

Assessing Transnational Civil Society and its Response to Terrorism
The Case of the United States

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Prepared for the International Studies Association
South Conference
Miami, Florida
October 20, 2005

INTRODUCTION

The current era of large-scale “Islamist”¹ inspired terrorist attacks did not begin on September 11, 2001. The destruction of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie Scotland in 1988, the 1993 World Trade Center bombings in New York, the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa and the 2000 attack of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen are all examples of a global conflict that began decades earlier. But it is with these recent attacks that terrorism reaches new heights of physical devastation, international notoriety, and psychological impact. When two planes slammed into the World Trade Center and one into the outer ring of the Pentagon killing 2,996 people from 41 countries² the world watched, stunned. The decade of expansion, prosperity and jubilation the West enjoyed following its triumph in the Cold War was abruptly interrupted. The infallibility of the world’s sole superpower was in doubt.

On September 28, 2001 the United Nations passes resolution 1373, morally condemning the attacks and creating a Counter Terrorism Committee designed to coordinate the implementation of international anti-terrorism legislation. On October 7, the United States and its “coalition of the willing” initiate a “global war on terror” by destroying Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan. Parts of this coalition will invade Iraq in March 2003 to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein. Responses from what might be very loosely called the “terrorist international” under the leadership of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda stage retaliatory attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as Egypt,

¹ Boroumand, Ladan and Roya Boroumand. “Islam, Terror and Democracy.” Quoted in America and the World: Debating the New Shape of International Politics. A Council on Foreign Relations Book, New York; W.W. Norton & Company, 2002: 299-300. The authors use “Islamist” to denote the misappropriation of Islam. Calling it “Islamic” would be similar to “Christian” or “Jewish” terrorism.

² September 11, 2001 Victims Tribute Website, accessible at www.September11victims.com.

Indonesia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Uzbekistan.

Ongoing International Efforts to Combat Terrorism

While the UN Counter Terrorism Committee and the US-led “coalition of the willing” are new actors on the international scene, efforts to combat terrorism stretch back almost fifty years. These efforts amount to a body of laws and norms designed to criminalize acts attributable to “terrorists” and “terrorism” in general, and to coordinate international efforts to stop them. Since 1963 thirteen different international conventions have been drafted and enacted:

- 1963—the Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft [general aircraft safety]
- 1970—the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft [aircraft hijacking]
- 1971—the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation [aviation sabotage and airborne bombings]
- 1973—the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons [diplomats]
- 1979—the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
- 1979—the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages
- 1988—Supplemental Protocol to the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation at Airports
- 1988—the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
- 1988—Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf
- 1991—the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Identification
- 1997—the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing
- 1999—the International Convention for Suppression of Terrorist Financing
- 2004— the International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism (not yet in force)

The focus of these conventions is on the act committed and the person attacked because, historically, the adage “one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” has limited the ability of the international community to develop a common definition of “terrorism” and “terrorist”. Changing the focus of cooperation has allowed the international community to take action against such crimes while avoiding the intractable political questions associated with those that commit them.

Each of these international agreements establishes a legal regime that describes the activity, declares it unacceptable and labels it a crime, requires a response, and sets an expected degree of cooperation from each signatory. As seen above, the conventions cover places where “terrorism” occurs such as aircraft and maritime vessels, victims such as diplomats and other State representatives, as well as objects used to “terrorize” such as nuclear weapons, plastic explosives, bombs and the funds used to acquire these weapons and carry out the attacks. These conventions have by 1999 become a substantial body of international law and represent an increasing agreement by States and the international community to cooperate in the eradication of “terrorism” regardless of its specific definition.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 act as a catalyst to these actions by the international community. Under the powers of Title VII of the United Nations Charter, and recognizing its ability to address threats to international peace and security, the United Nations in 2001 accelerated and concentrated its efforts by passing Resolution 1373 and creating the UN Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC). Resolution 1373 reaffirms the UN’s “unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks which took place in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001” and

“expresses its determination to prevent all such acts”.³ Resolution 1373 imposes binding obligations on all States, with the aim of combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including⁴:

1. Denying all forms of financial support for terrorist groups;
2. Suppressing the provision of safe haven, sustenance or support for terrorists;
3. Sharing information with other governments on any groups practicing or preparing terrorist acts;
4. Cooperating with other governments in the investigation, detection, arrest and prosecution of those involved in such acts;
5. Criminalizing active and passive assistance for terrorism in domestic laws and bringing violators of these laws of justice;
6. Becoming party as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols related to terrorism

The resolution requires that each State “take specific action” to meet these requirements “based on the specific circumstances of each country” with the goals of raising their national capacity to counter terrorism, and constantly improve the dialogue and cooperation among all parties so that international efforts continually strengthen.⁵

Comprising all fifteen members of the UN Security Council, the purpose of the Counter Terrorism Committee is to monitor, coordinate and encourage the implementation of Resolution 1373.⁶ It assists States in defining priorities, creating legal and regulatory schemes to reduce the effectiveness of “terrorist” operations within their countries, and cooperating regionally and globally to further this effort. They are to:

- Put in place effective counterterrorism legislation,
- Fully implement such legislation, and
- Pursue a dialogue with each State to ensure movement toward these goals.

³ Accessed at www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/mandate.html.

⁴ Accessed at www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/ask.html.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Accessed at www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/priorities.html.

To meet these stated goals the United Nations CTC has a series of subcommittees on legislation, law, immigration, extradition and law enforcement that assist each State in compliance with Resolution 1373 and is attentive to the particular stage progress for each country.⁷

In 2002 these actions were incorporated into an explicit, three-prong strategy by the “Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism” in order to refine and strengthen these efforts. This strategy aims to⁸:

Dissuade disaffected groups from embracing terrorism,
Deny groups or individuals the means to carry out acts of terrorism, and
Sustain broad-based international **cooperation** in the struggle against terrorism.

Dissuasion of groups from embracing terrorism is accomplished through the continuous creation and communication of internationally applicable norms and precepts of human rights. The UN has a primary role in encouraging States to become party to every international convention and to securely link these conventions to international criminal law. **Denial** of the means for carrying out acts of “terrorism” is the responsibility of the CTC as the leading interstate organization designed to promote and encourage States to adopt and implement these international conventions domestically.

Cooperation is the area in which the body of UN organizations feels it has a “comparative advantage”⁹ because it can both “project a clear and principled message underscoring the unacceptability of terrorism” and pursue a “more systematic” effort to curb terrorism based on “an appropriate division of labor according to each actor’s

⁷ Accessed at www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/work.html.

⁸ United Nations “Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism”, 2002 (UN designation A/57/273, S/2002/875), accessed at www.un.org/terrorism/.

⁹ Ibid 1.

comparative advantage”.¹⁰ Because it cannot function within States, the United Nations cannot itself carry out the operational aspects of the fight against terrorism. It maintains that it can best utilize its talents as a forum for discussion of the viewpoints of the world, as a point of access for experts to develop a comprehensive global plan, and as a leader in international cooperation.¹¹

The United Nations reiterates and strengthens these ideas on 10 March 2005 in Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s keynote address to the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security.¹² Proclaiming that terrorism is an act that “can never be accepted or justified, in any cause whatsoever...” the UN “...must be at the forefront in fighting against terrorism”. To that end, the UN formally suggests a definition of terrorism for the first time and initiates a campaign to complete a comprehensive convention outlawing terrorism in all its forms.¹³ This definition of terrorism:

...Would make it clear that any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians and non-combatants, with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from any act.¹⁴

The Secretary General calls for more from the United Nations network of organizations and from transnational civil society to make these needed advances:

Not only political leaders, but civil society and religious leaders should clearly denounce terrorist tactics as criminal and inexcusable. Civil society has already conducted magnificent campaigns against landmines, against the recruitment of children as soldiers, and against allowing war crimes to go unpunished. I should like to see an equally strong global campaign against terrorism.¹⁵

¹⁰ Ibid 2.

¹¹ Accessed at www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/ctc_meeting.html.

¹² Secretary General’s keynote address to the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security – “A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism.” March 10, 2005, Madrid, Spain.

¹³ Ibid 2.

¹⁴ Ibid 1.

¹⁵ Ibid 2.

The UN also calls for a response to terrorism that respects human rights and the rule of law: “As I see it, terrorism is in itself a direct attack on human rights and the rule of law. If we sacrifice them in our response, we will be handing victory to the terrorists.”¹⁶ The United Nations is the forum in the vanguard of the fight against terrorism in which almost fifty years of counterterrorism efforts have been created.

The Importance of Transnational Civil Society

The State and non-State international organizations that fan out from this center encourage, pressure, and assist member countries of the UN in their efforts to comply with international conventions to which they are a party. The United Nations CTC highlights the Group of Eight, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), UN Security Council, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime Prevention, the UN Development Programme, the UN Electoral Assistance Division, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization’s Global Outbreak and Response Network, the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).¹⁷ But these are just a few of the organizations that make up transnational civil society, embrace the UN mandate, and provide support and aid in implementation of its counterterrorism efforts.

The broad categories of State and non-State organizations include domestic and international security alliances, think tanks, aid organizations, business and monetary coordination groups, international trade organizations, cross-boundary social protest groups, student exchanges, religious organizations, social and sports groups, and voluntary citizens groups, among others. Each has taken part in the international effort to

¹⁶ Ibid, 1.

¹⁷ Secretary General’s keynote address to the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security – “A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism.” March 10, 2005, Madrid, Spain.

stop terrorism. In effect, the UN has fostered the creation of an operational system to combat terrorism by channeling the views of the world's governments through an open forum, and done so despite the political difficulties of defining "terrorism" and "terrorist".

While the United Nations provides essential leadership as an international forum to debate global problems and devise plans to address them, its power is limited in important ways. First, the UN cannot compel States and individuals to obey international law because it lacks enforcement capability. The United Nations operates through international consensus, political pressure and sanctions, but not with a body of police that can enforce the law.

Second, while national governments sign international treaties that bind them to global mores, norms and laws, these agreements are not self-executing and have little effect until they are adopted as national law in each State.¹⁸ Each State has a different procedure by which international treaties become law. Some have internal laws that automatically turn the treaty into law (*automatic standing incorporation*), while others must pass separate legislation that enables the law to be binding either as it is worded in its international form (*automatic ad hoc incorporation*) or in a detailed fashion as a translation of those same laws (*statutory ad hoc incorporation*).¹⁹

Third are the problems of implementation and enforcement. Domestic laws must be enforced by national military and police efforts, and implemented by the citizenry itself. Until this happens, international treaties and their norms and mores will remain ineffective inside individual States. In sum, international agreements are essential and

¹⁸ Cassese, International Law, 172-174.

¹⁹ Cassese, International Law, 168-169.

necessary first steps, but their efforts are not sufficient to accomplish the worldwide goal of eradicating terrorism.

Transnational civil society provides that sufficient condition because its “organizations supply the values which guide the evolving world system...for global socio-cultural and political integration”.²⁰ In other words, civil society connects the international State, global market and international community to the individual and national society. It is a product of society itself that interacts dynamically within these global spheres and is a conduit for the international mores, norms and laws that penetrate society to be effective.

Significance to this Project

The United Nations is leading a global effort to eradicate terrorism by developing international norms, treaties and laws, and cooperating with transnational civil society to transfer them to individuals and domestic society. This project investigates to what extent this effort is succeeding. Is there evidence that an increasing number of people, groups, organizations, and activists with national governments see international terrorism as a global issue that needs to be addressed in a cooperative manner? Do their societies invoke States’ collective decisions in the United Nations and actively pursue their adoption and implementation?

The answers to these questions are important because like any global problem, an effective response depends upon the creation of a comprehensive plan, competent leadership, and international cooperation, support and implementation on all levels of society to succeed. If a vast majority of transnational civil society increasingly sees

²⁰ Breed, Kees, cited in Ronald J. Gilbert, “Globalization and the Emerging Power of Civil Society Organizations: Prospects for a three-sector system of Global Governance” (University of South Carolina, student dissertation, 2000): 157.

international terrorism as an unacceptable activity that requires a global effort to eradicate, successful efforts to curb its occurrence will likely emerge. If international terrorism is still seen as a something other than an international problem by civil society, global cooperative efforts to combat and prevent it will likely fail.

This study looks for the existence of a gap between the emerging international response imposed from above and the societal-level support necessary to import and implement its laws and ideals. Without both levels of cooperation, grass-roots active or passive support for “terrorism” will allow it to remain legitimate, survive and regenerate despite international governmental attempts to combat and stop it.

Research strategy

In order to investigate the extent and character of international cooperation to eradicate terrorism, this project analyzes the transnational civil societal response of the United States. This paper is part of a larger project that also assesses and compares the transnational civil societal response of Indonesia, Russia, Spain, and Turkey. Each country is chosen²¹ because of their similarities in terms of a democratic form of government, open press, and subjection to a devastating attack by international terrorists, as well as their differences in geographic location, history and culture.

I analyze the transnational civil societal reactions to five specific acts of international terrorism that have occurred in these states and hypothesize that they are a likely first place to look for evidence that an international consensus against terrorism is developing. These countries are some of the ones most affected by “terrorism,” and logic would suggest that each country’s national interest and desire for security will lead them

²¹ I recognize that these five countries have varying levels of democracy and open press, with the U.S. and Spain being the most democratic and having the most press freedom, whereas Russia has the least amount of democracy and press freedom.

to adopt international precepts against terrorism and try to convince other States to follow their lead.

The five incidents of terrorism under investigation in this study are as follows:

1. The World Trade Center and Pentagon bombings in the United States on September 11, 2001
2. The Bali nightclub bombing in Indonesia on October 12, 2002
3. The Istanbul synagogue bombing on November 15, 2003 and the British Consulate and HSBC Bank bombings on November 20, 2003 in Turkey.
4. The railway bombings in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004
5. The school attacks in Beslan, Russia on September 1, 2004

For each attack, newspaper sources accessed through Lexis/Nexis are used to examine the reaction to both domestic and international events. I collect and analyze the content of news coverage for the attack within the country of origin for a period of three months. This three-month period is enough time for society to respond to the disaster and for the international cooperative effort to be seen.

For example, for the three months following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States I examine its governmental and civil societal response. A similar examination is done for the American civil societal response to the attacks in Indonesia, Russia, Turkey and Spain. I hypothesize that the 9/11 attacks act as a catalyst for an increase in the American civil societal response to each of the attacks in Bali, Istanbul, Madrid and Beslan. This increasing response will be on the domestic level as well and the international level and both will act to promote the moral values of the United Nations Counter Terrorism Committee and improve international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

The source of the news outlets is Lexis/Nexis Academic, a legal research tool that compiles hundreds of domestic and foreign news sources and translates them into

English. Domestic news sources are complemented by international news sources so that the domestic civil societal response can be checked against the more complete set of facts as seen by less biased international news sources. These news sources are as follows:

Table 1: Domestic and International News Sources from Lexis/Nexis used in the Analysis

Country	Name of News Source
UNITED STATES	Associated Press State & Local Wire, the Associated Press Worldstream, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, the Boston Globe, Chicago Sun-Times, the Columbus Dispatch (Ohio), Cox News Service, the Houston Chronicle, the New York Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, St. Petersburg Times (Florida), the State Department Federal Information and News Dispatch, United Press International, US Fed News, Voice of America News, the Washington Post, Yearbook of Experts News Release Wire
International News Sources	AFX.com, AFX-ASIA, Agence France Presse, Associated Press Online, Associated Press Worldstream, Cox News Service, CTK National News Wire (Czech Republic), Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Economic Press Review, Federal News Service, The Frontrunner, Global Press United, International News, Japan Economic Newswire, Johnson’s Russia List, Knight Ridder Washington Bureau, Panafrican News Agency, Press Association, The Press Trust of India, United Press International, U.S. State Department, Voice of America News, The Washington Post, World News Connection, Xinhua General News Service

For every news article that covers a terrorist attack I search for the existence of the following information to evaluate the extent of the a) governmental, b) individual, and c) organizational response to the crisis:

- (1 = Yes, evidence exists, and 0 = No, it does not)
1. Do they express condolences to those at home or abroad?
 2. Do they condemn terrorism as immoral and unacceptable?
 3. Do they state a need to increase domestic security?
 4. Do they state a need to increase international security?
 5. Are statements of domestic solidarity made?
 6. Are statements of international solidarity made?

While reading each article I record the answers to the above questions on an excel spreadsheet as the moral response (comprising evidence from questions 1 and 2), the security response (questions 3 and 4) and the solidarity response (questions 5 and 6). A notation of 1 shows evidence to support a “yes” answer to each question while 0 indicates that evidence does not exist to support an affirmative answer to that question. There is a separate spreadsheet for the American response to each of the five attacks.

Each spreadsheet also contains the substance of the article that justifies the existence or absence of the response I seek. Excerpts of each article are recorded and analyzed so that I may later verify its categorization and also place the transnational civil societal response in a national context to discover the political realities behind each response.

The response of each State's civil society in each of the three categories is compared to the others through a scaling system I have developed which is as follows:

0 to 30 is a weak response; from 0 to 1 responses every 3 days in the 90-day period
31 to 60 is a moderate responses; from 1 to 2 responses every 3 days
61 to 90 is a strong response; from 2 responses every 3 days to 1 response per day
91 and above is a very strong response; more than 1 response per day

Each of the three categories, morality, security and solidarity, are catchall categories meant to comprise the substance of the values and laws the international community intends to send to domestic society through the conduit of civil society. A table compiles the number of civil societal responses and characterizes the range of this response over each of the five terrorist events. In sum, the study is meant to arrive at assessment as to what extent American transnational civil society has responded in support of the effort to combat and eradicate terrorism and led by the United Nations.

How is this Empirical Evidence Useful?

This type of empirical evidence is useful to scholars of international cooperation who advocate the use of a global prohibition regime. This form of international cooperation emerges in response to particularly disruptive, destructive and/or immoral crimes in which unilateral and bilateral action or regional agreements are inadequate. Global prohibition regimes are “the culmination of both external pressures and domestic

political struggles” concerning such vital State interests as security, morality, economics, and the many complex activities that simultaneously damage all three.²²

Slavery, piracy, drug and human trafficking, ivory and whale harvesting are but a few examples of these destructive and undesirable activities that can be reduced through large-scale international cooperation. The rules established under these regimes “strictly circumscribe the conditions under which states can participate in and authorize [certain] activities, and proscribe all involvement by non-state actors”.²³ The norms themselves encompass laws, moral principles, implicit rules and patterns designed to govern and curb these types of behavior. They are developed in response to these activities, once seen as at least passively legitimate but which are increasingly viewed as illegitimate, immoral and unacceptable to the world at large.²⁴

Global prohibition regimes succeed because they influence both the international and domestic levels. Internationally, these regimes provide an element of standardization to cooperation among governments that have few other law enforcement concerns in common.²⁵ In directing the ideas, norms and values of international society “they create an expectation of cooperation that governments challenge only at the cost of some international embarrassment”.²⁶ This growing set of rules concerns human rights, the law of armed conflict, international criminal law, the environment and is applied to all actors under international law: individuals, States, international organizations, insurgents and national liberation movements.²⁷

²² Ethan Nadelmann, “Global prohibition regimes: the evolution of norms in international society (1990): 481.

²³ Ibid 479.

²⁴ Ibid 480.

²⁵ Ibid 479.

²⁶ Ibid 481.

²⁷ Cassese, Antonio. International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Those who press for the continuing existence and enforcement of these cosmopolitan and “universal” norms, called moral entrepreneurs, act domestically and transnationally to ensure that “states and individuals properly treat individual human beings”.²⁸ Those who refuse or fail to submit to these arguments are labeled as deviants and condemned not just by states but also by many communities and individuals as well.²⁹

Therein lies their power, for whereas the ‘state’ both politicizes and dehumanizes the outsider, as evidenced by its capacity decriminalize violence against individuals during wartime, ‘cosmopolitan’ moral views transcend the state, thereby politicizing the individual and emphasizing the existence of an international society of human beings sharing common moral bonds.³⁰

The expansive reach of these ideas enables transnational civil society to change behavior on the domestic level through the actions of individuals, social groups and international organizations.

How have these ideas been tested in the literature?

The power of transnational civil society to influence governmental actions and policies is well documented by Ethan Nadelmann, Richard Price and Donald Puchala, who discuss the creation, application and usefulness of global prohibition regimes and transnational civil society to curb an undesirable global activity. In his groundbreaking work, “Global prohibition regimes: the evolution of norms in international society,” Ethan Nadelmann argues that efforts to create global prohibition regimes succeed only with comprehensive, coordinated inter-governmental action and active support from transnational civil society. Nadelmann traces the activities of human slavery, piracy and Privateering, human and drug trafficking, whale and ivory harvesting from their position

²⁸ Nadelmann, 483.

²⁹ Ibid 481.

³⁰ Ibid 483-84.

as legitimate or tolerated acts to their current status as unacceptable, immoral acts that are the target of global prohibition regimes.

In each case, individuals, organizations, and States are “moral entrepreneurs” and the catalysts that emerge to organize, discuss, and disseminate knowledge and opinion that fosters societal discussion, reassessment, and changes in fundamental beliefs. These societal forces “actively agitate” for domestic and international responses to the problem that spread throughout transnational civil society and eventually become the basis of global prohibition regimes coordinated by the international community. In the case of slavery and the slave trade, the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society generated international discussion and pressured the British government to outlaw the practice, which they did in 1807 at home and in 1833 in all their colonies, in effect becoming an “international police force” that championed the cause of eradicating slavery worldwide.³¹

Nadelmann finds varying degrees of success in each of the above mentioned cases, as the prohibition of any activity depends on the ability of moral entrepreneurs to pressure states and influential actors to create a regime to combat the undesirable activity and the enlist support from transnational civil society to prevent it. The abolition of slavery enjoys a much higher rate of success than prohibitions against whaling and ivory harvesting. Comparatively, these activities have both been curbed to a great extent than actions such as drug trafficking and human prostitution.

In “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,”³² Richard Price applies Nadelmann’s theory to the worldwide suppression of the use of

³¹ Ibid 492.

³² Price, Richard. “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines” *International Organization* 52 (Summer, 1998: 613-644).

anti-personnel land mines. Once widespread in warfare, “many states have decided not that mines are not at all useful, but that their military utility is outweighed by their humanitarian costs”.³³ Price shows that as evidence of the destruction caused by landmines accumulated, moral entrepreneurs, civil society and social networks emerged to disseminate this information into society, proselytize, and generate support for government action banning their use.³⁴ Price argues, as does Nadelmann, that “the role of moral persuasion and social pressure arising from identity politics and emulation are particularly crucial” in creating the norms, and moral and symbolic force that accompanies global prohibition regimes.³⁵

In “What History and Experience Teach³⁶,” Donald Puchala also emphasizes the importance of civil societal support for international cooperative efforts. In his analysis, Puchala draws a convincing historical analogy between the piracy and Privateering existent throughout history and the rise of international terrorism today. He concludes that the aggressive and purposive acts of global leaders such as the Romans, French, Germans, British and Americans to wage an offensive effort to:

1. Search for and close down pirate sanctuaries
2. Remove their leaders
3. Encourage individual states to pass and enforce domestic laws designed to stop the activity.
4. Change the opinions of the masses regarding the perception of pirate/terrorist activities and their motives, thereby depriving them of sympathizers and abettors,

³³ Ibid 614.

³⁴ Ibid 617.

³⁵ Ibid 616.

³⁶ Puchala, Donald. “What History and Experience Teach.” Unpublished manuscript, 2003.

And provide the right combination of a comprehensive plan and international governmental and civil societal support to both combat and prevent the undesirable activity, whether it was piracy and Privateering in the past or terrorism today.

Extension of these ideas to international terrorism

In none of these studies are the ideas applied to modern acts of terrorism and the work of the United Nations Counter Terrorism Committee described earlier in this chapter. This project is an effort to extend this theoretical work to a new substantive area that is important to both academics and practitioners. I hope this study can help bridge the gap between theoretical academic studies and the real-life work of practitioners. Once an assessment of this evidence is made, I will be able to draw some conclusions as to the extent of success transnational civil society is experiencing in persuading the world to follow the lead of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee and its laws, values and norms. Academics will see Nadelmann's theory expanded and tested on a new substantive area, while practitioners will be able to see the everyday events in a comparative analysis that may be of some use.

In sum, if the civil societal evidence shows that Americans, Indonesians, Russians, Spaniards and Turks feel a strong degree of moral outrage and concern for all innocent victims of terrorist attacks, if they see terrorism as a national and global problem, the actions they have so far undertaken might serve as a vanguard for the efforts of the United Nations to combat and prevent terrorist attacks in the future. If direct terrorist attacks in these five states do not provoke such a reaction, there is little likelihood that societies in other parts of the world not as closely affected will press for and support international cooperative efforts to curb and prevent international terrorism. The efforts

of the Counter Terrorism Committee may succeed in setting laws and values and enacting them from above, but without support and implementation from society Ethan Nadelmann and myself both argue that their efforts will meet with only limited success.

The Results of the American Case

My research using the Lexis/Nexis news service identified 7,364 possibly relevant articles, 864 of which are relevant to the questions I am interested in and are used for this analysis. The three figures on the following pages are content analyses of the news articles for the governmental, individual and organizational responses for the United States and act as a basis for analysis, explanation and comparison.

The American Governmental Response

The content analysis contained in Figure 1 on the following page shows three interesting macro-level patterns. The first is that the American government responds in a very active manner to each terrorist attack (see box on Figure 1 for description of quantity of response). Line 7 of Figure 1 shows an average of more than one published governmental response per day over the 90-day period of study for four of the five attacks. Only in response to the Synagogue attacks is the governmental response less than one response per day. It is 79 responses over 90 days, still an active response. In sum, the content analysis indicates a consistently very active response to terrorism by the American government.

A second striking macro-level finding evident at the bottom of Figure 1 (line 9) is that the governmental response is at its highest level in response to 9/11 but thereafter decreases steadily in proportion to the overall civil societal response. The governmental

Figure 1. The long-term American governmental response to terrorism: a content analysis

Response	9/11	Bali	Synagogue	Madrid	Beslan	Character of response* (key below)
1. International condolences	N/A	3	8	15	19	MORALITY
2. Unequivocal rejection of terrorism	55	14	14	26	29	<u>Moderately strong</u> after 9/11, dips to <u>weak</u> after Bali and Synagogue but slowly strengthens again
3. Increase domestic security	205	19	5	25	18	SECURITY
4. Cooperate for international security	90	53	29	58	61	<u>Extremely strong</u> after 9/11, dips to <u>weak</u> after Synagogue attacks. <i>International security</i> increases to <u>strong</u> after Beslan while <i>domestic security</i> remains <u>weak</u>
5. Domestic solidarity	86	3	1	4	16	SOLIDARITY
6. International solidarity	87	37	22	52	62	<u>Strong</u> after 9/11, dips to <u>weak</u> after Synagogue attacks. <i>International security</i> increases to <u>strong</u> after Beslan while <i>domestic security</i> remains <u>weak</u>
7. Number of governmental responses	523	129	79	180	205	Consistently active
8. Total number of responses for event	968	255	168	400	496	Consistently active
9. Proportion of overall civil societal response attributable to government	54%	50%	47%	45%	41%	Decreasing in proportion to individual and organizational response

Character of Response
Weak 0>1 responses every 3 days in 90 day study
Moderate 1>2 responses every 3 days
Strong 2>3 responses every 3 days
Very strong more than one response per day

response represents 54% of the entire response to the attack on 9/11 but then steadily decreases to 50% after Bali, 47% after the Synagogue attacks, 45% after Madrid and 41% after Beslan. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the very active and steady governmental response averages more than one published response per day throughout the period of study, so this proportional decline is significant because it indicates the governmental response is part of a more balanced reaction by American civil society.

A third interesting macro-level finding takes place after the 9/11 attacks. First, the immense response to 9/11 (column 2) is followed by a much more modest response to the Bali and Synagogue attacks (columns 3 and 4). I hypothesize earlier in the paper that domestic terrorist attacks are a catalyst for action and a consistently higher response to other attacks, yet the evidence does not bear out this argument. If my argument is to be proven the responses following the Bali and Synagogue attacks should be much stronger.

But while I have no explanation for the results of the short-term, post-9/11 governmental response, the arrival of the Madrid and Beslan attacks do illustrate that 9/11 is a catalyst to the American response. The number of morality, security, solidarity, and responses (lines 1-6) and the overall responses to the event (line 7) increase dramatically over the responses to the Bali and Synagogue attacks. This jump in response rate may have many causes. The U.S. government may finally realize after the fourth and fifth large-scale attacks that the seriousness of the terrorist threat requires a more substantial response. It may instead feel closer allegiance and ties to Spain and Russia than it does to Indonesia and Turkey, and this is the reason for an increase in response. The American public and organizations may have shown more interest in these “westernized” European countries than the Muslim countries with which they are less

familiar and connected, and this interest elicits a stronger response. A convincing explanation is not apparent.

Looking at the specifics of the response to Madrid and Beslan there are also several other interesting patterns. First, while each category sees an increase, it is the international security and international solidarity responses that dramatically increase after the Madrid and Beslan bombings. In both these categories (rows 4 and 6) the character of the response jumps from weak to moderate and continues to climb. This evidence indicates that the American government sees a great deal more significance in these two issues.

Second, this significant increase is contained only within in the *international* dimensions of the security and solidarity responses (lines 4 and 6), not in their *domestic* counterparts (lines 3 and 5). While these domestic responses do increase, they remain within the weak category both for the Madrid and Beslan attacks. In the content analysis it appears the American government is not responding as if it is worried about domestic security and solidarity as much as their international counterparts, a reasonable act if it believes it is adequately preparing itself at home.

Third, a disappointing portion of the response is the lack of morality response (Figure 1 line 1). While the post-9/11 response is moderate and bordering on strong (line 1) at no point in response to the other four attacks does it exceed the weak category. The Synagogue attacks are a low point in the American government's moral response, and as the attacks continue the morality response grows toward the moderate category, yet the quantity of the response remains small. This is discouraging if one places the success of

an international regime against terrorism on convincing the global population that an activity like terrorism is immoral.

Summary

In conclusion, the content analysis in Figure 1 shows the American governmental response to be consistently active and increasingly balanced with the overall civil societal response as the attacks continue to mount. The significant drop in response after the 9/11 attacks is largely reversed in the aftermath of the Madrid and Beslan attacks, yet the evidence shows a delay in this resurgent response that cannot be easily explained. The attacks of 9/11 do act as a catalyst for American governmental action, but while the responses to future attacks are substantial they do vary.

In the post-9/11 governmental response it is the international security and solidarity aspects that emerge as the cornerstones of the American response. While the domestic components to these responses and the morality response do also rebound they remain weak. This is troublesome in that the American governmental response leans more toward conventional security concerns than the moral components of the argument.

The American Individual Response

The content analysis in Figure 2 on the next page illustrates four interesting points about the individual response to terrorism. First, the individual response comprises an increasing proportion of the overall societal response as the terrorist attacks continue. Line 9 of Figure 2 shows that individuals make up only 18% of the overall response to the 9/11 attacks, but that this proportion increases to 27% after each of the Bali and Synagogue attacks, 42% after Madrid and 30% after Beslan. While the overall size of the individual response does vary by attack, it is on a general upward trend and is a strong

Figure 2. The long-term American individual response to terrorism: a content analysis

Response	9/11	Bali	Synagogue	Madrid	Beslan	Character of response
1. International condolences	N/A	3	3	12	26	MORALITY
2. Unequivocal rejection of terrorism	29	9	8	18	27	Moderate response after 9/11, dips after Bali and Synagogue but strengthens slowly
3. Increase domestic security	43	12	0	12	2	SECURITY
4. Cooperate for international security	21	15	13	60	18	Moderate response after 9/11, weak except for Madrid which is strong
5. Domestic solidarity	72	14	0	20	8	SOLIDARITY
6. International solidarity	19	15	21	47	69	Strong domestically after 9/11 Weak international response is constantly strengthening
7. Number of individual responses	184	68	45	169	150	Active but fluctuates between moderate and strong
8. Total number of responses for event	968	255	168	400	496	
9. Proportion of overall civil societal response attributable to individuals	19%	27%	27%	42%	30%	No specific pattern but a consistently significant level of response to each attack.

Character of Response

Weak 0>1 responses every 3 days in 90 day study

Moderate 1>2 responses every 3 days

Strong 2>3 responses every 3 days

Very strong more than one response per day

sign of continuing engagement. This increasingly strong response also acts to balance out the overall American response as the attacks continue.

Second, after the response to 9/11, individuals see international security and solidarity as far more important than domestic security and solidarity. In the post 9/11 response Americans are understandably concerned about domestic security and solidarity (lines 3 and 5). But Americans seem less worried about their own security and solidarity after each of the next four terrorist attacks (lines 3 and 5) and are supportive of international security cooperation and international solidarity (lines 4 and 6). As the attacks continue, line 6 shows a general upward trend for international solidarity and it increases from weak to strong as time passes. Line 4 shows a different pattern, with weak but slowly increasing support for international security cooperation after each attack. The lack of support for international security may be related to the lack of response for domestic security cooperation. If Americans are less concerned about their own safety after each attack they therefore are not likely to international security cooperation as a priority.

Third, the morality response is weak throughout the aftermath of each attack but is slowly increasing. Americans unequivocally reject terrorism in the response to each attack (line 2) but the number of responses remains weak despite a very gradual upward trend. In response to 9/11 only 29 of the 184 recorded responses were moral in nature. This number dips in response to the Bali and Synagogue attacks but increases slowly after the Madrid and Beslan attacks, reaching the level of the post 9/11 response. Individuals in America seem again to be taking a bit more notice of the moral component to terrorism and the content analysis illustrates this trend (line 2).

Fourth, individuals in America respond with particular strength to the attacks in Madrid Spain. While the overall number of societal responses to the Madrid attacks is less than those to Beslan (400 to 496), the individual response is significantly greater (169 to 150) and comprises 42% of the overall response compared with 30% of the response to Beslan. It is evident that Americans feel a closer affinity for the Spanish than for the other nationalities, and seems likely to be explained by the close ethnic and societal ties the United States has enjoyed with Spain for many years. It is a connection that Americans do not have in such large amounts with the people of Turkey, Russia and Indonesia. It may help to explain why individuals moderately support international security cooperation with Spain and not with the other three countries. Security cooperation with Spain may be seen as easier or more necessary given the closer social and cultural ties they do not share with Indonesia, Turkey or Russia.

Summary

The American individual response to terrorism reveals several interesting conclusions. First, a general increase in the level of individual responses as terrorists stage attacks in Indonesia, Turkey, Spain and Russia is a strong indication of prolonged engagement in the issue. It provides evidence that individual citizens in America are aware of continuing terrorist attacks around the world and are supportive of efforts of deal with the terrorist threat.

Second, individuals are not as concerned about issues of morality and security as matters of solidarity. It makes sense that Americans encourage international solidarity as the attacks continue around the world. One can also argue that Americans feel more secure after post 9/11 efforts to revamp national security, but there is no reasonable

explanation for the lack of morality response. The immorality of terrorism is apparent to many around the world, yet the individual morality response lags significantly behind the solidarity response. This is overall a negative finding.

Third, individuals feel a particular affinity for the victims of the train bombings in Madrid Spain. While support for Indonesians, Turks and Russians is substantial, it is support for the Spanish that is significantly higher. This is an interesting finding because it makes sense that in a group of substantial international responses the largest will be toward a group Americans feel a particular connection. It also indicates that the reverse may be true. American citizens may feel less affinity and solidarity with Turks and Indonesians because they have fewer ties with those societies.

In sum, the American individual response to terrorism is positive in that it shows an overall trend of growth throughout the response to each attack. Engagement continues in the response to each attack and international solidarity continues to increase. The troubling aspect is the lack of moral response that illustrates while solidarity is growing steadily stronger moral condemnation is growing at a much slower rate.

The American Organizational Response

Figure 3 on the next page illustrates four interesting points in the American organizational response to terrorism. First, the overall organizational response is moderate to very strong but follows no particular pattern. It is very strong after 9/11, with 261 of 968 responses for 27%, but drops off significantly in number to a moderate response to the next three attacks (line 7). It is not until the response to Beslan that the organizational response again becomes very strong. In effect, the attacks of 9/11 are a catalyst for an organizational response to that event but the pattern does not continue

Figure 3. The long-term American organizational response to terrorism: a content analysis

Response	9/11	Bali	Synagogue	Madrid	Beslan	Character of response
1. International condolences	N/A	0	5	3	17	MORALITY
2. Unequivocal rejection of terrorism	11	2	2	5	12	Initially <u>moderate</u> after 9/11 <u>weak</u> afterwards and very slowly strengthening
3. Increase domestic security	27	0	4	7	12	SECURITY
4. Cooperate for international security	13	11	9	4	16	Consistently <u>weak</u> domestic and international response
5. Domestic solidarity	169	22	14	18	38	SOLIDARITY
6. International solidarity	41	23	10	14	46	<u>Very strong</u> after 9/11, Dipping to <u>weak</u> after Synagogue but strengthening to <u>moderate</u> after Beslan
7. Number of Organizational responses	261	58	44	51	141	Response ranges from <u>moderate</u> to <u>very strongly</u> active
8. Total number of responses for event	968	255	168	400	496	
9. Proportion of overall civil societal response attributable to organizations	27%	23%	26%	13%	29%	No specific pattern but a consistently significant level of response to each attack.

Character of Response

Weak 0>1 responses every 3 days in 90 day study

Moderate 1>2 responses every 3 days

Strong 2>3 responses every 3 days

Very strong more than one response per day

unabated. While the organizational response is continually positive in that it is always at least moderate, it does not show a continuous and significant increase as the attacks continue.

Second and similarly, the proportion of the overall societal response contributed by organizations is substantial but follows no general pattern (line 9). While organizations make up a substantial 27% of the response to 9/11, this proportion drops to 23% after Bali, is 26% of the response to the Synagogue attacks, a mere 13% of the response to the attacks in Madrid and 29% of the response to the Beslan attacks (line 7). In sum, responses to four of the five attacks find that organizational responses make up between one-quarter and one-third of the total societal response, and this is positive development. It shows that organizations significantly contribute to the reaction of society after each attack.

Finally, there are two other points to be made about the specific security, solidarity, and morality responses by organizations in the United States. First, is that the security response is not strong. This may be expected given the priorities of organizations are social while the government usually takes the lead in matters of defense. What is surprising are the lackluster morality and solidarity responses. The morality response is weak and continues to be so throughout the organizational response to each attack. The solidarity response is also surprisingly weak after the attacks of 9/11 and it is not until it responds to the Beslan attacks that it increases to a moderate level. In sum, while the overall organizational response is substantial after each attack, the individual components of that response are rather weak.

Summary

The American organizational response is a continuous and substantial portion of the overall American societal response to terrorism. In both the quantity of responses and the proportion of the overall societal response, organizations in America contribute significantly to the fight against terrorism. Looking closer at the components of the response this assessment is not quite as positive. While the overall international solidarity response continues to grow steadily, the morality response lags behind. Weak throughout the study, it only marginally increases as the attacks continue. The variation in these two components of the organizational response provides mixed support for the strength of the overall organizational response.

Conclusion to the study

The governmental, individual and organizational responses to terrorism each tell a different side of the American societal response to terrorism. The most positive aspect of these results, taken together, is that as the attacks continue the overall American societal response becomes more balanced. Initially the American government provides by far the largest proportion of the response (see figure 4 on the next page). It is interesting that while the government maintains the largest, most consistent portion of the American societal response, as attacks continue its proportion of the overall response consistently decreases.

Figure 4. The Increasing Balance of the American Societal Response to Terrorism

Event	9/11	Bali	Synagogue	Madrid	Beslan
Proportion of overall civil societal response					
Governmental response	54%	50%	47%	45%	41%
Individual response	19	27	27	42	30
Organizational response	27	23	26	13	29
Combined individual and organizational response	46%	50%	53%	55%	59%

As you can see in the above table, the American governmental response is balanced more and more by the combined individual and organizational response as the attacks continue. Whereas the governmental response is 54% of the overall response to 9/11, it decreases steadily and consistently until after the Beslan attacks it makes up 41% of the total societal response. The individual and organizational responses increase from 46% to 59% and comprise a growing “social response” that provides needed depth and balance to the American governmental response.

Second, despite the discouraging results in the governmental, individual and organizational analyses, the sum of evidence shows a significant increase in moral outrage in response to the attacks. Figure 5 on the next page shows that while the morality response is comparatively smaller than the security and solidarity response for each attack, it too is growing and becoming a more substantial part of the response.

Figure 5. Comparing the Morality, Security and Solidarity components of the U.S. response

Event	9/11	Bali	Synagogue	Madrid	Beslan
Portion of overall civil societal response					
1. Number of morality responses (% of total)	95 (10%)	31 (12%)	40 (24%)	79 (20%)	130 (26%)
2. Number of security responses (% of total)	399 (41%)	110 (43%)	60 (36%)	166 (41%)	127 (26%)
3. Number of solidarity responses (% of total)	474 (49%)	114 (45%)	68 (40%)	155 (39%)	239 (48%)
4. Total number of responses (total)	968 (100%)	255 (100%)	168 (100%)	400 (100%)	496 (100%)

After the drop in response from 9/11 to the Bali attacks, the morality component actually increases steadily in number and overall proportion so that by the time of the Beslan response it is equal to the security response (lines 1 and 2 in the Beslan column). This is an encouraging development and indicates that as the attacks continue the actors that make up civil society, the government, individuals and organizations, are becoming increasingly outraged and find terrorist attacks morally unacceptable.

This information provides supportive evidence for Ethan Nadelmann’s theory and increases the chances for success in curbing terrorism in the United States. Nadelmann posits that greater success will be found when the societal response contains strong leadership and actions to combat the problem from above and support from society to prevent its regeneration at the grass roots level. The content analysis of this study shows both an attempt by the American government to lead and fight terrorism from above, and a continuously strengthening response from American society to implement these policies and prevent terrorism from taking root. It also shows an overall increase in the moral outrage felt by all segments of society.

These results reflect an increasingly balanced societal response that responds to the desires of international leadership under the United Nations Counter Terrorism Committee, the security response of the U.S. government, and the moral and solidarity response of the entirety of American society. The 9/11 attacks do prove to be a catalyst to increasing American societal involvement and support for the principles espoused by the United Nations Counter Terrorism Committee. As the organizational response continues to grow, as the morality response continues to grow, and as the overall civil societal response shifts in favor of “social awareness,” chances improve that governmental efforts to combat terrorism from above are met with grass-roots societal efforts to prevent terrorism from below

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