

**What Happens When International Integration Occurs:
The External Factor**

United States Cold War Foreign Policy
and Its Impact on the Creation of a European System

Darin H. Van Tassell
and
Danielle L. Smith

Ours is a world of nation-states. Nationalism remains one of the most tenacious ideological bonds tying human beings together into separate political communities. The challenges posed by recent events in Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda will never be appreciated fully without such an understanding. While there may be variations, at the heart of nationalism remains an ideology with which people create consent on the basis of strong common symbols and identification. Indeed, it is a fire that both warms our souls and is capable of burning down our houses. As Arnold Toynbee accurately notes, "the cult of sovereignty has become mankind's major religion. Its god demands human sacrifice."¹ Assuming Toynbee is correct, we are left with the proverbial Catch-22 situation, for national sovereignty makes it difficult for units other than the nation-state to exist. The understandable emotional attachment to the notion that there should be someone or something that possesses supreme power to act free from external control within the state's boundaries is difficult to overcome. Unfortunately, it is this same emotional attachment to state sovereignty that promotes conflict and often prevents the world from addressing many of its most pressing problems -- the issues of terrorism and genocide being among the more obvious. Such being the case, one must face a tumultuous question: Is the present global political structure capable of responding to the challenges currently being posed to it? What are those forces which serve to compel nations to give up degrees of their sovereignty in order to integrate? What are the prospects for moving beyond the nation-state? What are the processes that take place when international integration occurs? Why do some societies come together when so many others seem to be falling apart? Indeed, what happens when it happens? In Europe, arguably the most violent place on the planet for centuries but incredibly peaceful the past sixty years, the process of such integration -- despite stops and starts along the way -- is both well-documented and ongoing. What are the lessons to be learned from the European integration experience? After taking into account what others are saying as to why integration occurs, we offer another model for understanding why integration occurs, and the events which unfolded in post-WWII Europe will serve as our case study.

What Does International Integration Look Like? A Review of Relevant Literature

The question of international integration is certainly not new. In his essay entitled, "The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional," David Mitrany writes about integration by dealing with this issue of sovereignty.² He contends that our most pressing problems are issues which

¹ Full cite on Toynbee required.

² David Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional?" *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 4 (December 1965), pp. 119-149. (Reprinted in Mitrany, *A Working Peace*, pp. 174 – 213).

cannot be solved or handled by national institutions. In fact, he contends that while more and more problems are becoming global in nature, recognition of global interests simply does not exist--only national interests. Based on such assessments, he contends that peace cannot be maintained in a nation-state system, for the collision of sovereignty witnessed in Europe during the twentieth century cannot be avoided in the current international order.

In essence, Mitrany argues that the nation-state system is becoming "functionally" obsolete. Thus, in order to avoid the collision of national sovereignty in the future, he envisions the doing away with the nation-state by building up of an international community and developing a sense of "globalness." His plan for doing so is known as the functionalist approach to international integration. Mitrany argues that nations essentially conduct two types of activities--political and non-political. Thus, it is Mitrany's contention that there are plenty of non-political activities--such as technical and humanitarian--on which nations can cooperate rather easily. It is Mitrany's contention that cooperation in these areas will lead to an increase in cooperation in more political activities, thereby gradually decreasing the possibilities for conflict. In short, Mitrany's idea of functionalism assumes that economic and political unification can take place at the global level. He disagrees with those who would advocate a more federal approach, because the idea of regional federalism is counterproductive as it would perpetuate this notion of national sovereignty. Mitrany argues that "the task is not to consolidate but to loosen the hold of the territorially sovereign conception of political relations. Breaking through the barrier of sovereignty is the ultimate test. Thus, this can only be done through the shedding of national functions and authority and pooling them in a global manner." Again, it is this notion that every authority must be linked to a given territory that he finds dangerous in the federalist position.

Scholars such as Mitrany, however, would appear to find themselves firmly entrenched among the idealists who write about integration based on the work of sociologist Amitai Etzioni. Etzioni contends that sociology can contribute to the study of international relations because non-rational ties among nations have become more common. In his two articles, "The Dialects of Supranational Unification," and "The Epigenesis of Political Communities at the International Level," Etzioni writes about the study of change.³ He claims if one wishes to direct change, one need recognize that lasting change must happen in layers. Thus, he argues that the process of forming consensus in international systems is quite similar to the national one; that is, integration proceeds in steps. It must start at the bottom or lower levels, for in order to have any hope of

³ Amitai Etzioni, "The Epigenesis of Political Communities at the International Level," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68, pp. 927-935. Amitai Etzioni, "The Dialects of Supranational Unification," *American Journal of Political Science Review*, 56 (December, 1962), pp. 927-235.

overcoming the hurdles towards lasting unification, consensus has to take place initially at the most basic of levels. According to Etzioni, this is important for two reasons. First, size is important. The smaller a nation is the more homogeneous it is likely to be. Thus, the smaller an area to be integrated, the easier it will become. And second, because the nature of the integration which is to take place is also important, Etzioni advocates ordering those areas which have greater "spillover" tendencies. The order in which unification takes place is important, according to Etzioni, because if integration occurs in a certain sequence, it will be most effectively completed. Once a union at the more basic level solidifies, then the process can move to the next.

In short, Etzioni argues that if one wishes to find international integration occurring, one should look for consensus formation. Smaller cohesive unions must serve as the building blocs if something larger is sought. As Etzioni notes, "One cannot build a second floor structure of consensus formation unless the first one has a firm foundation."⁴ Only after the major requirements of small size and cohesion are satisfied can other possible combinations emerge. However, he warns against that the "pace of upgrading function must not overtake that of decreasing heterogeneity."

It should be noted that this whole process is not linear but dialectic, for the outcome is a union of opposite forces which have been integrated in an accommodating fashion. As Etzioni observes:

...political communities often unify not by increasing their membership, but in a dialectic fashion: two or more groups form; they appear to be moving in opposite direction until each is well integrated. Then they are synthesized (not merged) in a superior union. That is, they form one encompassing union without dissolving the bonds that held together the units that composed a group before the larger unification. The earlier autonomous groups become sub-groups in one union, adjusting to the new over-riding bond without being fused into one group that knows no internal divisions.⁵

In the final analysis, Etzioni is concerned chiefly with community formation and the sorts of influences which are "guiding" the unification process. "Who controls?" is what Etzioni finds most relevant. In sharp contrast to Mitrany's position, Etzioni argues that elite and coercive unification are much more frequent than egalitarian unification. In fact, he sees the distinction not so much in terms of coercive and non-coercive integration but high coercion and low coercion. Coercion in some form will likely occur. In any case, international integration occurs, according to Etzioni, when communities are built up by the "accumulation of new performances and control

⁴ Full cite from article required.

⁵ Full cite from article required.

over them." In other words, Etzioni believes in the functional approach but differs in certain regards from Mitrany, such as the order and who controls it.

Although they disagree in terms of process, both Mitrany and Etzioni advocate a functionalist approach to understanding how international integration occurs. However, in "The Challenge of Regionalism," Ernest B. Haas argues that the universal approach to integration advocated by functionalism will not work and that our energies are best spent observing the regional level, for it is here where one can best gain insights into the process of community formation. By advocating the formation of regional organizations which are supranational in nature, the implication is that nations must give up some part of their sovereignty. According to Haas, this process is capable of providing a wealth of information on the process of "denationalization." How do nations cease to be nations? How do people lose the self-consciousness which comes from having lived within the confines of a fixed set of frontiers? And how do they develop loyalties extending over a broader geographic area? Haas contends that answers to such questions are best observed by studying regionalism.

Haas's study of community formation at the regional level shows that the background conditions to integration can differ significantly in terms of the actors involved in the process and elite participation. Nonetheless, Haas suggests that at least three elements facilitate the regional integration process: (1) if the central aim is the preservation of peace among the participants, (2) successful integration tends to take place around a "core area," and (3) international contacts among elites of similar status and outlook in all the political units be made to flourish. This latter point is particularly interesting, for one is able to observe rather easily such "personal contacts" in the form of an increasing flow of mail, trade, and migration. Finally, Haas contends that integration can be considered achieved when the states in the region cease to prepare for war against one another, a seemingly obvious point whose importance should not be dismissed.

In his article, "Patterns in Regional Integration," Joseph S. Nye challenges the sense of "inevitability" inherent in the functionalist processes advocated by both Etzioni and Mitrany, for he notes that "spillback" is a possibility as well. Nye's work demonstrates that as in the case of East Africa during the early 1960s, economic unions can prove to contribute to abortive attempts at political union, for too little emphasis often is placed on conscious political action. In short, functionalism does not make unification automatic. According to Nye, the careful calculation of welfare benefits and economic interests when making decisions makes sense only when the political framework within which interests interact can be taken for granted. Most African states are still involved in determining and changing the structure within which interests work. In such conditions, the primacy of politics makes sense.

By using the attempts to form regional integration in East Africa as an example, Nye argues that there need exist at least one more variable for successful integration which is seldom discussed. In underdeveloped areas, Nye suggests that a "catalyst" or external factor may be almost a necessary condition for integration. In addition to those factors which Haas would contend bring states up to the fringe and establish the preconditions for political action, some "outside actors or events are necessary for providing the willpower to leap from the brink to the other side rather than allow spillback." Moreover, Nye notes that most frameworks are concerned only with the process being peaceful, but the catalyst variable might well involve varying degrees of violence and force. In short, Nye contends that in order to understand what happens when the international integration process takes place, more attention must be paid to the external environment. Elements such as military force, coercion, or economic aid must be factored into the equation.

While the approaches to integration of the articles reviewed in this essay so far have focused upon process, Stanley Hoffman submits that in order to go beyond the nation-state, one will have to do more than set up adequate background conditions. In "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," Hoffman in many ways brings our discussion full circle to where it began. He rightly notes that if any part of the world is able to supersede the nation-state, it is Europe. But Hoffman reminds us that in spite of all the reasons why it should not be, the nation-state remains the primary unit in international relations--even in Europe. In short, he contends that the most visible aspect of European integration is the survival of nations, even though they have been transformed.

To be sure, Hoffman is not optimistic about the prospects of integration in Europe and is doubtful that it will occur. Nonetheless, he provides at least three conditions for international integration: (1) domestic integration is a pre-requisite, for a community must exist within the units, (2) it depends upon the presence of leaders who represent those sections of the elites which support integration, and (3) the units' baggage must be light. If their past international experiences have been trying, then integration will not be easy. Even if all the necessary conditions existed, according to Hoffman, the end result might be nothing more than the combining of smaller nation-states into fewer, bigger ones. Consequently, due to the resistance of the nation-state, Hoffman suggests that we should study the transformation of national sovereignty instead of the formation of rival communities, as the "regionalists" would have us do.

"So where does all of this leave us?" one might ask. Based on the essays reviewed here, one must conclude that while the authors may disagree in terms of starting points, directions, or processes, they all appeared willing to acknowledge that in order to become internationally integrated, the issue of sovereignty is the major hurdle. This emotional attachment to the notion

that there should be someone or something who possesses supreme power to act free from external control within the state's boundaries is difficult to overcome. As noted in the introduction, it is this same emotional attachment to state sovereignty that promotes conflict and prevents the world from addressing many of its worst problems. The question then becomes what are those forces which serve to compel nations to give up degrees of their sovereignty in order to integrate? War is certainly one. This essay offers another: the foreign policy impact of a powerful external government. Specifically, we investigate the impact of U.S. foreign policy toward Western Europe during the Cold War and cast this already well-developed model in a new light.

The Events in Europe: Using a Different Microscope

With the end of World War II, the United States found itself swept up in a Cold War against its former ally. Just as easily, a bi-polar world developed which divided Europe between the capitalist ideology of the United States and the communist thinking of the Soviet Union. The United States government quickly realized the strategic position that Europe was to play in the Cold War. Indeed, we will argue that it was the implementation of policy designed to meet the goals of the defeat of communism by the U.S. that ultimately gave the governments of Western Europe the ability to create a unified economic and political system marketed as a single Europe.

After experiencing the nightmare of global warfare twice and entering into the Cold War, political leaders in the U.S. and Western European nations sought to carry out two goals. The first was to prevent the spread of communism and the second pertained to the ideas of creating a new balance of power system on the continent to eliminate the possibility of the outbreak of conflicts equivalent to those in 1914 and 1939. Early on, many high ranking officials realized that the best way to reach these goals was through the establishment of systems linking the defense and economic capabilities of the nations of Western Europe. By the beginning of 1937, Walter Lippman had already stated his belief that the only way to prevent crisis in Europe was to aim to create an economic union, and on the side of the United States, revive an equivalent of the lend/lease program.⁶ No later than the end of 1950 some officials pointed out that because Europe had climbed on the back of the U.S. and looked to the nation to carry her following the implementation of the Marshall Plan, the American government was in a position to take a leading part in bringing about European Unification.⁷ Over the coming decades, both parties worked to reach decisions and create treaties vital to the success and longevity of democracy and stability in

⁶ Max Beloff, The United States and the Unity of Europe (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1963), 14.

⁷ U.S. Congress, Proposed United States of Europe, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., 1950, 5382.

Western Europe. These watershed acts culminated in the formation of a single Europe in 1985, and were greatly influenced by United States foreign policy choices during the Cold War.

The first sign of cooperation among European nations was the ratification of the Brussels Treaty Organization in March of 1948. This pact was a collective effort on the parts of Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (the latter three shall be referred to as the Benelux). Modeled after the Rio Treaty between the U.S. and Latin American states, *Brussels* required that the nations involved protect and aid each other in the case of an act of aggression was carried out against one of the signatory states.⁸ In this case, the role of the aggressor was viewed as being played by Germany. All of the nations partial to the Brussels pact had been deeply affected by Hitler's actions during World War II, and as a result their fear of blatant aggression was explicitly aimed at Germany. They were concerned about the prospects of German rearmament and so, by extension, also feared the Soviet Union. The general consensus was that the Soviets would be the first to rearm their sector of the nation. France and Britain had determined that the best solution for preventing this rearmament was to continue their occupation of West Germany in order to prevent a Soviet takeover of the entire country. The two nations were certain that Soviet control would lead to rearmament of Germany and hostility towards all of Western Europe.

France and Britain also understood that a strong presence in West Germany to counter-balance the Soviet one in the East was impossible without the support of the American military. The U.S. had an enormous arsenal of weapons, especially nuclear, capable of generating the strength required to prevent the Soviet Army from crossing the boundary between Eastern and Western German zones. Leaders in Western Europe also believed that the best way to obtain military support from the U.S. was to enter into a collective security treaty. At the same time, U.S. leaders saw that such a treaty gave them access to facilities in the West and allowed for the stationing of service members in Europe; thus enabling the trip-wire effect and giving the U.S. considerable leverage against the Soviets. The general feeling in Congress appeared to be that the U.S. was incapable of winning a war against Russia, if attacked by her, without the European allies.⁹ In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was chartered and ratified, creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Through this organization, the U.S. was able to extend its policy of nuclear deterrence to its Western European allies and thus reduce the amount of Soviet intimidation against those nations.¹⁰ Weapons and military build-up quickly became a very important part of NATO. The U.S. even allocated \$1,130,000,000 of the \$1,450,000,000 authorized to President

⁸ Lord Ismay, *NATO: The First Five Years, 1949-1954* (Bosch-Utrecht), 8.

⁹ U.S. Congress, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 1949, 3619.

¹⁰ Morton A. Kaplan, *The Rationale for NATO: European Collective Security* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973), 84.

Harry Truman for spending to be distributed among the signatories of the treaty organization in the form of equipment shipped from the U.S. and as funds for financing materials necessary for facilitating increased military in Europe.¹¹

At the time the West was generating a great amount of military power, Russia and its allies were carrying out a similar agenda. The possibility of a conflict between the two superpowers on the continent brought the question of what to do with Germany to the forefront of American and European policy making decisions. Creating the proper role for Germany to play in the NATO alliance included both security and economic factors. In fact, some in Congress believed that the U.S. would make a serious mistake if it did not require the nations of Europe to pool their basic resources for their common defense and protection, and altering their economic courses to the extent of cooperation required.¹²

Within NATO, the majority of weapons build-up in Western Europe happened under American leadership. The use of European factories for production allowed the nations to focus on the strengthening of their economic sectors and various industries. None of this would have been possible without the new sense of security NATO helped to foster among the Western leadership. Knowledge of protection from outside forces, i.e. communism and the Soviets, along with growing economies afforded Western Europeans the ability to turn their attention to affairs of an internal nature.

The question of exactly what role Germany should play in the formation of this new Europe continually weighed on the minds of all nations within NATO. The French, especially, were concerned about the future of West Germany and hoped that by anchoring it within the boundaries of NATO, it could prevent the government from playing power games between the east and west.¹³ The U.S. solution was to make West Germany a NATO member, and therefore allow for it to rearm itself. France felt that this was unreasonable. In sharing a common border with the Germans, it considered itself the most vulnerable to German aggression. To ease this fear, French minister Robert Schuman presented his idea for linking the economies of France and Germany, thereby creating a sense of unity and replacing the rivalry and friction of the past.¹⁴ Central to the Schuman Plan was the necessity of pooling the production capabilities of the French Lorraine with the valuable industries of the German Ruhr. Both governments were forced to work in tandem

¹¹ U.S. Congress, Details of the Military Aid Program to European Recovery, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, 9111.

¹² U.S. Congressional Debates, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., 1950, 8098.

¹³ Colin Crouch and David Marquand, ed., The Politics of 1992 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1990), 12.

¹⁴ William Diebold Jr., The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation, 1950-1959 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), 11.

when producing economic policies. This practice clearly committed both nations to peacefully coexist as war against one would damage the economy of the other. German chancellor at the time, Konrad Adenauer, was willing to sign on to the Shuman Plan. Though his concern was less likely to be the reinstatement of balance of power, he was desperate to rebuild the German economy into something that supported its citizens and saw the Shuman Plan as one of the many means by which to do so.

American officials were pleased to see a spirit of cooperation and security being fostered among the nations of Western Europe, proclaiming that the Shuman Plan set up a framework for an enduring peace between the French and German people.¹⁵ As one representative so clearly stated in 1950, “we face two Cs in Europe, one communism, one competition, and we ought to make up our minds over which is feared most.”¹⁶ However, despite this success, the U.S. did not give up on its plan to rearm West Germany. The outbreak of the Korean War shocked U.S. officials and caused the government to realize its ability to prevent communism from breaching the containment line had been compromised. The only way to prevent a similar situation from occurring in Europe was to strengthen its weapons capabilities where containment was being implemented; in this case Western Germany. The U.S. plan called for the acceptance of West Germany as a full NATO ally and the implementation of a weapons and military system within the state. Rationally, NATO needed German terrain. Without it, the strategic plans of the organization’s command lacked sufficient depth for defensive maneuvers.¹⁷ Again, the French showed their dissatisfaction with a strengthened Germany military by introducing an alternate plan of action. Originally called the Pleven Plan, after the French minister, it called for the creation of a joint European Army and later became the framework for the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1950. The EDC’s purpose was essentially to limit the role and effect that U.S. would have in developing a German system of defense. The French suggested that the Germans only be allowed to rearm under the supervision of a continent-spanning European army. At that point, this was the most far-reaching architectural scheme for European security yet to be proposed.¹⁸ Giving such an amount of sovereignty was a truly original idea for the time and almost unthinkable. Even NATO’s mutual security system allowed for each nation to maintain its own standing army. The issue was hotly debated by all involved, with Britain and the U.S. rejecting the plan outright. The U.S. wanted a much broader amount of influence in the final decision to “the German Question” and wanted the military

¹⁵ U.S. Congress, The Shuman Plan: Extension of Remarks of Hon. Daniel J. Flood, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951, A 6595.

¹⁶ U.S. Congressional Debates, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., 1950, 8097.

¹⁷ Kaplan, 15.

¹⁸ Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 48.

potential of Germany, both in manpower and industrial capacity, to be fully and promptly utilized.¹⁹ Conversely, Britain had never felt enough like a member of the continent to share the control of its armed services. At the same time, U.S. involvement in Korea caused the French to fear that the country would focus its security efforts more in the Pacific and abandon its commitment to European nations.²⁰ A system independent of American military troop support was vital for maintaining security in the face of a withdrawal of U.S. forces. An extra incentive for the French in creating the EDC was the fact that the U.S. refused to deploy additional troops to Europe unless France changed its position on Germany. As a compromise, France permitted the development of a German force equivalent to 1/3 of a division. In May 1952, the six nations of France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux signed the EDC Treaty with U.S. approval. Great Britain's Anthony Eden, with U.S. assurance, also signed a five-year mutual security pact with all treaty members in place of making a full commitment to developing a European Army.

As quickly as the French accepted the new terms of the EDC, they changed their position once more. Three reasons for this rejection of the EDC remain clear. First, French forces were heavily involved in Indochina struggling to regain a colonial territory. This meant that the French element of the European Army equaled less than that of the German element, and this was unacceptable for the purposes of French security.²¹ A second factor was the end of the Korean War. With less U.S. concentration in the Pacific, it was much freer to commit resources to Europe. France no longer needed to appease U.S. desires in fear of loss of support on the continent. Lastly, Stalin's death in 1953 created a feeling in France that Cold War tensions were not as strong and a relaxed attitude about defense developed. So in May of 1954 the French Assembly voted down the ratification of the EDC Treaty rendering it useless. The ensuing result was that NATO continued to be the dominant force in European security and U.S. involvement on the continent grew abnormally large.²²

Though during this period an over-arching and internal European security system failed to develop, an economic system began to take shape. The Shuman plan successfully integrated the economics of Germany and France, and European nations saw the profitable and peaceful benefits of implementing such a system. So in 1951, Italy and the Benelux joined Germany and France in creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the Treaty of Paris in 1951. Free movement of goods beyond national borders was the first sign of supra-nationalism developing in the Western half of the continent. In an effort to involve the British government, the Strousburg

¹⁹ See U.S. Congressional discussions, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., 1950, 16759.

²⁰ Kaplan, 23.

²¹ John W. Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-92 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 41.

²² Full citation still required.

plan linking the economies of the ECSC and Britain was presented but ultimately Eden rejected this plan in favor of a strong relationship with the U.S.²³ The government's thinking seemed to be that the pooling of resources and production of France and Germany made further conflict between the two impossible on practical grounds.²⁴ By 1954, it became clear that a system to integrate the Treaties of Brussels and Paris was needed. One was defensive in nature and the other financial, and a combination of the two held the great promise of a very stable and economically mature supranational body. It was decided the best way to implement this plan was the expansion of the Treaty of Brussels through the addition of Germany and Italy. These Paris Agreements allowed all signing nations to function as the Western European Union (WEU). Security still played an important role in the WEU even as economic responsibilities increased. One of the most important aspects of the union was the new Agency for Control of Armaments. This internally functioning body was responsible for supervising and limiting the number of troops and kinds and amounts of weapons all of its members deployed on the continent.²⁵

The largest flaw in the WEU system was that it lacked the ability to directly deal with the issue of nuclear weapons within Europe. There were no legal stipulations dictating the rules for proliferation and etc., causing discontent among the nations involved because although they did not see each other as threatening, the Cold War was heating up around the world. Economically, many policies employed by the nations did not carry over to others, causing the system to be far from the ideal standard envisioned. To confront these issues, all members met to sign the Treaty of Rome in March 1957. This new treaty was responsible for creating the European Economic Community (EEC), or Common Market, which now shared common policies such as those pertaining to agriculture. Here is where Europe began to most closely resemble the modern economic system in place today. Rome also outlined the organization of the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom) which gained the role of supervising the development of nuclear weapons systems on the continent.

These developments were all very troubling to the U.S. government. It had originally overseen the rebuilding of Europe and the creation of NATO, an ultimate security organization. In fact, all of these European pacts had been able to develop in the shadow and security of NATO.²⁶ Now however, the nations of Europe were attempting to move out and untangle themselves from the grasp of the Atlantic System. Leading the way were the French, who made it quite clear they were looking for an entente and larger more equitable role in the decision making process as

²³ Ibid, 39.

²⁴ John Calman, ed. *The Common Market* (London: Anthony Blond, Ltd., 1967), 66.

²⁵ Ullman, 51.

²⁶ Ibid, 53

opposed to the one-way packed that had existed for so long. The preference was geared toward association with the U.S. rather than command under it. More and more it appeared that the Europeans were beginning to differentiate between global responsibilities of the U.S., and the regional ones of Europe.²⁷ It was a large setback to U.S. plans for security through Western spheres of influence when the Fouchet Plan calling for a collective European defense system autonomous from NATO was presented in 1961. Initiated by France, this plan was undoubtedly used to reprimand the U.S. for failing to create a tripartite head of NATO led by the U.S., France, and Britain in 1958.

The French and many other European nations were weary of U.S. involvement and dominance in their internal affairs. In fact, this can even be seen as the first time true discontent began to emerge among U.S. allies in Europe.²⁸ Part of the reason for the diminishing role of the U.S. came from American politics. President John F. Kennedy won the election the election of 1960 on the platform of a “missile gap” in the arms race with the Soviet Union. When it became clear that this idea was largely based on fictitious statements, the United States lost a large amount of credibility in its handling of deterrence against the Soviet threat. The Americans though had been trying to step up their influence in Europe, especially since the creation of Euratom. U.S. officials believed that allowing the production of nuclear weapons within Britain and France, coupled with this autonomous defense system could create proliferation problems. Secretary of Defense McNamara warned against any proliferation, strongly advising U.S. allies against building atomic weapons of their own, thus duplicating U.S. efforts. No doubt a duplication of U.S nuclear material meant the end of influence and control the American government had over the military and weapons decisions on the continent.

Britain found itself in a unique situation following the announcement of the Fouchet Plan. Many nations in the community felt isolated by the Anglo-American relationship and also felt as though Great Britain was highly favored, as evidenced by President Kennedy’s fear of sharing nuclear secrets with nations outside of Britain. Always willing to strengthen its relationship with the U.S., Britain had sided with America in denouncing a security system autonomous from NATO. At the same time, both governments made a joint statement regarding nuclear test bans and the support they gave to the idea. These actions effectively isolated the island even further from the continent and caused it to experience economic repercussions from France through the use of the EEC. When Britain applied for membership in 1963, the president of France, Charles DeGualle,

²⁷ Christopher Antstis and Alexander Moens, ed. Disconcerted Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1994), 15. (Includes two previous sentences as well)

²⁸ Ibid, 11.

did everything in his power to block the nation's entrance into the community. The was successful for quite some time, though by October 1966, U.S. president Lyndon Johnson began to criticize French methods and to suggest that the option he favored was to have a united Europe as a partner to NATO.²⁹ This push caused the British government to work more forcefully at attempts to join the EEC and the French to consider British enrollment now that equality in NATO leadership seemed possible. However, DeGualle still only wanted to consider the British on associate level status and not as full members. This antagonization continued until the end of DeGualle's term in office. Not until 1969 at The Hague Summit was Britain eligible to begin entry talks for full membership in the EEC.

Since the beginning of the 1960's, the six nations comprising the expanded Brussels Treaty talked of starting and Economic and Monetary Union. Due to the condition of Anglo-French relations for the first half of the decade however, this goal was severely marginalized as idealistic until the latter part of the decade. Full French cooperation was needed in order to make a single community a reality, and this did not occur until 1967. At that time, European leaders were finally able to meet and discuss the best possible way for meeting economic and security needs that were common and dissimilar throughout all six nations. The solution was the merging of the EEC, ECSC, and Euratom into one large European Community (EC). Combining each of these agencies provided European leaders the opportunity to further strengthen internal security by increasing supranationalism and economic interdependency. By 1969, the formation of an economic bloc was not so much seen as a vehicle for combating communism as it was for creating unity within a continent fragmented by so many cultures, goals, and different economies. This proved to be the case especially when, at the Hague Summit, member-states proposed and agreed upon expanding the number of EC participants. In 1973, Demark, Ireland, and Great Britain all accepted invitations to join, thus reducing the potency of the U.S. – British relationship.³⁰

From Washington, the view of a dominant NATO system over a European sphere of influence was beginning to look unrealistic. The U.S. policy of détente that had been implemented gave the Europeans a sense that the Soviet Union was not as fearful as it had once been. By extension, it also signaled that NATO was not an organization that needed to be heavily relied upon for security, causing countries to move away from this almost twenty-year-old treaty. If these countries were not relying on NATO, then they were also not relying on the United States. Congress took note of this in 1967 when it was remarked upon that out of all of the NATO nations,

²⁹ Young, 93.

³⁰ Antstis, 14.

the United States was the only one which had fully met its commitment to the treaty.³¹ It was becoming obvious that the cost of propping up the defense mechanisms of NATO was too expensive for the U.S. to continue without receiving fiscal support from other treaty members; especially since defense spending within the U.S. budget was exacerbated by the conflict in Vietnam. At the end of the decade Congress started claiming that it was the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. that provided Europe's protection and hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops needed to be brought back to U.S. soil, thus reducing the cost of being involved with European affairs.³²

It in the 1970's it was clear that there had been a decisive split in the relationship between America and her European allies. Outrage over the new Nixon administration's continuation of the Vietnam conflict brought many of the European nations closer together and caused the creation of similar views on matters of foreign policy. Some members of the U.S. government started to see the EC and its members not just as a group expected to buy U.S. goods, but as a viable trading partner forging a place in the new world order.³³ Leaders such as Willy Brandt of Germany showed the rest of Europe that they did not need to rely on the U.S. in dealing with Eastern Europe through the use of his successful Ostpolitik in 1972. American policy throughout the decade continued to crumble with respect to the Cold War. Blunders such as the 1973 oil crisis caused by the OPEC embargo enlightened Europeans as to how affected they truly were by U.S. actions worldwide regardless of whether or not they supported the policies being implemented by the nation. Further incidences such as the disintegration of the SALT II talks and Jimmy Carter's inability to restrain the Soviets in Afghanistan only provided further evidence that a strong common European policy was needed to replace American policies that once were so heavily relied upon.

Politicians from across Western Europe had come together in December 1974 for the Paris Summit the wake of the oil crisis in an effort to create a method for dealing with similar problems in the future. The largest issue on the table was the organizing of direct elections for the intra-governmental European parliament. Though Italy and the Benelux had long favored this method as a way to counter French and German domination of the system, Britain felt that these kinds of elections revealed a long-term threat to their efforts of maintaining national security and sovereignty.³⁴ The idea was effectively stamped out for the time being.

Though the elections had not been popular, the idea of developing a true economic bloc was. When Germany's Helmut Schmidt presented the single currency policy, he was met with astounding

³¹ U.S. Congress, Indefensible Policy, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, 26305.

³² U.S. Congress, We Must Cut Our Armed Forces in Europe and Bring 20,000 Men and Their Dependents Home, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, 33511.

³³ U.S. Congress, Remarks by Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe Before the European Free Trade Association, Washington D.C. May 5, 1970, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, 14097.

enthusiasm. Originally, the idea had been forced on him by Carter as a way to re-inflate the German economy.³⁵ However, many of the Europeans realized just how powerful the idea of a single European currency competing could be. After much deliberation, it was decided that doing go created healthy competition against the dollar and could reduce European economic reliance on the U.S. over a long-term period. In 1979 the European Monetary System began operating and was influential over the foreign policy thinkers in the United States. Secretary Cyrus Vance, with the Department of State, proclaimed to the Berlin Press Association that:

True security cannot be bought with arms alone. The security of the West depends ultimately upon the vitality and the appeal of free political systems; upon the health of our economies; and upon the ability of Western democracies to cooperate with one another.³⁶

These statements gave some insight into the fact that the U.S. government understood the direction in which the European Community was headed. The EC now had what was necessary to become economically strong, but to be politically so, the cooperation of Britain was vital. No other member-state within Europe held the same clout with the U.S. that the British did.

The opportunity arose with the election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1979. Thatcher was a staunch anticommunist and an ally of Reagan while he was proclaiming the seriousness of the evil empire. Using this as her tool of persuasion, Thatcher painted a picture of the EC as the only way for the people of Western Europe to consolidate and keep communism at bay.³⁷ This method worked stunningly well, and in March 1985 at the Brussels Council, EC leaders voted on the creation of a Single European Market to guide the economic interests of half a continent, marking the transition from interdependency to true supranationalism.

Conclusion

By framing the events in Europe in the manner we have here, the historical record both suggests and clarifies that the United States government had a strong desire to manage European security affairs during the Cold War period. In the end, the United States' goal of creating a stable Europe actually gave the continent the tools and safety net it needed in order to work internally on

³⁴ Young, 138.

³⁵ Ibid, 132.

³⁶ U.S. Department of State, Security of the Western Alliance, Current Policy Series, no. 120, 2.

³⁷ Young, 137.

matters of security, economic, and political cooperation. Such choices were heavily influenced by American decisions, down to the original participant member-states of the future EU. Also, due to American-Anglo relations, Britain was not allowed access to the role it traditionally played in European relations, and therefore the development of the EU was surely affected by the U.S. government's alliances and policies. Though towards the end of this time frame U.S. influence began to dissipate, there is much evidence to suggest that early U.S. foreign policy goals were an impetus for initial European cooperation, and helped to provide the firm foundation of small cohesive units that Etzioni argues are the most important first steps of international integration. A large incentive in building commonalities between nations in Europe to prepare for integration stems from the fact that Western European nations did in fact carry "heavy baggage" with them. To be sure, integration can occur with Hoffman's idea of "light baggage" as well, but the chances of involvement by an external force will be less probable; opposite of the case in Western Europe. European weariness of war and distrust of one another made it all the more necessary for an external force to participate in the integration process. Though hardly underdeveloped, the state of the European economy following WWII created a necessity for fiscal support from beyond the borders of the continent, giving way to the entrance of the "external catalyst". Monetary control is often accompanied by political intervention, allowing the United States to play an influential role in the redesigning of Europe. Indeed, it was a conscious effort on the part of U.S. government officials to become involved in the external and internal affairs of Europe.

But what about this model helps us to reach an advanced understanding in the direction and progress of integration attempts throughout other parts of the globe? Currently putting the European Union into perspective allows for the possibility that the regionalism created by such events is an integration anomaly. While there have been attempts at low-level integration in almost all geographic areas, the emphasis tends to lay in either economic or security concerns, unlike the visible functioning dualism of the EU. For prolonged and meaningful integration to occur, spillover is vital. By creating the NATO system, the U.S. removed a divisive step (common security/military policy) in the unification process, thus paving the way for simple economic and social unities which generated the necessary spillover; leading to a much more complex system of internal goals and policies. By enacting its foreign/security policy over Europe, the U.S. afforded European leaders the ability to more or less ignore external threats and focus solely on internal development goals. Thus dualism was supplied by the external catalyst.

Other regions have not been afforded this luxury. The challenges posed by internal and external forces are too overwhelming for existing governments to take the liberty of ignoring one policy in favor of pursuing another. It is more than arguable that the level of involvement played by

the United States in Europe is *sui generis* in the realm of foreign policy. This means, therefore, that other regions of the world have not had the advantage of being beneficiaries of great amounts of monetary and military assistance as have the Europeans. In effect, they have not benefited from a similar external catalyst. Many other nations in regions that possess budding integrated economic systems do carry similar “heavy baggage;” however, there is no efficient way in which to remove the tenets of security policy; as they are already heavily ingrained with the economic notions held by individual governments. Without an external force to remove security concerns, the catalyst for deepening economic cooperation and creating the necessary spillover for engaging in high-level regional integration is absent.

Economically, the re-development of Europe following the massive global conflict of WWII is similarly without an equivalent. Though the economy was undeniably destroyed, the European thought process and liberal capitalist ideals required to operate such a system were already firmly rooted in the social structures of the nations involved in the rebuilding process. Therefore, they only had to be rebuilt, rather than created. This is unlike many of the nations in the global marketplace today, which receive financial backing and assistance but have not fully developed the ideals to see fully through the creation, much less the operation, of a liberal capitalist marketplace. Integration attempts will undoubtedly fail in regions where a lack of harmony in market systems and pace of internal development exists. Here, the European continent also possesses an advantage in comparison to other regions. WWII had effectively caused the collapse of all economies involved, and therefore a massive rebuilding effort was conceived. The U.S. Marshall Plan was aimed at financially supporting the entire Western half of the continent, ensuring the revival of economies would be completed in tandem with one another. It is highly likely that this harmony of development led to greater ease of transition when approaching other subjects of the integration process. Even in the modern EU it is easy to see how this is the case. In including member nations with weaker economies and lesser financial development, the Union has consistently been forced to worry about maintaining its pace and success of integration, and many policies have had to be reworked or abandoned all together. Thus the idea of “leveling up” has become an important measure and process for determining readiness for entrance into the EU.

As the small building blocks continued to develop, regional autonomy increased as illustrated by the decline in direct policy control in Europe by the United States. Successful integration practices will eventually diminish or replace the external catalyst in favor of internally based motivations (or catalysts), i.e. spillover. The integration and creation of such regionalism were heavily dependent on many coinciding factors, including: the existence of an external catalyst, the persistence of “heavy baggage,” and the ability to reinstate existing ideals of a working

economy. In summary, it is highly unlikely that many other regions of the world will have the desire or push to be able to overcome the challenges posed by national interests in the way that those of Europe have.

