz, K.N. 1959. *Man, The State, And War*. New York and London: Columbia University Press.
- _____. 1967. "Electoral Punishment and Foreign Policy Crises". In *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*. J. Rosenau, ed. New York: Free Press.
- Weart, S. 1998. *Never at War*. Yale University Press.
- Whaley, B. 1973. *Codeword Barbarossa*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Wheeler, H. 1960. "The Role of Myth System in American-Soviet Relations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 4: 179-84.

-
- White, R. K. 1965. "Images in the Context of International Conflict: Soviet Perceptions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. ". In *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis*. Ed. H. C. Kelman. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- _____. 1968. *Nobody wanted war: Misperception in Vietnam and other Wars*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company.
- Wildavsky, A. 1988. *Searching for Safety*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
- Wohlstetter, R. 1962. *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Wright, Q. 1942. *A Study of War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- _____. 1957. "Design for a Research Project on International Conflict and the Factors Causing Their Aggravation or Amelioration." *Western Political Quarterly* 10: 263-75.
- _____. 1955. *The Study of International Relations*. New York: Appleton.
- Yeltsin, B. 1994. *The Struggle for Russia*. New York: Random House.
- Yeltsin, B. 2000. *Midnight Diaries*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Zawodny, J.K. ed. 1966. *Man and International Relations: Contributions of the Social Sciences to the Study of Conflict and Integration*. Vol.I. San Francisco, CA: Chandler Publishing Company.
- Zinnes, D.A. ed. 1983. *Conflict Processes and The Breakdown of International Systems*. Vol.20(2). Denver, CO: University Of Denver.
- Zur, O. 1987. "The Psychohistory of Warfare: The Co-Evolution of Culture, Psyche and Enemy". *Journal of Peace Research*. 24(2): 125-133.

Additional Sources:

Foreign Broadcast Information Service translation of Russian press reports including television and radio reports.

Russian and American Newspapers, in particular: *Christian Science Monitor, Guardian, Los Angeles Times, Moscow News, Nezavisimaya gazeta, Profil, Time Magazine*.